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. ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The argument that I present in this thesis is that while the idea of the Self is an illusion, a myth which 
our brains create, it is one that is necessary for our survival. However, by understanding its 
neurological origins we are able to take advantage of it without being victims of egocentricity. My first 
chapter, Neurology of the Self, lays down the neurological foundations for our concept of the Self and 
goes on to argue that, while biology and neurology must remain the basis of our understanding, we 
need to transcend our purely scientific concepts in order to integrate them with art and spirituality. Our 
transcendental view, I argue, seeks to establish values that make life worth living for and are essential to 
our survival. I consider some possible implications, both real and imagined, of neurological 
ilnpairment. The second chapter, Consciousness and the Self, considers the neurological and chemical basis 
for consciousness and develops the ways in which the imagined Self can be used to create a balanced 
life that is not highjacked by ego. In the third chapter, Human Nature and the Self, I continue to argue for 
a liberated view of the Self bearing in mind its neurological origin which itself is the creator of our 
received reality. Compassion, which Schopenhauer's philosophy argued for as the basis of morality, is 
shown to be facilitated by the concept of a centred Self which I apply to the subject of morality in the 
fourth chapter, Morality and the Self. 
.with the fifth chapter, Illusion and the Imagined Self. I come to the very heart of the argument to which 
tny considered research findings and previous chapters have lead, namely, that the illusion of the Self is 
neurologically created by our brains and that we do not have an unchanging Self which is other than 
the experiences and ideas from which our whole Being derives meaning. Nonetheless, this Self and 
other values we create are essential for our well being and should be cherished in themselves as being 
crucial for our healthy individual and collective survival. Furthermore, since w~ are now aware of the 
origin of our idea of the Self we can gain oW: freedom from a manipulating ego and become centred 
Selves able to creatively transcend and transform the limits of our neurologically given reality by being 
I 
"" 
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actively involved in the ongoing process of change. 'nlis is the subject of my sixth chapter, Spiritllali{y 
a1/d the Creati[)(] Se!f, and is endorsed in my concluding chapter which, neglecting a view which carefully 
avoids accepting absolutes that just might be falsified tomorrow, argues that the best values that we 
create today should be used as absolutes from which to derive principles for living and continuing to 
live which could, at least, lessen the threat to our survival. 
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General Introduction 
"That II/hich does the seeillg, Call1/ot be seell; that which does the heariltg, call1/ot be 
heard; al/d that llJhich does the !hitlking, Call1lot be thotlght; " 
-TI-IE VEDAS (Vardq, 1995:XV) 
I want to look at the neurology behind the personality of the Self, including instances where 
some impairment is present in the brain. Having cerebral palsy myself, the outward 
manifestations of which have often been mistaken as implying a lack of intellectual ability, I 
started to question what it was that the worth/value of human life turned on. Combining 
research in neurology with my own specific inner experience I shall pursue the study, not 
only from the point of view of someone looking i~ from the outside, but of someone 
e.: .. ::perie1lcittg the inside and looking out. Long before I knew anything of the writings of 
Descartes I was fascinated by the fact that the loss of a limb (1) did not seem to diminish a 
person - it did not destroy the "I". If the loss of a limb left the personality intact, then what 
about the central nervous system? If the brain is damaged, does this affect the mind, 
diminishing the "i", or is it just that it may make communication so difficult that it only 
appears to do so? If there is more to persons than the sum total of their parts, what is this 
"emergent property", what are persons? What is worth living for and how can we survive 
change and seeming contradictions in our value systems? Although we can no longer 
depend upon tradition to provide us with an absolute life's goal, or destination, I will be 
arguing that to jettison some of the traci.itional value~ may be to put our very survival at risk. 
There are many ways that we could choose to describe the Self starting with a physical 
description through to a metaphysical o~e in which we describe both how we see ourselves 
and how others sec us. I will refer to how we see ourselves, as our "imagined" Self and, 
" , 
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following MacIntyre (1985), how others see us, as our "strict" Self. Both these aspects of 
the Self will be investigated with a neurological bias because I wish to assess in what way 
neurological problems: 
1. may occasion actual malperception, as in a case, for instance, where autism both 
limits and exaggerates some perceptions. 
2. may so limit experience of life that one cannot integrate one's own individuality 
into the general life of society, and 
3. may give rise to misconceptions on the part of others who find it difficult to 
decode both verbal and non-verbal communication, as when, in the former case, 
there is a speech impediment and, in the latter, there are irregular bodily movements 
or spasms. 
Firstly, let me defel1d the assumption (above) that "we are more tl1an the sum total of our 
parts". Homo sapiens is a conscious, reasoning being. He has thoughts. Some of these are 
practical, are acted upon and have further physical and mental consequences. Some are 
abstract and add directly to the inner life of the person through memory. The key question 
is: "What is the nature of the being that has these thoughts?" Hume (1962:300-312), was the 
first in Western philosophy to put forward what has come to be called "The Bundle 
Theory" of personal identity, which sees our separate perceptions being received by a noit-
personal subject of ~xperiences, as opposed to, "The Ego Theory" which links all 
.. 'perceptions in a chain of events that is experienced by an organising subject of experiences 
or person, e.g. a soul (Blakemore/Parfit, 1989:22). In religious terms, the Buddha was the 
, . 
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first Bundle Theorist with his teaching of "anatta" and "non-Atman" or the No Self tiell', 
while Christianity teaches the underlying unity of the individual. 
For Bume it is memory that is the source of personal identity and the imagination that gives 
it unity, producing our experience of continuance through the chain of events linking one 
resembling image to another. By way of modern analogy, we may recall that in a film, the 
contiguous showing of 24 stills per second produces the movie (Pirsig, 1992,415). Just as the 
stills themselves are not the movie picture, so neither is the sum of our parts in themselves 
the whole of our personal identity, regardless of whether or not we accept The Bundle 
Theory or The Ego Theory. In neurological terms, our brains run the stills, that is, they 
receive and organize our perceptions and, in this way, they produce our notion of a Self. 
This idea, it could be argued, has been mishandled by the Church who seem to have 
overlooked the central teaching of Jesus Christ that his would-be followers should "deny 
themselves" which is very much in line with the teachings of other Eastern philosophies (2). 
The idea that the Self exists in a material way is limiting and makes no more sense than to 
say that either love'or thoughts can be defined as something a neurosurgeon might put his 
hands on when operating on someone's brain. My argument is not that because the Self 
does not exist as a material object it should be ignored. Quite the contrary, because it exists 
as a neurological and, therefore, subjective creation we can benefit from it whilst, at the 
same time, objectively standing outside its control. This is a way of recognising the more 
unpleasant aspects of our characters while determining to exercise control over them. 
One of the problems which faces The Ego Theory is the effect of change over time; the 
fact that, as Bume says (1962:307), "An infant becomes a man, and is sometimes fat, 
sometimes lean, without any change in his identity". Nagel says that (parfit,1984:468-477), 
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while as a reductionist he agrees with Parfit that the Self is a subject' of experiences he 
disagrees as to what that subject is. Personal identity lies in the brain; it is whatever enables a 
person to identify and reidentify himself and his mental states. Nagel believes that his 
personal identity rests upon whatever explains the physical continuity of his mental life. If 
the carrier of continuity is a Cartesian Ego then that is what he really is. In contrast to the 
views of Parfit (Parfit, 1984:469), Nagel is reported as saying, 
"If on the other hand certain states and activities of my brain underlie the mental 
capacity, then that brain in those states .. .is what I am, and my survival of the 
destruction of my brain is not concievable. However, I may not know that it is not 
conceivable, because I may not know the condition of my identity ... in trying to 
conceive of my survival after the destruction of my brain, I will not succeed In 
referring to ~ in su~h a situation if I am in fact my brain". 
Parfit's vtew is that what matters is not physical continuity, as In Nagel's brain, but 
psychological continuity and connectedness as he claims to demonstrate using The Bundle 
Theory. Employingi-lumean imagery, by way of illustration, he claims that there is no such 
separate entity as a nation, something other than its citizens and the land they inhabit. The 
make-up of any such nation may change by way of its inhabitants and its laws and 
constitution, although its continued existence remains in the fact of its citizens acting 
together in various ways on its territory. Likewise, in Hume's words, " ... the same' person 
may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing 
his identity" (Hume,1962:311). When we stop insisting that a person must be a separately 
existing entity we are free from having to conclude that the Self is a brain or a whole body, 
., in the same way that we are not necessarily going to refer to a nation as its government, its 
citiZens, nor its territory, nor indeed as just simply all three. 
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Neurologically, there needs to be a marriage between Nagel's more biological approach and 
Parfit's psychological interpretation. After 'all, if it was not for the speed at which dendritic 
connections change within the brain we would not enjoy the range of psychological 
diversity that we do. Every neuron, of which there are some 100 biIlion in the cerebral 
cortex, is its own processing unit (Penrose, 1994) and must be quite capable of acting even 
without the benefit of a nervous system, e.g. a one-celled animal is capable of swimming 
toward food, retreating from danger, negotiating obstacles, and learning by experience. Such 
nerve cells in vertebrates receive messages from the senses via afferent nerve fibre and send 
messages to muscles through axons or efferent nerve fibre. Since, from the age of around 
25 years, we lose thousands of nerve cells or neurons every day in the process of entropy it 
could be argued that we are constantly in the process of change and therefore there is no 
continuity to the Self. Bume considered the problems of the change brought about by 
ageing (as noted above) although without the benefits of a knowledge of neurology. The 
problem is clearly divided into two parts by Bume. There is, the possible difference between 
gradual change, as in growing old, and that caused by sudden destruction and replacement. 
The case for gradual change is made by the example of a ship which, over the years, is 
repaired and has various sections replaced. At no stage would we question its identity as the 
same ship. Again, the case for sudden change is made by imagining an old dilapidated 
church. An architect is asked to redesign it in a modern style and, having pulled down the 
original brick building which at the time is little more than a ruin, the builders rebuild it 
using firestone. Although neither the form nor materials are the same, and the only thing 
common between the two being its name and the parish inhabitants it is meant to serve, yet 
this is sufficient for it to be acknowledged' as being the same even though, in this case, the 
complete destruction of the original church building had to precede its replacement. 
, 
•• 
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Defending The Bundle Theory, Parfit (Blakemore/Parfit, 1984:23) uses the analogy of a 
club which has existed for some time, holding regular meetings. It then disbands but, years 
later, a number of past members get together and hold gatherings in the same way that had 
been done before. They form a club with the same name which has the same rules. Parfit 
maintains that the question as to whether or not these people revived the old club or started 
a new one which is exactly similar, is entirely meaningless. To those who insist that there 
must be an answer he states that this merely shows that they do not understand the nature 
of dubs and that we can know what happened without answering the question. There are, 
of course, other Sorites-type questions that seem to be fatuous, e.g. How many grains of 
sand make a pile and how many would you have to remove for it to cease to be one? In a 
similar way, Parfit harnesses the science fiction idea of teietraJlsportation and the production of 
Replicas. He argues that, whilst agreeing that it is counter-intuitive, The I3undle Theory 
should make it unnecessary to be concerned about our destruction if we know that an 
identical Replica, albeit constructed from different material, with all our past memories will 
be created in our stead; if, for example, at the touch of a button, having taken an exact 
COpy, a replicator both destroys you and then reproduces an exact organic Replica, say, on 
Mars (presuming, supposedly, that Mars has been colonized and is a desirable destination) at 
the speed of light. 
Alternatively, whilst we have people today, some of whose internal organs originally 
belonged to someone else, suppose we started to replace someone's brain cells gradually 
over a period of some' 30 years. Would there ever come a point at which they would cease 
" to be their original self and become someone else? Would they still be the same person with 
only 10% of their original cells as they were when they still had 90%? Do these questions 
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make sense or is Parfit right to say that they are empty questions? Could Nagel agree with 
Parfit, identifying, as he does, the Self with the brain and its mental states? Is Parfit's 
psychological continuity the same as Nagel's physical continuity of the mentll life? Is the 
energy which creates matter and, presumably, is involved with the conscious life of the Self, 
interested in specific matter and, if not, does it really matter whether we retain our physical 
bodies, let alone, our psychological continuity? If it does matter, then, to whom does it 
matter? 
Clearly, there is no simple linguistic definition of the Self. How can it be explained as "the 
sum total of its parts" when those parts are continually changing? But, how could it be 1JIore 
or less? Since many marriages continue long after a period of seven years during which all 
our cells have been renewed and we are, therefore, constructed of different material, what is 
it that survives? Must we recognize that the Self is so animated by conscious life and 
changing relationships that in trying to pin it down, as if attempting to freeze it in time, we 
will always find it somewhere else? Is it not true that even if we were able to describe all the 
neurology from which consciousness and a sense of Self seem to spring we still would have 
understood only the conditions of the experiences rather than explained them, as is the 
situation in the case of the imagined scientist of the Australian philosopher, Frank Jackson, 
who lived in a black and white environment and yet understood everything that gave others 
an experience of colour which she did not have herself. (Church land, 1986:330-333)? I will 
argue that the Self is a construct of the conscious brain which, in becoming too attached to 
things as we creatively imagine them to be at anyone time, limits Being to a slate of 
possessing. Being is no~ pinning life down so much as being aware of the flow; rather than a 
state of being it is a process of beco1Jlittg aware.' 
\ . 
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The Ego Theory is more acceptable to us because it seems to present the possibility of 
something permanent and enduring, something which promises security and constancy in a 
reality where the absence of these things is continually threatening. What we fail to realise is 
that the acceptance of this theory, in part, creates the very Ego whose existence it postulates 
and that this Ego is the very Self from whose desires, satiations, fears, boredoms and 
anxieties we most wish to rid ourselves. It is only in becoming able to stand detached from a 
notion of Conscious Self, in thraldom to the ego, that life flows in an unrestricted form of 
consciousness where awareness of the unconscious flows unhampered into consciousness. 
From this position, in giving up our imagined Self, we become aware of no-Self in which all 
that is lost are the chains (3). Here, the values of Self, love, integrity etc are refined and 
endorsed as human metaphysical values worthy of cherishing and essential for survival. 
These could be referred to as spiritual qualities which no longer require the myths of 
religion to authenticate them but, rather, as self-authenticated guides to the way we relate 
satisfactorily to our relative environments. 
Of course we are SelVes as any observer will confirm. We do not merge into each other but 
the Selves we are within depends on our focus of awareness. Instead of being self-centred 
and at the mercy of instinct we need to be self-aware and free, what I have chosen to refer 
to as becoming a celltred Self. 
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Chapter One 
Neurology and the Self 
In this chapter I want to look at the material structure of the brain whose neurological 
functions gives us the COl/sciOflS notion/illusion of (our)Selves as transcending those 
material foundations. Firstly, I shall look at the biological structure of the material brain 
with its association to consciousness, our concept of mind and our notion of a Self. My 
second concern will be the value of our transcendent concept of a Self which underpins 
our personality as an integrated whole. 
Section One 
The Material Brain 
Many cognitive scientists believe tllat the mind is inside the brain, with content of 
consciousness located in the cerebral cortex. Cartesian dualism holds that the mind 
somehow interacts witll the brain. Materialism thinks that it is nothing but an 
epiphenomenon or aspect of material changes going on in the brain, the result of activity 
taking place betw;en some 100 billion neurons. Whilst many scientists today, like the 
biologist Francis Crick in his book All Astol/ishillg Hypothesis (Crick 1994), believe the 
latter to be the most likely probability the ne_urophysiologist, Eccles, courageously holds 
fast, in tlle face of opposing views, to dualism or interaction ism as does Popper, with 
--
whom he wrote the book The Self alld It's Bnufc(popper 1983). It was Huxley (1825-95), 
who in his 1874 paper "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata" introduced the 
word "epiphenomenon" to explain his theory that consciousness is like the steam-whistle 
on a locomotive, indicating a physical change rather than being the cause of it and having 
no effect on the engine but being an a~cillary and powerless gadget (James 1890:131). 
Huxley, who following the publication of Darwin's Oflthe Origin of Speciesjn 1859 became 
'" 
,", 
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known as "Darwin's bulldog" because of his publishing of Darwinian ViewS, was 
challenged by Lloyd Morgan to explain why, if consCiousness was useless, it ever evolved. 
This is a question that evolutionists still have to answer (Blakemore/Weiskrantz 
1987:311) since our current knowledge that the contellt of consciousness lies within the 
cerebral cortex, or at least the brain hemispheres, whilst consciousness itself is a mid or 
hind brain phenomenon, does not do so. 
First we need to distinguish the 1llitld from the self. Descartes thought that the mind was 
whatever it is that is the subject of consciousness. He thereby excluded those things that 
affect or influence one unconsciously. Is an unconscious desire to wash one's hands 
repeatedly (when one is perhaps conscious only of the feeling that one's hands are dirty 
and need washing, again) a part of the mind or n~t? Given the Cartesian absolute 
separation of mind from everything else, it is hard to see how something, which is not 
part of the mind, can affect something that is. However, at this stage it seems 
unimportant whether we accept unconscious desires as part of the mind and revise the 
Cartesian definition to include them, or whether we stipulate that they are not part of the 
mind and reject th~ Cartesian separation between mind and body. 
What is clear in either case is that the mind is,primarily the subject of consciousness. It is 
related to those mechanisms by wl~ich the objects of consciousness become conscious 
and, also, to those mechanisms which affect what things become conscious and how. 
The connection with the Self lies in the identification of the subject of consciousness (the 
mind) with the "I", and the relationship of the "I" to the Self. (This, according to some, 
is one of the places where Descartes went wrong.) But this is much too easy. The "I" of 
consciousness is a logical - or even a grammatical - requirement of consciousness itself. If 
. , 
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there is to be consciousness there must, logically, be something that is conscious. As 
Schopenhauer pointed out, the World as Representation brings into existence both 
Subject and Object simultaneously. But my existence is more than a simple back 
projection of the world. For a start, back-projection does not require me, anyone would 
do. So cogito does indeed imply sum. But equally, cogitas implies es and colitat, est. In starting 
with "cogito", Descartes builds his own existence into his premise, and "colito ergo sum" 
becomes an assertion rather than an argument. Secondly, the existence of a Self requires 
more than that there be a simple subject of experience as, as it were, a screen onto which 
experience can be projected. For my experiences to be my experiences I must exist in 
time; I must outlast each successive experience in order to be a continuing subject of 
experience. Thirdly, one might say that the "I" of experience is just too thin to function 
as a Self as well. At the very least, we must allow that experience affects the experiencer, 
so that to see something, for example, for the second time is not to see it in the same way 
as it was seen at first. (The process of dehabituation is taken up in Chapter Two -
Consciousness and the Se!f5. 
What this thesis wiil explore is the relationship between the "I" of experience and the "I" 
of the Self. And, in particular, it wiillook at the way in which two things condition - and 
perhaps explain - the transition from one to the other. These things are, firsdy, the 
material condition of experience. By this I mean the way the neurological and 
physiological substrate of experience, cognition and memory affect experience. The 
second is the way in which our actual experience of the world feeds back into the way in 
which we experience it and the extent to which we have control over this process. I want 
to argue that these ~o things contribute to the creation of the Self, but that what finally 
determines the nature of the Self that is created is our recognition of and participation in 
the process. 
j • 
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The accretion of experiences constructs a Self for us which I have called the "imagined" 
or "constructed" Self. This can, if we let it, both fossilize us into being forever whatever 
we have become by the simple process of being around and also stand between us and 
the world as a barrier to genuinely new and creative experiences. Dy becoming aware of 
this process we can, if we choose to, break it up and refashion ourselves into what I have 
called the "centred" or "creative" Self. There are limits to the extent to which we can do 
this, but they are much wider and less restrictive limits than we face if we just stick with 
what life and our genetic history has landed us with. 
In the analysis which follows, we should bear in mind Hume's warmng that our 
reasoning is often affected by the way that we feel. For example, it is more comfortable 
sometimes to reject materialism out of hand because we wish to believe that there is 
more to human beings than simple mechanicalism. We feel that this would be 
dehumanising, robbing us of an inner life, will and intentionality. This is not in itself, 
however, a reason for rejecting this position. Unfortunately, human beings are not always 
the logical creatur~ that they like to think but rather they are irrational beings struggling 
to subordinate their psyches, emotions, fears and neuroses to the dictates of pure reason 
- a battIe which at times is unequal as they strive to rise above the fears and phobias of 
their own neurological make-up. In the rest of this section I hope to show that 
materialism - at least of the straightforward kind - will not even account for the 
physiological functions of the brain, let a!one the phenomenon of consciousness. It does 
seem evident tint the argument for or against materialism would be advanced in one way 
or the other if it could be established whether consciousness has evolved purely as a 
result of the development of the brain or whether it is the results of some non-
materialistic creation. In this respect it is possible that quantum theory will help our 
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further understanding (1). In his book The Tunring Point, Fritjof Capra, the quantum 
physicist, (1982: 396-7), quotes from Jung's Aioll (1951,p261) on the difference between 
mind and matter: 
Sooner or later, nuclear physics and the psychology of the unconscious will draw 
closer together as both of them, independently of one another and from opposite 
directions, push forward into transcendental territory ... Psyche cannot be totally 
different from matter, for how otherwise could it move matter? And matter 
cannot be alien to psyche, for how else could matter produce psyche? Psyche and 
matter exist in tlle same world, and each partakes of the other, otherwise any 
reciprocal action would be impossible. If research could only advance far enough, 
therefore, we should arrive at an ultimate agreement between physical and 
psychological concepts. Our present attempts may be bold, but I believe they are 
on the right lines (2). 
In the science of classical physiCs, which is accessible to our common sense reasoning, it 
is easy to understand the difficulties we may sometimes have in grounding that reasoning 
in a foundation of objective reality, outside our subjective feelings which are liable to 
distort the way we see things. For example, because we cannot see them with the naked 
eye, most of us remain oblivious to the micro-organisms that live on our skin and, 
indeed, some would be disgusted at the thought, even though they provide a life-
protecting service. However when we are made aware we have no problem about seeing 
, .' . 
that such things are natural and are as much a part of the human condition as the fact 
. that most of us in the W<::st live in houses, although this is a far more obvious fact. Such 
a Psychologically rational relationship which holds here is unlikely to do so in quantum 
physics. Using this theory, which is likely to be counter-intuitive, it is harder to 
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comprehend a possibly rational relationship between the observed and the observer. 
Indeed, in his inaugural lecture when accepting the Lucasian llrofessorship in 
Mathematics at Cambridge in 1980, Stephen Hawking (1993) said that quantum 
mechanics is essentially a theory of what we do not know and cannot predict, and yet, 
that its discovery was undoubtedly the greatest achievement in theoretical physics in this 
century(3). He believes that a quantum theory of gravity is needed if we are to describe 
the early universe and then give some explanation for the initial conditions beyond 
merely appealing to the anthropic principle(4). Although classical physics and quantum 
physics are largely in agreement that the ultimate constituents of matter are particles; 
these have definite position and motion in classical physics, whereas we are faced with 
uncertainty when taking measurements in the micro-world of quantum physics. Indeed, 
the difficulty of trying to understand quantum physics in terms of common sense 
(classical physics) is highlighted by the thought experiment of Schrodinger regarding an 
imagined "quantum cat" where the common sense view of having either a dead cat or 
one that is alive is replaced by uncertainty until these "virtual" transitions are actually 
collapsed into a definite position, or "real" transition, perhaps by the influence of mind. 
(Refer to my Cliapter Two, Consciousness and the Self for a detailed account of both 
Schrodinger's experiment and quantum realities). llere, I want to note the teaching of 
Anaxagoras (c.500-430 BC) which is interpreted by Russell (Russell, 1946) as: 
Mind has power over all things that have life ... Mind is the source of motion. 
It is a fascinating thought that the actuating force of creation could be a conscious mind. 
As in many of today's eastern philosophies Anaxagoras thought that everything, however 
small, contains portions of all opposites, such as hot and cold, white and black. 'n1is is 
the principle referred to in Chinese philosophy by the terms yin and yang. Indeed, 
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Anaxagoras' seminal idea was that the particles from which nature is constructed can be 
divided into even smaller constituents the minutest of which will cont~in a fragment of 
all others things, e.g. that skin and bone must be in the milk we drink and the food we 
eat. This is interesting in the light of current biology since we now know that each 
nucleus of a human cell contains the blueprint not only for the part of the body to which 
it belongs but for every other part as well. Also, we notice that a fragment from a laser 
produced three-dimensional hologram contains the whole picture originally shown by the 
unfragmented hologram. For example, if a hologram containing the picture of a human 
body was broken into pieces and we looked at the piece that had previously shown the 
left leg then we would instead see the whole body. A similar thing is seen when using 
mathematical shapes called fractals - objects whose geometry is chaotic. Such shapes 
multiplied many times, using a computer, give an orderly shape - the Sierpinski gasket -
made from the original shape multiplied until order is achieved "for order cannot exist 
without chaos, nor chaos without order" (peat, 1996, 176). For Anaxagoras mind is 
uniform and is just as good in animals as in man; man's apparent superiority being due to 
the fact that he has hands and, therefore, all seeming differences of intelligence are really 
due to physical abilities. Mind, he saw as the cause of a rotation, which is gradually 
spreading throughout the world, and is forcing the lightest things to go to the 
circumference, and the heaviest to fall towards the centre. 
.-
Such an all-embracing concept where everything is interconnected so that the smallest 
event can have an effect on the whole system has striking similarities with the non-
locality view of quantum physics and of the fact that every particle has its associated anti-
particle. David Hodgson, in his book The Mind Mattet'S (1991:458-461), is critical of the 
view that all conscious entities are matter-dependent and exist only in association with 
the occurrence of appropriate. (quantum) physical processes. Whilst arguing that 
I 
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evolution could have selected for conSClousness because it was advantageous and 
efficacious, Hodgson states that he feels more comfortable with the idea of a rational 
being without a beginning than with the idea of a physical world (with or without a 
beginning) which at some stage is without consciousness and rationality. Such a rational 
being, he says, could have devised the physical laws of nature but the physical laws of 
nature could not have created rational beings and seem unlikely to have given rise to 
them by chance (5). Such a view is, however, at variance with those of biologists like 
Crick (referenced above), who believes that eventually we will be able to explain 
everything from a mechanistic point of view, and the zoologist Desmond Morris, or 
Richard Dawkins, the latter believing that consciousness and the type of complexity and 
intelligence that go along with being a creative force is the achievement of evolution over 
a period of hundreds of millions of years of natural seiection (Dawkins, 1994). Again, this 
argument is countered by Ward (1996) who believes in evolution emanating from an 
intelligent Mind and not that it could happen by chance. 
Here I refer to the biologist Michael Behe (1996: 4,24,39,101-2 & 111) who, while 
accepting the general principles of evolution to explain the later development of animals, 
believes that the electron microscope has so revolutionized our understanding of the 
complexity of the cell that we can no longer accept evolution as being responsible for its 
development. To emphasize the significance of this he instances Ernst Haeckel (1834-
1919) who was another popularizer of Darwin's theory. I-Iaeckel had believed the cell to 
be simply a "homogeneous globule of protoplasm" instead of being the very complex 
structures it is. The individual constituents of the cell are molecular constructions, they 
are molecular ",at'hillcs which haul cargo from one place in the cell to another along 
"highways" made of other molecules, while others act as cables, ropes and pulleys to 
hold the cell in shapes. At this biochemical level there is no Darwinian grad/(al mutation 
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causing change to the cellular system. Each molecular machine within the cell is its own 
system but all of them need to be in place before the cell can functi~n as a complete 
entity just as the separate parts of a mousetrap need to be assembled before it can be 
used to catch mice. Just as you cannot simply start with the base of a mousetrap, then 
catch a few mice, add a spring and then catch a few more mice, add a hammer and then 
catch a few more mice, and so on, so you cannot construct a functional cell by gradual 
evolution. In this ways, he believes, that Darwin's own criteria for invalidation has been 
met since Darwin wrote in his Oright 0/ Species: 
If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not 
possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my 
theory would absolutely break down. 
Since we are unable to established whether consciousness has evolved purely as a result 
of the development of the brain or whether it is the results of some non-materialistic 
creation I want, at this stage, to look at how consciousness may be instantiated. 
Notwithstanding Hume's comment that the Self is a mere "bundle ... of different 
perceptions .. :n1e mind" being "a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively 
make their appearance" (Hume,1962: 302) we normally think of consciousness as being 
unified. Indeed, it is hard to imagine it otherwise. However, both in cases of split 
personalities (not to be confused with schizophrenia) and split-brains - where the COpflS 
callostt1?' has been divided in an effort to combat epilepsy - it has been found that separate 
responses have been received from the same physical person yet apparently from two 
different consciousnesses. Around 1960, a Los Angeles neurosurgeon, Joseph Bogen, 
observed with Roger Sperry, a psychobiologist, that the behaviour of split-brain monkeys 
outside test situations indicated that division of the commissures left motivation, 
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consciousness and voluntary action virtually unimpaired (Gregory, 1987:114-7). Dogen 
pointed out that the operation offered promise of' relief from debilitating epileptic fits 
which involved reverberation of discharges across the copus callostl!?!. Following 1962, 
when Dogen and Philip Vogel performed a total neocortical commissurotomy on a man 
who suffered frequent epileptic attacks, and particularly after 1965, when a growing team 
of researchers working under Sperry's close direction in the laboratory at the California 
Institute of Technology explored the state of divided and asymmetric mental activity in a 
small population of commissurotomy patients, systematic psychological tests were able to 
be applied. 
It is believed that the left hemisphere of the brain, which controls the right side of the 
body, is generally the dominant one, and is the centre of logic, verbal abilities and the 
data processing of thousands of bits of information pouring into the brain every second. 
The right hemisphere controls the left side of the body, and it is devoted to the creative 
and intuitive activities of the mind. Dut if one hemisphere is damaged at a young age then 
the other side takes over most of its functions. Generally, it has been suggested that 
geometrical thinking (particularly in three dimensions), and also music, may normally be 
carried out by the right hemisphere, to give balance to the verbal and analytical abilities 
of the left. In a case where damage has occu~red to the left hemisphere it is possible that 
the abilities of the right hemisphere to perform elementary arithmetic and understand 
--
simple sentences are enhanced. In Sperry's psychological tests two separate stimuli were 
kept apart so that information supplied to the left ~isual field would be received by the 
right brain hemisphere only and, similarly, what was given to the right visual field would 
be picked up by the left hemisphere alone. When a picture of a cup was flashed to the 
left visual field while a pencil was flashed to the right, the subject would say, "That's a 
pencil" while, at the same time moving to take a saucer rather than a piece of paper as 
i 
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the appropriate item to match with a cup. 'l11e reason for this is thought to be that the 
left hemisphere processing the image of the pencil from the right vis~al field is able to 
vocalize whilst the right hemisphere processing the image of the cup from the left visual 
field would perform the actions associated with geometric thinking. Roger Penrose 
(penrose 1991:496-7), citing this case by way of illustration, writes: 
What is most striking about these split-brain subjects is that the two sides seem 
to behave as virtually independent individuals, each of which may be 
communicated with separately by the experimenter - although the 
communication is more difficult, and on the more primitive level, with the right 
hemisphere rather than the left, owing to the right's lack of verbal ability. One 
half of the subject's cerebrum may communicate with the other in simple ways, 
i.e. by watching the motion of the arm controlled by the other side, or perhaps by 
hearing tell-tale sounds (like the rattling of a saucer). But even this primitive 
communication between the two sides can be removed by carefully controlled 
laboratory conditions. Vague emotional feelings can stiIl be passed from one side 
to the other, however, presumably because structures which are not split, such as 
the hypothalamus, are still in communication with both sides(6). 
Penrose's mention of some "vague emotional feelings" being passed between the two 
sides via the hypothalamus is interesting since it is noticed that transmission is also active 
across the brain stem which, whilst normaIly being considered to be consciously 
unaware, gives a degree of physical coherence. It seems that what unites conscious 
awareness of the whole Self is tied up both biologically and neurologically with the 
uninterrupted flow of information between the two brain hemispheres. The analytical 
logic of the left hemisphere merging with the more instinctive feelings coming from the 
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right hemisphere make up our complex behaviour. It has been observed by James Bower 
(1994), a neurobiologist at Cal tech Pasadena, California, that to work at' its best the brain 
needs data in 3D form, it being a tremendously sophisticated device for moving through 
3D space. He illustrates the brain's comparative slowness when working in 2D form by 
the way we might puzzle over a map or a photograph but understand even a complex 3D 
scene immediately. Interestingly, in his inaugural lecture (mentioned above), Hawking 
(1993:59) said: 
Why space-time should be four-dimensional is a question that is normally 
considered to be outside the realm of physics. However, there is a good 
anthropic principle argument for [it] ... Three space-time dimensions - that is, two 
space and one time - are clearly insufficient for any complicated organism. On 
the other hand, if there were more than three spatial dimensions, the orbits of 
planets around the sun or electrons around a nucleus would be unstable and they 
would tend to spiral inwards. There remains the possibility of more than one time 
dimension, but I for one find such a universe very hard to imagine. 
It is my belief that just as Hawking uses a combination of general relativity theory and 
quantum theory to research the beginning of the universe so an awareness of these things 
would help us to underst111d the evolution of the brain and , hence, of the mind and the 
concept we have of the Self. Penrose (1994), believes that there are big gaps, perhaps 
fundamental ones, in physics that have not yet been recognized. He says that we know 
very little about how the world works and, as far as consciousness is concerned, he thinks 
that there is sOl1lethittg di.f1etr!1lt going Otl, something not necessarily outside science but, 
something outside science as we presently know it. Whatever it is, he considers it to be 
beyond the descriptions we fully understand in physics and certainly beyond the 
21 
computer to simulate. In his opinion, it is a mistake to see neurons in terms of transistors 
and wires; what we need is a new model, if possible, one that will span' the gulf between 
macro, or classical, and micro, or quantum, physics. As a professor of Mathematics at 
Oxford University he is more aware than most of the precise nature of computation but, 
he states, mathematics is more than knowledge of clever computation, it requires 
intelligent understanding which computers do not possess. I-Iere again we should remind 
ourselves that general relativity is a classical theory whereas quantum is counter-intuitive. 
It is one thing to understand that there are some 200 different chemical 
neurotransmitters in the brain which only change when there is some alteration in their 
compounds, that is, in their constituent elementary particles, but what we really require to 
know is more about the behaviour of these elementary forces. 1he reason for this is, 
perhaps, made clearer if we consider a point made by the science writer, John Gribbin, 
and the Cambridge cosmologist, Martin Rees (1990:33-4), that each carbon atom in our 
bodies can be traced back to stars that died violently before tl1e Solar System formed and, 
therefore, we are quite literally made from tl1e ashes of long dead stars. Notwithstanding 
that with the human brain containing an estimated one hundred million billion billion 
particles it is unlikely that we will ever be able to reliably predict human behaviour. Even 
though the basic physical laws that govern the activity of the brain are said to be 
comparatively simple, given its subjection to quantum uncertainty and the fact that we 
cannot measure its original state (short of dismantling it), a small change to this initial 
-. 
state would make a large difference to subsequent behaviour as is shown by chaos theory 
(1). Although it should be understood that, apart from its initial state (3) and the quantity 
of nerve data coming into it, because of the low energy of the brain the quantum 
mechanical uncertainty would have only a small effect in the brain's randomness 
(Hawking, 1993:120-1). 
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At the present time we are very much dependent for our knowledge upon biology and 
neurology; these are the equivalents of general relativity theory with ~hich we map out 
the· general area and carry out practical research. Coming to grips with quantum 
mechanics will, hopefully, add another dimension to our overall understanding. What we 
need to know is how a system at a micro level, i.e. quantum physics, giving such seeming 
chaotic and unpredictable results from what Feynman called a "sum over history" of all 
possible worlds, can produce a macro Qevel) world which has the order demonstrated by 
classical physics of which biology and neurology are a part. Here, I would emphasize 
what I said above about the geometric chaos of fractals which, after being multiplied a 
sufficient number of times, produce an orderly shape. How did this system evolve a brain 
with a cerebral cortex of some 100 billjon neurons aided by about 10 time as many glial 
cells? Such questions would, presumably, be answered by Hawking's desired "theory of 
everything" but, in the meantime, we must work on with what we know(7). 
Unlike a computer, the brain is not just processing information but is dealing with 
"meaning". Both our reasoning and our feelings make us what we are. We process 
thousands of bits of information coming from receptors every second using a biological 
organ of approximately 3lbs in weight, our brain, which is an immensely complex and 
convoluted development at the cranial end of a spinal cord averaging around 40 
centimetres in length. This spinal cord and brain make up the central nervous system. 
The spinal cord starts to enlarge to develop the hindbrain - the medulla and pons giving 
rise to the cerebellum (or small brain) which plays a large part in physical co-ordination 
and balance. Further rostally (forwards) is the midbrain followed by the forebrain. The 
brain is divided into two separate hemispheres joined by a large bundle of fibres called 
the corpus callosu1?I. Each hemisphere is divided into four general function lobes: the 
frontal lobe, which goes far back towards the parietal lobe, being concerned with 
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emotional behaviour and the physical control of the body; the occipital lobe, in the rear 
(above the cerebellum), being concerned with vision; the temporal lob'e, which is offset 
towards the rear and beneath the frontal lobe, being concerned with memory and 
language; and the parietal lobe, which is situated at the top and in front of the occipital 
lobe, being involved with the analysis of information coming from the senses. Chemical 
neurotransmitters, which the brain converts into volleys of electrical nerve impulses or 
ions, are used as both excitatory and inhibitory messengers between neurons. Cells are 
induced to fire only when the critical threshold, whereby positive messengers exceed 
negative, is reached. de Bono (1987:317) likens this process to the way in which one 
domino knocks down the next in a domino series; each cell is its own parallel distributed 
processing unit and its energy source is released and made active by being "triggered" by 
the activity in preceding cells. A neuron transmits from its centre (soma) along an axon 
fibre which may be several centimetres in length and attached to hundreds of much 
smaller dendrites. These end in a slightly bulbous terminator called a "synaptic knob" 
which all but connect with a tiny protuberance, called a "dendritic spine" on a receiving 
dendrite of another cell or directly to its cell body. The gap between the two, some forty 
thousandths of a millimetre or 250 nanometres in distance, is called a "synaptic cleft" or 
"synaptic gap" and it is this tl1at is jumped by the neurotransmitter. 
Nerve fibres in the central nervous system are myelin insulated cylindrical tubes or 
membranes (although not all nerve fibres· are myelinated, many are not, especially in the 
peripheral nerVous system) carrying a solution of mainly potassium chloride with a small 
amount of sodium chloride, i.e. salt, giving potassium, sodium and chloride ions. '111is 
membrane is a semi-fluid lipid, permeable to certain hydrated ions and not to others. 
Thus, the energy or electric current which the nerve fibre generates is carried by a flow of 
ions in fluid. Both potassium and sodium ions are positively charged whereas chloride 
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ions are negatively charged. When the nerve is in its resting state there are mainly 
chloride ions, with some potassium and fewer' sodium ions inside the axon thus 
producing an internal negative state, while, on the outside, a positive state is produced by 
the presence of a majority of sodium over potassium ions with even fewer chloride ions. 
In order to maintain the negative charge on the inside and ensure an excess of potassium 
over sodium ions there is a "metabolic pump" which slowly pumps sodium ions back out 
through the surrounding membrane and a smaller one sending potassium ions inside 
(Penrose 1991:505). An active state is caused by a reverse process in which the inside of 
the membrane becomes positive and the outside negative. This is induced by a potential 
change in the membrane's transient permeability coming from a receptor or from the 
nerve endings of another nerve fibre. If the membrane becomes more permeable to 
sodium ions, then these will flow in through its electric field opening of «sodium gates" 
thus leaving the outside negatively charged with an excess of potassium over sodium ions 
and the inside positively charged with an excess of sodium over potassium ions. As the 
signal passes through the appropriate region of fibre to the next, "potassium gates" allow 
the potassium ions to flow to the outside of the membrane, starting to restore the 
negative charge inside and, as the signal recedes, so sodium ions are pumped out and 
potassium ions pumped in thus restoring completely the resting state of the nerve fibre in 
readiness for the next signal. The passage of sodium ions carrying positive charge is 
referred to as depolarizing the membrane, the spreading of which, from region to region, 
is known as the "action potential". Return to the resting condition is called repolarization 
and must be accomplished before any further electrochemical events, or depolarization, 
can take place (Penrose 1991:502-7). 
• 
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Section Two 
The Transcendental Self 
Our scientific study of the brain in terms of anatomy, biology, physiology, chemistry and 
physics tell us much about its structure and method of communication but very little, if 
anything about, for instance, how memories are brought into consciousness or how we 
are able to imagine events that never took place. The truth is that we do not yet, nor may 
we ever, know. 111e cynic might say tl1at we use the word "mind" in these matters 
whenever we reach the limit of our knowledge, very much as we refer to "God" for 
much the same reason, tl1US making God a "God of tl1e gaps" as some theologians say. 
Understandably, many neurologists today would prefer to talk about "mental events" or 
"mental states" rather than tl1e mind. Most of us would prefer to speak about what we 
know for sure, sellSIl proprio, rather than have to guess the most likely explanation but no 
matter how much we long for certainty and, with Hume (1975:165) and, later, tl1e logical 
positivists, would commit our guesswork to the flames, life just is not that simple. As tl1e 
sacked vicar, Anthony Freeman, found, the loss of faith in an absolute God "out tl1ere" 
(Freeman, 1994:70-1) who upholds the values of peace, joy, goodness, love etc. does not 
destroy tl1ese values but simply encourages us to cherish tl1em as human values and be a 
little more modest in the way in which we hold tl1em and in our insistence on tl1em. 
Capra (1996) adopts the Santiago rn1eory of the mind (8) which says that the brain is the 
structtlre and the mind is a process. Using a tripartite view, Capra argues tl1at tl1e process of 
---
the mind, using the stn/ctllt'e of the brain, produces a pattent. Again, although it is not clear 
in what way the tripartite view of Eccles and Popper (1983) settles the mind/body 
interaction problem, other than merely complicatillg it, tl1e metaphysical problems are 
carefully rehearsed. They hold that the mind is a reality in its own right created by a 
"liaison brain" with which it interacts at tl1ree different levels, namely, tl10se of; a Wotld 1 
of "physical objects and states" comprising the inorganic matter and energy of the 
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cosmos, the biology and structure of living things including the brain itself; a World 2 
involving "states of consciousness" giving subje~tive knowledge and experiences of 
perception, thinking, emotions, dispositional intentions, memories, dreams and creative 
imagination and; a World 3 of "knowledge of objective sense" producing cultural heritage 
coded on the material substrates of philosophy, theology, science, history, literature, art 
and technology, together with theoretical systems such as scientific problems and critical 
arguments. Eccles, for example, argues that the question, "Where is the self-conscious 
mind located?" is answerable in principle. He says (p.376): 
This can be appreciated when we consider some of the components of the self-
conscious mind. It makes no sense to ask where are located the feelings of love 
or hate, or joy or fear, or of such values as truth, goodness and beauty, which 
apply to human appraisals. These are experienced. Abstract concepts such as in 
mathematics have no location per se, but can be materialized, as it were, in 
specific examples and demonstrations. Similarly a location of the self-conscious 
mind appears when its actions become materialized in its interaction with the 
liaison brain. 
He goes on to argue that both the self-conscious mind and the states of World 2 have 
temporal properties but not spatial ones. By way of illustration he points to the 
transcendency of "clock" time over "experienced" time as when it appears to slow down 
in an acute emergency, or speed up when recalling and reliving past experiences or 
imagining some future event. We may also note the way in which a musical composer 
• might perform a composition in his head in a fraction of the time that it will take the 
musicians to perform it in front of an audience(9). Eccles says that for the most part our 
, experiences of experienced time and clock time are synchronized, as they must be for the 
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effective control of actions in response to present situations. Thus, I assume, he means 
us to understand that the brain and mind are similarly locked together. Actual 
neurological processes are involved in conceptions and perceptions of both a mind and 
its created Self and these change in accordance with our focus of attention at anyone 
time. 
Popper (pAM) endorses a similar view about perception by recounting a lecture that he 
gave to a student society in Oxford shortly after the publication of Ryle's COllcept of Milld 
(1949) in which he, Popper, offered an alternative outline to the mind-body problem. 
The students had been much impressed by R.yle's book and they kept repeating that what 
Popper was saying was exactly what Ryle would have said. So, in despair, Popper 
eventually said, "All right, I'll make a confession, I believe in the ghost in tlle machine. 
You cannot say that tbat is exactly what Ryle would have said". Later on in their book 
(pA86), Popper likens the self's (mind's) relationship to the liaison brain to that of a 
driver and a car; the things that the driver does has certain effects although he hardly 
understands the causal chain he sets in motion. Popper says, "The working of the brain is 
partly accessible and partly inaccessible to tlle self". Here, of course, our consciously 
created Self is being. influenced, not only by the conscious mind, but by mentally 
unconscious neurological processes. 
In their sixth dialogue at the end of Tbe Bmin atld It~ Se!both Popper and Eccles agree 
that the "self" is a creation of World 3. Popper says (p.495), "I think tllat tile self in a 
sense plays on the brain, as a pianist plays on a piano or as a driver plays on the controls 
of a car". Clearly, Popper is not asking us to believe in some absolute homunculus, a 
neuropianist, with objective reality accessible to scientific refutation but, perhaps, he is 
asking us to accept a relativistic view of self whose neurological creation is dependent 
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upon the setting-up of a recurSive loop between one's conSCiOUS awareness and 
unconscious neurological states. 111e biologist Real-mey (1995) reminds us that similar 
feedback loops have evolved for survival purposes and as such operate at the level of 
cells, the individual units of life, all the way up to large animals in accordance with the 
laws of chemistry and physics. (Recall the way in which messages are passed around the 
central nervous system only as the critical point is reached whereby excitatory impulse 
messengers exceed those that are inhibitory). Just as our fight/flight mechanism comes 
into action by the release of adrenalin in a stimulation and response sequence to danger 
so we restore equilibrium caused by mental angst, such as the fear of death, by the 
creation of myths. A similar idea, I believe, applies to the creation of Self. Kant (1933) 
argued that the Self, as a subject of consciousness, is transcendental and, as such, is 
neither open to scientific enquiry nor can it be the object of its own awareness. 
Holding the mind to be a reality in its own right created by a "liaison brain", apropos 
Popper and Eccles, does seem to be fraught with difficulties which need not be 
addressed here, and for reasons of clarity, we may advantageously put to one side, when 
dealing with questions about the Self. We should carefully separate the problem of the 
existence of the mind from that of the existence of the Self. 111e existence of the Self as I 
conceive it as being a "myth" avoids getting into the situation of having to defend it as an 
entity in its own right rather than a story which holds all our experiences together. It is, at 
--
one and the same time, both an "emergent property" and a recursive feedback loop by 
which those experiences are connected in consciousness. The Self does, however, serve as 
a term of absolute value against which to instantiate an identity in the same way that 
Newton, believing space to be the mind of God and, therefore, absolute and objective, 
used it as a framework against which to plot the material bodies of the Universe in terms 
of their location and velocity. I believe that just as Newton's (personally accepted) 
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absolute enabled him to produce useful calculations about the Universe so we need to 
accept self-imposed absolutes, albeit not closed· to critical inspection and possible 
improvement in the light of current knowledge at anyone time, as necessary for our 
survival because of the nature of beings that we are(10). A fish that refuses to live in 
water will diel I argue in my Chapter Five - Illusion mid the I/1Mgifled Self, that Self is 
symbolic and exists, along with other values that are necessary for our survival, only 
within the consciousness of the human mind. 
As an indexical, the term "Self", like the terms "I", "here" and "now", or demonstratives 
(called "token-reflexives" by Reichenbach) like "this" and "that", belongs to the 
perspective of the subject rather than to an objective order. It has no more actual 
location in time or space than does the secondary, and subjective, quality of colour. 
Nevertheless, it is an essential reference point as we interpret the world and our 
relationship to it. Sir John Eccles (1983:253) quotes from V.B. Mountcastle (1975): 
Each of us believes himself to live directly within the world that surrounds him, 
to sense its objects and events precisely, to live in real and current times. I assert 
tllat these are perceptual illusions, for each of us confronts the world from a 
brain linked to what is "out there" by a few fragile sensory nerve fibres. 'I1lese are 
our only information channels, our .lifeline to reality. 111ese sensory nerve fibres 
are not high-fidelity recorders, for tlley accentuate certain stimulus features, 
neglect others. The central neuron is a story-teller witll regard to the afferent(11) 
nerve fibres; and he is never completely trustwo rtllY, allowing distortion of 
quality and measure, within a strained but isomorphic spatial relation between 
"outside" and "inside". Sensation is an abstraction, not a replication of the real 
world (12). 
I. 
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Here, we could say, is a neurological version of d1e view expressed by'Schopenhauer in 
his The U;;'odd as Will afld Represe1ltatiol1. What we are given, by our senses, of objective 
reality - what is actually "out there" - is the subject of selection and interpretation; this 
includes selecting out extraneous matter and interpreting other input so as to produce 
secondary qualities(13). Indeed, much of the selection process is done at the level of the 
unconscious and most sense data do not even reach conscious awareness for reasoned 
assesSmel'lt. Just as Aristotle, followed by Locke, wrote that there is nothing in the 
intellect that is not first in sense-perception, so Schopenhauer (1966:voI2, 1'.71) saw the 
intellect like a bank of issue which must always have ready money in the safe witl1 which 
to meet, on demand, all the notes it has issued. The money he likened to our perceptions 
or primary representations while die notes are like our concepts and are secondary. 
Perception, Schopenhauer thought, belongs to understanding alone and, even in man, is 
irrational as when it deceives us into thinking that things seen at a distance are much 
smaller than they are; it is our reason that disabuses us of this deception. As 
Schopenhauer (1966:vol1, p.2S) puts it, "Reason can only k,10»J'. Albeit, he didn't see 
man as primarily a rational creature at all but subordinate to the purposes of the Will 
which, itself, is the root, origin, and controller of the intellect. As a man who saw life as a 
wretched business and who had decided to spend his time trying to understand it (Magee, 
1983:9) Schopenhauer seems to have managed several insights al1ead of his time. Magee 
(p.263) writes: 
Schopenhauer was the first great philosopher to see the mind in biological 
terms .. .In addition, Schopenhauer had shown more insight than anyone else into 
the role of the unconscious at a time when educated people were beginning to 
encounter that concept for the first time. 
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(Again see my Chapter Two, COIISciollSlIeSS alld the Sc!f5. 
Even though Schopenhauer thought that he had made an advance in modifying Kant's 
conviction that the Self was unknowable, he was aware that the "I" is "opaque and 
therefore remains a riddle to itself". He writes (1966:voI2, p.193): 
... even Itl self-consciousness, the I is not absolutely simple, but consists of a 
knower (intellect) and a known (Will); the former is not known and the latter is 
not knowing, although the two flow together into the consciousness of an 1. 
It is, for Schopenhauer, the Will, as the transcendent being-in-itself, which produces the 
intellect by which it derives the means of expression. It is this intellect alone that kflOJllS 
and inwardly represents our perceptions of the outside world and represents the Self to 
conscious awareness. Although an atheist, Schopenhauer considers the Will to be 
indestructible even by death. He maintains that the pL1.ce to put man's real inner nature is 
not in consciousness but in the Will. Consciousness is conditioned by the intellect which 
is an accident of our being and a function of the brain. "One can just as easily believe in a 
digestion without a stomach as in a knowing consciousness without a brain," he writes 
(ibid, p.199). He continues (p.201): 
The brain, together with the nerves and spinal chord attached to it, is a mere 
fruit, a product, in fact a parasite, of the rest of the organism, in so far as it is not 
directly geared to the inner organism's working, but serves tlle purpose of self-
preservation by regulating its relations with the external world. 
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The Will is clothed and given an objective image, according to Schopenhauer, by the 
brain which is orientated to space, time, and causality; the Will is met~physical and the 
intellect (brain) is physical. Here, I am reminded of Eccles' "liaison brain" where 
conscious awareness is somehow seen to read off other activity in the brain. As far as the 
world of phenomena is concerned, although Schopenhauer allows for the possibility that 
the Will, as the thing-in-itself, might have determinations, qualities, and modes of 
existence which are unknowable and incomprehensible to us, without the physical 
organism there is empty nothingness. My own thought is that Will is now best thought of 
as being expressed in DNA and that here we have a form of evolved intelligence of 
which brain-centred consciousness makes us aware. So, again, we have an argument 
which leads to the conclusion that the mind (consciousness) has a physical basis in the 
brain whose narrative of the created Self is a combined story of botJl the Will (its history) 
and the imagination. 
The mind should, tJlerefore, be tJ10ught of only in relation to the central nervous system 
and its experiences of tJ1e environment through sense perceptions for tJ1ese are what 
gives it expression. This expression gives rise to an "imagined" self (see my Chapter Five 
- Jlll/siOlt Oftd the Jl1Iagi1/ed Selfj which, again for survival purposes should be given absolute 
value within the consciousness of the mind. Trying to answer tJ1e question in the first 
paragraph of my introductory chapter - If the brain is damaged, does this affect the mind, 
diminishing the "I", or is it just that it may make communication so much more difficult 
that it only appears to do so? - I would want to say that if the mind is tJ1e expressed 
product of tJ1e brain, tJ1en either damage or ageing may possibly, but not necessarily, be 
damaging in this respect. If, however, the mind is universal - having an intelligence of its 
own - and tJle brain simply gitJes it expression, then it seems reasonable to suggest that 
communication of the "l/personality" would involve a greater struggle than might 
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otherwise have been the case if brain damage had not occurred. Whichever of these two 
views we take seems to make little, if any, practical difference since, in either case, we 
cannot knoll} the noumenal mind apart from the phenomenal brain. What is important to 
recognize is that the brain is far more tllan an organ to make us consciously aware of 
ourselves and our sense perceptions; it is a storer of memories/information, an 
imaginative creator, and the controller of our physical movements. Here is an evolved 
intelligence the processes of which we remain consciously unaware. As such, the mind 
can respond to a damaged brain in the same frustrated way that we might respond to 
some external technical gadget that is malfunctioning. This can be seen if we consider the 
way we respond to our own periodical temporary losses of memory when we sometimes 
say, "it's on the tip of my tongue". We do not, in such circumstances, think that we are 
losing our mind but, rather, that something we use, namely, our memory - a function of 
our brain, has let us down. People with a similar but permanent problem may be even 
more frustrated since, apart from this one area where a brain dysfunction occurs, they 
live normal lives and may have above average intellectual capabilities. Such is the case 
mentioned by Dr Oliver Sacks (1986). He tells us that Dr P. was a musician of distinction 
and teacher at a music school. Dr P. increasingly failed to see faces and saw faces when 
there were no faces to see. When outside he would pat the heads of water-hydrants and 
parking meters taking them to be the heads of children. He would amiably address 
carved knobs' on the furniture and was astounded when they did not reply. Not realizing 
that there was anything seriously wrong - he was actually suffering from progressive 
"aglIOSid', a term coined by Freud to describe certain disorders of recognition and 
perception - he laughed off tllese "mistakes" until, some three years later, when diabetes 
developed. Aware that such a condition could affect the eyes, Dr P. consulted an 
opthalmolog1st who took a detailed history and examined his eyes closely. He was told 
,. 
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that there was nothing wrong with his eyes but that he should consult a neurologist since 
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there was trouble with the visual part (cortex) of his brain. Sacks was the neurologist 
consulted. After the first consultation Dr P. looked round for his hat.' Reaching for his 
wife's head he tried to lift it off and place it on his own having, apparently mistaken her 
head for his hat; the wife looked as though she was accustomed to such things (1986:10). 
Sacks tells us that: 
Dr P.'s temporal lobes were obviously intact: he had a wonderful musical cortex. 
\Vhat, I wondered was going on in his parietal and occipital lobes, especially in 
those areas where visual processing occurred? 
Sacks wondered how his patient managed to do anything - dressing, going to the 
lavatory, having a bath, etc. Dr P.'s wife answered that question: apparently, Dr P. did 
everything whilst singing. But if he is interrupted he loses his d1read and comes to a 
complete stop; he does not recognize his clod1es or, even, his own body. Sacks told his 
patient d1at he was unable to tell him what was wrong and could only say what he had 
found to be right which was d1at Dr P. was a wonderful musician and d1at music was his 
life. His prescription was a life d1at consisted entirely of music - music had been the 
centre of his life and now it should be made d1e whole. Interestingly, Sacks comments 
(p.17): 
In The lr-'otld As U7ill And Representatio1J, Schopenhauer speaks of music as "pure 
Will". How fascinated he would have been by Dr P., a man who had wholly lost 
the world as representation, but wholly preserved it as music or Will. 
Despite the gradual advance of his disease, Dr P. lived and taught music to d1e last days 
of his life. Although he may not have recognized the faces of his students he, otherwise, 
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went about his life normally using music as a foundation against which to direct and 
orientate himself. Again, like Newton's accepted absolute space, music was a dependable 
value against which to plot his practical everyday life. Such cases of "loss" are harrowing 
in that one's awareness is unaffected. As in the case of a lost limb one is aware of 
something which is no longer there to be used. In such cases, the concept of Self - the 
imagined Self - can be built only on what remains as the focus of attention and for Dr P. 
this was music. I would not describe my own physical difficulties as being "harrowing" in 
any way but merely frustrating at times or, as I sometimes say, "just a damned nuisance". 
As I said at the beginning, I have cerebral palsy. TIle effects of this is to cause me to have 
only a very poor sense of balance, poor physical co-ordination of my limbs with one side 
of my body (the left) being easier to control than the other, and a speech problem tied in 
with irregular breath control. It is, of course, very difficult to identify which parts of 
one's brain are causing the problem and since I have not been able to obtain an analysis 
using modem scanning equipment (14) I can only fall back upon what I have learned 
about neurology to try and identify cause from effect. When the brain damage is to the 
pars illte1'1?1edia of the cerebellum, which lies below the two cerebral hemispheres and is 
attached to the brain stem, physical movements are irregular. This is because the pars 
inter1lledia is failing to correctly monitor and control movements instigated by the motor 
cortex. Eccles tells us (1983:289) that we can regard the pan itlterl?ledia of the cerebellum 
as acting like a controlling system on a target finding missile. It acts as a closed loop 
system which, by monitoring and informing the motor cortex, contributes to the 
smoothness and accuracy of voluntary movements by modifying the motor commands 
issued by the motor cortex. 11le more we are unaware of skilled movements, as for 
example in a game of tennis, the better they will be performed. It is thought that 
throughout life, but particularly when young, we are engaged in an incessant teaching 
programme for the cerebellum which develops tile automation that adds finesse and skill 
t. 
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to many of the tasks we perform. 'This means that things like playing tennis are out of the 
question for me since I am incapable of developing the co-ordination required to 
estimate the trajectory of the ball, visually track, maint.'tin balance whilst running to where 
it is expected that the ball will fall, and intercept and hit it. In the normal state of affairs 
anyone would find such things difficult and their performance would necessitate much 
concentration at first, as when we learn to drive a motor vehicle, but with practice less 
concentration is required as the unconscious autonomic nervous system begins to 
assume a roleC1S). We can imagine that a tennis player would never perform to 
professional standards if s/he had to consciously control each shot, the g"ame being far 
too fast to allow this to happen. When the pars intermedia is damaged more things remain 
under conscious control or, at least, a conscious effort is made to counter false and 
impaired effects, such as movements. A sense of balance is one of these, as is the gross 
movements when one actually needs finer ones to perform more delicate tasks. I find 
that if someone, not realizing my difficulty, calls to me unexpectedly from behind, my 
attention is interrupted and, hence, I may lose my balance. Similarly, although I have a 
good grip and, therefore, I am useful for unscrewing tight bottle tops, I am lethal if I 
need to hold sometlling that is delicate since I find it hard, sometimes, to moderate my 
grip and end up squashing the item. For example, when drinking from a polystyrene cup 
I find it helpful to use two such containers, one inside tlle other, so as to add strengtll 
and be less susceptible to collapsing when I grip too hard. 
The above paragraph demonstrates that far from diminishing a sense of one's identity, it 
is possible that damage to certain areas of the unconscious brain, by which I mean tllose 
that are not aware, actually intensifies the struggle involved just coping with everyday life 
as one seeks to compensate for realized impairment. Furthermore, providing tllat there is 
notlling wrong with one's creative functions then these are stimulated by tlle very fact 
, .... 
I 
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that one is unable to look to one's peers as a measure of what is possible and is, 
therefore, thrown upon one's own resourcefulness in finding ways around difficulties, 
perhaps by thinking of "unusual" solutions to problems. Very often, the usual way of 
doing something is blocked by one's inability in some area. A very simple illustration of 
what I mean is my own inability to lift a full cup of liquid to my mouth without spilling it. 
For a long time this caused me so much embarrassment that even when I was thirsty I . 
would refuse a drink and felt anxious when I expected the possibility that I might be 
offered one. I am pleased to say that with the increasing years my common sense has got 
the better of me and my embarrassment takes a back seat to my thirst; the solution, after 
all, is simple; I ask for the cup/glass to be placed on a table, or anything else that I can sit 
at, and I bend down so that my lips touch and balance the cup while I tip it towards me, 
drinking sufficient to allow me to raise both the cup and myself whilst I still steady the 
cup by holding it tightly against my lip. People who do not know me may give me a 
second glance since it is strange to see a grown man do such a thing. Of course, it is not a 
thing that I would do if there was an alternative but, in the circumstances, it seems to be 
a pragmatic approach which is intended to cause no inconvenience or offence to others 
while allowing me to cope and take a part in the everyday life of the community. 
In our search for identity and personal integrity perhaps we should remember that it is 
the irritation of the grain of sand in the oyster that produces the pearl. Schopenhauer, as 
we have seen, allowed for the possibility that the Will, as the thing-in-itself, might have 
determinations, qualities, and modes of existence, which are unknowable and 
incomprehensible to us. He also believed that struggle was part of the process of 
salvation which might lead to a better existence - this would not be on account of 
intellectual activity but by the renunciation and denial of self-will. As Magee (1983:372-3) 
writes: 
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He also believed that such truths stated generally in this way do not make much 
impression on mankind at large, and that for this reason the great religions 
present them in more interesting forms, more concretely and specitically, in the 
shape of history, myth, legend, fable, parable, prophecy, song, commandment, 
ritual, social institutions, architecture, art, and so on. To the simple-minded all 
these metaphorical constructs are presented as literal truths, and are believed in 
them by them as literal truths; but literally they are not true: it is their symbolic 
content that is true (16). 111US, for instance, Schopenhauer positively disbelieved 
in the existence of a personal god, and a fortiori did not believe in the divinity of 
Jesus, and therefore cannot in any serious sense what ever be said to be a 
Christian - and yet he believed in that great fundamental truth contained in 
Christianity as well as in Brahmanism and Buddhism, the need for salvation from 
an existence given up to suffering and death, and its attainability through the 
denial of the Will, hence by a decided opposition to nature, is beyond all 
comparison the most important truth there can be. 
Schopenhauer's way of finishing his day was to read the Scriptures of India - The 
Upallishads or, maybe, The BhagaIJad Gila. Certainly, his philosophy would not have 
allowed him to believe in the reincarnation of a knowing Self, or intellect, but he did see 
the Will, as the thing-in-itself - the mystery of "life", continuing. Here, of course, there is 
no personal content so when "we" are dead that is the end of us. What is unclear, and 
still remains so, is the actual content of the Self whilst we are alive. To what extent are 
~ the myths etc. that we consciously tell ourselves less necessary as survival value than the 
I~ unconscious way in which our brains represent the world to us. Can we, should we, 
~. adopt a more scientific approach to the "whole" of life and will we survive if we do? Or 
l 
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do we need Schopenhauer's dual approach, clinically scientific for the most part, but able 
to relax into his own survival needs for the rest? Sacks writes (1986:22ff) about a patient 
with Korsakov's (dementia) disease which, although leaving past memories intact, causes 
the loss of memory of current events within seconds. Such patients live in a kind of time-
warp, clearly remembering their lives in the past but unable to connect events in the 
present. Sacks says (p.28): 
"Only connect" - but how could he connect? \Vhat was life without connections? 
"I may venture to affirm," Hume wrote, "that we are nothing but a bundle or 
collection of different sensations, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." 
Sacks considered whether there could be any depth of abiding feeling or thinking 
remaining in this man or had he been reduced to a sort of Humean drivel, a simple 
succession of unconnected impressions and events. His conclusions, following the Soviet 
neuropsychologist A.R. Luria from whom he had sought an opinion, were that: 
A man does not consist of memory alone. He has feelings, will, sensibility, moral 
being .. .It is here ... you may touch him, and see a profound change. 
Sacks thought that although his patient existed in frozen time, around 1945: 
... humanly, spiritually, he is at times a different man altogether - no longer 
fluttering, restless, bored, and lost, but deeply attentive to the beauty and soul of 
the world, rich in all the Kierkegaardian categories - tl1e aesthetic, the moral; the 
religious, the dramatic. I had wondered, when I first met him, if he were not 
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condemned to a sort of "Humean" froth, a meaningless fluttering on the surface 
of life, and whether there was any way of transcending the in~oherence of his 
Humean disease. Empirical science told me that there was not - but empirical 
science, empiricalism, takes no account of the soul, no account of what 
constitutes and determines personal being. Perhaps there is a philosophical as 
well as a clinical lesson here: that in Korsakov's, or dementia, or other such 
catastrophes, however great the organic damage and Humean dissolution, there 
remains the undiminished possibility of reintegration by art, by communion, by 
touching the human spirit: and this can be preserved in what seems at first a 
hopeless state of neurological devastation. 
As someone whose mental abilities are easily misconstrued by strangers because of my 
physical awkwardness, I am well aware how frustrating it can be for anyone to be 
thought of as "not all there". Once people have made that judgement then there can be 
no proper communication between people; it is not so much the physical difficulty that a 
person might have in being understood which is the major problem but the fact that 
someone has already judged that what slhe has to say is not going to be worth the effort 
of listening. Nevertheless, such people do sometimes listen in spite of themselves when 
they have to. I am sometimes amused by two different types of reaction to me - the 
before and after. Before giving a public address, even when people have known me to be 
--
the speaker, I find that some people are disinclined even to give me the time of day, but, 
after seeing me in action its as though they think to themselves "well, fancy that!" and 
they come and are most pleasant. Now, I understand the problem and I do my best to 
put people at their ease but it does make me aware that someone, like myself, with a 
mind longing to express itself but unable to break down the barriers must be awfully 
frustrated. In fact, I sometimes feel this myself when among a crowd of strangers and 
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not being able to do anything that would convince people that I am not as stupid as my 
body language might make me out to be. On these occa .. c;ions it is like being in a glass box 
- able to see what is going on but unable to join in. 
The film All/lIke/lillgs tells the story of a group of 20 patients, survivors of the sleeping-
sickness epidemic, ellcepbalilis letbatgica, which swept the world during the 1920's, who 
were awakened for a brief period of time by the administration of the chemical L-DOPA, 
given by Dr Sacks in the late 1960's. In the book (Sacks, 1991) from which the film was 
made, Sacks makes it clear that, in his opinion, institutions, insofar as they are coercive 
(17), aggravate the sickness of their inmates. He states, concerning one such patient, that 
both her Parkinsonism and her neuroses all but disappeared in more human conditions, 
e.g. in the hospital gardens or when visited by a much-loved sister. It cannot be doubted 
that we can be profoundly affected by things that stir us emotionally, such primitive 
responses having evolved ahead of our abilities to reason, and we would be foolish to 
underrate their survival value. It is far more reasonable to accept those things that have 
shown to be valuable, even when they are not things that can be put under a microscope 
and empirically tested, than to reject them out of hand. So when someone like Sacks, 
having exhausted the current limits of scientific knowledge, starts talking about there 
remaining the undiminished possibility of reintegration by art, by communion, and 
touching the human spirit, having seen positive results from such things then we should 
pay attention (18). As much as we might rate the value of science, there are human 
problems that science will not touch and we ought not to ignore them simply for this 
reason. 
All this is not to underestimate the problems that some people have, nor is it to ignore 
the commitment involved in helping them. It is, however, to understand how one might 
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become a prisoner of one's own neurological states. A couple (Mills, 1995) who adopted 
a boy found that he seemed to withdraw and live in his own little world. He was 
diagnosed as being autistic. He appeared, even at tlle age of nine years, not to have 
developed a sense of Self. For example, when he had done something wrong, say 
dropped something, he would refer to his halld, rather than himself, as having been 
naughty (perhaps, suggesting an absence of ability to recognize a connection between 
cause and effect). AltllOugh having knowledge, he lacked understanding, as shown in his 
ability to repeat a story word for word and yet be unable to tell it in any other way or to 
answer questions about it or, the way he would stand at me curb-side and say rhymes 
that warned about the dangers of stepping out in front of oncoming traffic at tlle same 
time as doing just that. He had little, if any, sense of pain; because he had seen other 
children fall over in the school playground and howl over a cut knee etc. he would 
imitate the same response to tlle least, minutest injury, and yet when, because of an 
obsession Witll light, he kept his face so close to the bulb of a table lamp that it caused a 
nasty blister on his nose he made no adverse response. His abnormal emotional reaction 
was highlighted by his response when his adoptive mother's grandmother died; the 
unreality of death was made plain when in answer to his mother's grieving he said that "it 
(death) had served her right" and then by his asking when they could get grandma out of 
the coffin (as one might get a toy out of a cupboard). He was acutely aware of thin!,'S that 
would remain unnoticed to most people such as the fact that all the lamp posts in the 
area where he lived had a particular hole in their caste and were given a unique number. 
His obsessional behaviour was such as to cause him, whilst out with his mother, to stop 
at each lamp post and read off the number, which he would remember, and put his 
finger into tlle hole and, because tlley had once stopped to eat at a McDonald's 
restaurant they had got to eat exactly tlle same tllings tlut they had had the first time on 
all subsequent visits. Failure to comply with tllis routine would cause behavioural 
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problems, maybe because it upset the boy's attempt to bring order out of the chaos of his 
world where his perceptions of everything were so fragmented. 
Of course, no one can know what it is like to be someone else or be certain how they 
perceive the world. We cannot even be certain that when two people look at a particular 
colour they are experiencing the same thing; we only know that they call it the same 
colour because, from earliest childhood, whenever they have experienced seeing that 
colour they have been told its name, e.g. red, blue etc. (19). We all probably experience 
the world in slightly different ways but witl1in a band which we acknowledge as "normal" 
(20). For example, although no human being without the aid of scientific equipment 
would hear the ultrasonic sound that enable whales to communicate over extraordinary 
distances, tl1is is "normal" rather tl1an "abnormal" for our species; tl1e reason for this bit 
of reality being denied us is tl1at we are not equipped witl1 the necessary sense organs. 
But tl1en, it is not normal for people to display such extraordinary talents shown by 
autistic savants, like Stephen Wiltshire, who from the age of around seven years showed a 
preoccupation with drawing buildings of great complexity and size: after a brief glance at 
a complex and monumental building, like London's Albert Hall or St Paul's he was able 
to draw it quickly from memory in unbelievable detail (Sacks, 1995: 186-232) (21). 
Neurological impairment is mysterious in many of its manifestations but then 
neurological potential is not that well understood either. 
In summary: 
1) The mind is dependent on the brain which gives it expression and probably creates it. 
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2) Only certain parts of the brain are involved in conscious awareness and, while we are 
unable to say what affect damage to these areas would have on the mind, it is likely that 
lesions to some other parts do not diminish the mind but, simply, make conscIous 
control that much more necessary whilst, at the same time, more difticult. 
3) The Self is not the mind but is created out of the mind's need to spin unity out of 
fragmentation and order out of chaos. That such a "myth" is not materially real matters 
as little to us as the material unreality of music mattered to Dr P. 
4) The concept of Self must be seen as having "survival" value. It may be no more "out 
there" t11an is the God of our belief, the values of goodness and love, or a musical 
composition. All these things have, however, survival value and should be cherished as 
such, lest, in our desire to be independent of our nature we destroy some of t11e very 
things on which, unknowingly, we depend. Such things are like trutl1S that are expressed 
senS/{ allegonco because t11ey cannot be pinned down in any tangible way. In his 
Translator's Notes to Nikos K'lzantzakis' novel, The Last Te111ptaliotl, P.A. Bien says that 
Kazantzakis "sought to convert matter into spirit by means of art" (Kazantzakis, 
1960:513&517). In a similar way authors, like Salman Rushdie, have made the point that 
religion is art, a point which surely would have been appreciated by Schopenhauer and 
certainly is by Sacks. 
In this chapter I have looked at the material structure of the brain whose neurological 
functions gives us the COI/SciOIlS notion of (our)Selves as transcending those material 
foundations. Firstly, I looked at the biological structure of the material brain with its 
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association to consciousness, our concept of mind and our notion of a Self. My second 
concern was with the value of our transcendent concept of a Self which underpins our 
personality as an integrated whole and what light might be shed upon the process by 
studying some of the difficulties caused by neurological impairment. 
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Chapter Two 
Consciousness and the Self 
In this chapter I want to look at the neurobiological input which goes into the creation of 
the Self and the contribution made by both our conscious and unconscious processes. By 
demonstrating the way in which we are in the grip of evolved biological programming I 
will argue that our present environment can be coped with far better when we 
consciously act to tum our imagined Self into a centred Self. 
Section One 
Neurological Underpinning 
At the macro level we are quite comfortable with the concept of binary opposition 
which, apart from the obvious division into male and female, light (day) and dark (night), 
or the Cartesian tension between mind and body, operate at the more fundamental, or 
micro, level of cell division, the double helix of the DNA molecule, and that between 
particle and anti-particle. 111e distinction I want to concentrate on in this chapter is that 
of the conscious and the unconscious. I was bemused one day recently when reflecting 
upon an event which seemed to demonstrate an ability of the unconscious mind to work, 
unbeknown to the conscious mind, on a problem and to present an answer to 
consciousness. After lunch I had joined my wife in an attempt to fill in the crossword in 
the daily newspaper and eventually we were left with just two clues which we could not 
answer. That evel!ing, as we sat watching television, the answer to one of them popped 
into my head. The following morning, seeing the unfinished crossword on the table, J 
read out the other unsolved clue and my wife immediately gave the correct answer. 
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Where do such solutions come from? It is as though we had consulted some problem 
solving service with the request that they should have the solutions ready for us later on 
and, without further attention from us, this is what happened. What is this "black hole of 
the mind" into which our thoughts are dragged? Hofstadter (1982:283), musing upon the 
divide between conscious and unconscious mind, considered it to be one of the most 
disturbing aspects of trying to understand the mind. Often our conscious thoughts seem 
to spring from areas of the mind over which we have no control and, although we take 
credit for the creative ideas we have, we often realize that conscious effort has had very 
little to do with it. '1l1is raises the question of who we really are and what neurological 
input goes into the creation of the Self - just how much freewill do we have, given what 
we derive from our genes? 
It appears as if thoughts from the level of consciousness somehow pass a sort of "event 
horizon" where they are beyond our attention. Unlike tl1e cosmic black hole which seems 
to swallow light, etc., without returning more than an occasional particle, the divide 
between the conscious and unconscious mind permits a two way traffic which becomes 
transformed as it travels beyond the divide in either direction. It is as though tl1e light 
that we consciously recognize, in particular colours with forms and boundaries, becomes 
a pure light which is undetectable, that is, witl10ut recognizable form, in the unconscious 
and tl1at tice versa, unconscious thought takes on recognizable form as it passes the 
threshold into consciousness. We may also think of this process of unconscious thought 
becoming conscious as being vaguely analogous to what happens with a television 
picture. Meaningful scenes are sent from a studio via an array of particle-waves. Beams of 
electrons from a cathode ray tube are sorted by electrical and magnetic fields so that the 
dots on tl1e screen reproduce meaningful pictures. It seems that we are talking about two 
different levels, or views, of reality - the familiar one of common sense, or classical 
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physics, and the more underlying theoretical and less recognizable one of particle ,md 
quantum physics. 
At the most common level of reality we recognIze our bodies as flesh and blood. 
Another view, or level, is that they are matter constructed of atoms, and agam, of 
particles or waves of energy. 111e laws that govern these micro levels may spill over into, 
and affect our lives at a conscious level, although it could be that because of the low 
energy state of the brain the quantum mechanical uncertainty would be minimal. 
Nevertheless, we do recognize that the presence of different chemicals in the brain has a 
vast influence on who we are, our behaviour and how we think and feel, and that 
chemicals change only when there is some alteration in their compounds, that is, in their 
constituent elementary particles. We can see the influence of chemicals in the body from 
. at least around the sixth week of the existence of a foetus when, depending upon the 
presence of a Y chromosome, it will develop testes. Before that, the foetus is 
hermaphroditic in that it has the same structure whether it is male or female. From this 
time onward, and even before the existence of the external genital organs and the brain, 
the testes produce androgens or male sex hormones. However, the presence of two X 
chromosomes will cause the foetus to continue developing in its initial, unaltered state 
until around the sixth month when differentiation of the gonads cause the formation of 
two ovaries. Both the structure and the operation of the brain is, of course, affected by 
these different hormones. Moir and Jessel write (1989:38-9): 
While the brain is developing in the womb, the hormones control the way the 
neural networks are laid out. Later on, at puberty, these hormones will revisit the 
brain to switch on the network they earlier created. 111eir action is like the 
process of photography: it is as if a negative is produced in the womb, which is 
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only developed when these chemical messengers return in adolescence. 
Differences in human behaviour depend on the interaction between hormones 
and the brain. 
Later on in their book (p.125) they quote Freud, who wrote to his colleagues: 
... bear in mind that someday all our provisional formulations in psychology will 
have to be based on an organic foundation .. .It will probably be seen that it is 
special chemical substances and processes which achieve the effects of 
sexuality ... 
Notably, Darwin in his Origitl of Species, said that psychology would be based on a new 
foundation, "that of necessary acquirement of each mental power by gradation" 
(Humphrey, 1986:63). Although Darwin himself never specifically tackled the problem of 
the "necessity" of consciousness, the assertion made by his disciple, TIlOmas Huxley, 
that consciousness has no effect upon behaviour, likening it to the steam whistle o~ a 
locomotive which is caused by steam escaping from the valve but having no effect upon 
the engine, was challenged, as Humphrey reminds us, by Lloyd Morgan who stated that 
any evolutionist who accepted it should account on evolutionary grounds for tl1e 
existence of a useless adjunct to a neural process. (See my chapter one - Neurology of the 
Se!fj. 
Clearly, knowledge of this biological base has been and is continuing to be developed 
and, particularly, in neurobiological terms we are just starting to get a glimpse of the 
complexity of tl1e central nervous system at which we marvel. TI1e neurobiologist, Gerald 
Edelman, writes that we are at the beginning of a neuroscicntific revolution by the end of 
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which we will know how the mind works, what governs our nature, and how we know 
the world. He emphasizes the prime position which should be given to biology and 
neuroscience for an understanding of the actual matter underlying the mind and its 
principles of organization. He insists that psychology should always defer to biology. Our 
3lb brain which looks like a pickled walnut or a helping of porridge and which the 
ancient Egyptians used to discard when mummifying their dead believing it to be mere 
packing for the head since it did not bleed in death, is the most amazing communication 
system in the known universe. It controls the production of hundreds of chemicals in 
exact quantities for delivery to precise locations and negotiates neural connections 
(synapses) whose number exceed the total human population of the earth by around 
200,000 times(1). The fabric of this organ, of which the exponential calculation of all its 
possible dendritic connections exceed the number of atoms in the known universe, 
whose nerve cells and their delicate connections were hardly known in the time of 
Charles Darwin (1809-1882), has begun to be discovered in just over the past one 
hundred years. Our higher thoughts, which distinguish us from other animals, take place 
in the cerebral cortex which varies between two to five millimetres in thickness, is about 
the size of a man's handkerchief, and covers the two hemispheres of the brain. 111is 
cortex, which is the latest part of the human brain to evolve, now accounts for around 80 
per cent of its volume and its neurons are thought to be sensitive enough to register 
quantum-level phenomena. It seems that what happens at the micro level must have an 
effect at the macro level and this is reinforced when one reflects that a particle of light, a 
photon, that is, a single atomic event that took place within a star aeons ago (Peat, 
1996,194), affects the sensitivity of the optic nerve and, hence, our ability to see. 111e 
physicist Peat (pp.211-2) speculates: 
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Processes within the stars release energy in the fonn of photons that travel great 
distances through space until, by chance, some of them happen to enter the 
human eye. Within the retina of the eye other quantum processes take place, 
leading to an unfolding of activity within the brain. In a sense, therefore, the 
processes within the heart of a star enfold into the photon and, as it reaches the 
eye, photon activity unfold into consciousness. 
Curiously enough, Einstein's theory of relativity tells us, that with respect to the light 
ray, the time taken for the journey from star to eye is zero-no time at all... 
... according to quantum field theory, (2) a photon cannot be emitted unless 
something is already there to receive the emission. Indeed, it is not so much that 
the photon leaves the star and enters the eye, but rather that the eye-
consciousness and the star lose their separate distinctions within an overall 
conSCIOus process. 
Here we have then a cause at the micro level producing an observable effect at the 
grosser macro level. Working at such different levels we realize just how cut off and 
compartmentalized they seem to be from each other. This is surely nowhere more in 
evidence than when we try to link the physics of energy/matter with the psychology of 
thought; at what point and how does one become the other? Are thollghts below 
consciousness in a particle state and yet ordered, as are the electrons transmitted to the 
cathode ray tube of the television set which are re-sorted to produce meaningful pictures 
on a phosphorous-coated screen, in such a way as to be transfonned into conscious 
thoughts? Is it the focus of our attention that causes one to become the other? (See my 
illustrations below of both Schrodinger's thought experiment and \Vheeler's delayed 
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choice experiment.) To answer such questions, perhaps, what we need is a better 
understanding of quantum physics. In order to do· so, we have to be prepared to step 
outside of the classical paradigm with its Aristotelian logic. Here categories and 
boundaries give way to the context in which events occur, e.g. whether particles or waves 
appertain. Instead of division by categories we have a process in a complex web of 
relationship in which balance and harmony are involved. 
What we have at present is what surely must be the incomplete quantum theory of which 
Einstein is reported to have said reminded him of "the system of delusions of an 
exceedingly intelligent paranoic, concocted of incoherent elements of thought" (Zohar, 
1991:8). The paradox caused by two seeming inconsistent views whereby, on the one 
hand, we become aware of particles and, on the other, we become aware of waves, 
suggests that there is something missing. The Austrian physicist and philosopher, Irwin 
Schrodinger (1881-1961) demonstrated this uncertainty in which a wave of energy 
becomes a particle of matter. It appears that by some process of interference, which may 
include observation and/or measurement, one state inexplicably flips to the other and 
this raises the question of the possible role of human consciousness in the formation of 
physical reality. Schrodinger's thought experiment was that a cat might be placed inside a 
box into which a bit of radioactive material would also be placed. 1he radioactive 
material, which obeys the rules of probability, has a 50% chance of shooting out a decay 
particle in an upward direction, in which case it will strike a particle detector thus 
triggering a switch that releases lethal poison into the cat's feeding bowl. Altematively, 
the decay particle goes in a downward direction, strikes a different particle detector 
which, this time, triggers a switch to release a nourishing meal into the cat's bowl. 
\V'hether, on opening the box, we have a live cat to stroke or a dead one to bury is 
uncertain and a matter of probability. \Vhat it is that collapses the wave function is not 
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known but it is apparent that until this fixed reality comes into being its nature is 
uncertain. Indeed, the wave/particle is a paradox to the extent that, according to 
mathematical physics there can be no fixed reality and all that we have is a wave of 
probability that fans out into many possibilities - a superposition of states - that cannot 
be collapsed but, of course, our experience tells us otherwise. Although, in quantum reality, 
Schodinger's cat is both alive and dead, the quantum wave fanning out between the two 
possibilities, we are aware that on observation the particle aspect of the wave/particle 
function will be only too evident. Likewise, we know that although no neurosurgeon has 
ever discovered a thought when operating on the brain this does not convince us that we 
ought to question our e:.;petience of thoughts. 
Many of the things we learn about quantum physics seem to fly in the face of classical 
physics and common sense and it was to highlight the seeming absurdity of the 
Copenhagen Interpretation, that a wave of probability existed until collapsed by being 
observed, that Schrodinger thought of his hypothetical experiment. To common sense, 
the decay particle will shoot out either its poison or a nourishing meal whether or not it 
is being observed but Neils Bohr, who had been instrumental in formulating the 
Copenhagen Interpretation maintained that the common sense view is wrong. What we 
have, prior to observation, is a "superposition of states" or, in Schrodinger's words, 
"having in it the living and the dead cat mixed or smeared out in equal 
parts"(Gribbin,1995:21). The many possibilities into which a wave fans out are known as 
"virtual" transitions as against "real" transitions which describe the collapsed wave or 
distinct particle. Zohar draws an analogy with "a sheltered young woman at last 
presented to society at her 'coming out'" (Zohar, 1991:16). In the real world of classical 
physics the young woman would date different boys on separate occasions and thus gain 
confidence that, eventually she could make a judgement as to a husband with whom 
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marriage would seem a viable proposition. Her quantum counterpart, however, would 
take up with llil suitors, al.Lill; once, perhaps even setting up house with each of them 
simultaneously. Indeed from within one house, she would be able to see herself in 
another. Eventually, she would experience real transition in settling down with just one 
of her suitors but this is not to say tl1at her other liaisons (virtual transitions) have left no 
trace - there would have been offspring of, at least, some of the other relationships which 
would have grown up to influence the world. Zohar (1991:414) quotes David Bohm 
(1917 -92) the theoretical physicist who had suggested that in nature: 
in many ways the concept of virtual transition resembles tl1e idea of evolution in 
biology, which states that all kinds of species can appear as a result of 
mutations, but that only certain species can survive indefinitely namely, tl10se 
satisfying certain requirements for survival in a specific environment 
surrounding the species. 
This so called "many worlds theory" suggests that all possibilities are viable for a time 
and tl1at, indeed, although two viable transitions may both be vulnerable to annihilation, 
their progeny may be established as real transitions. Was tl1e C.openhagen Interpretation 
right to suppose that conscious observation may well be among tl1e things whose 
interference influences the collapse of a wave into a distinct particle? Certainly, it 
provides a series of formulae which physicists can use to predict the outcome of 
experiments even though they are unable to explain "why". If it is correct, as results 
would seem to indicate, then perhaps we have more to do with the construction of our 
own relative world tl1an most of us usually think. Perhaps Plotinus' (205-270AD) 
intellectual attempts to unite the knower with the known in a system where ultimate 
reality is One can be better appreciated from the perspective of quantum physics than 
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from any other. Many experiments have been carried out which show a correlation 
between a pair of particles without regard for locality in either time or space, even across 
the universe (Zohar, 1991:20-1). This problem of non-locality was something that 
Einstein could not accept and he spent the rest of his life, some 30 years which he finally 
considered to have been wasted, looking for a "shared" principle (3). To make this less 
esoteric we, like Einstein, might take as example twins separated at birth and brought up 
one in America and the other in England. Although unaware, even, of each others 
existence over the years both become prosecuting barristers, answer to the same 
nickname, dress almost exclusively in the same shade of brown, and get married at the 
same age to brunettes named Barbara. For Einstein there had to be a common factor, 
perhaps some shared genetic material, which caused the twins to adopt the same life-
style. However, as noted above, experiments with pairs of non-particles favour, in this 
instance, quantum theory against Einstein's incredulity. Einstein expressed his wonder in 
"My Credo", a speech to the German League of Human Rights in Berlin during the 
autumn of 1932 (Campbell, 1973:143): 
The most beautiful emotion we can experience is the mystical. It is the power of 
all true art and science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger ... is as good as 
dead. To know that what is impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself as 
the higher wisdom and the most radiant beauty, which our dull faculties can 
comprehend only in their most primitive forms - this knowledge, this feeling, is 
at the heart of true religiousness. In this sense, and in this sense only, I belong 
to the ranks of devoutly religious men. 
It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Stephen Priest in his book Theoties qf the Milld in a 
chapter on Idealism, mentions John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart's book The Nature qf 
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E"<istellce (1927) in which McTaggart argues that conscIous spiritual selves are 
fundamental constituents of the Universe. As such we logically give the empirical world 
existence by our perception there being no matter and, as spiritual selves, we are 
immortal. Priest writes (1991:70): 
Interestingly, McTaggart rejects the claim that God exists, so combining a 
doctrine of personal immortality with atheism. This perhaps illustrates my point 
that theism and belief in one's survival of death are logically independent. 
Likewise Priest, in his final chapter, maintains that whatever has the capacity to think - be 
it God, a computer, or a soul - is a mind. In the case of humans and other higher 
animals, he states, "the mind is the brain" (p.214). In support of this argument he 
reasons that brain damage may affect the mind, as when it causes amnesia. By holding 
that thinking and consciousness are "activities" of the brain, Priest claims that the 
mind/body problem is solved since "there is no ontological problem about something 
and its activities, or about a thing and what it docs" (p.214). For Priest, both materialists 
and idealists are wrong - the one for maintaining that mental events are physical, and the 
other for maintaining that material events are mental- this, however, does not mean that 
dualists are correct either, since Priest is of the opinion that their belief in an interface 
problem places them in the grip of a metaphysical illusion as absurd as Lewis Carroll's 
speculation in his Alice itl U:"ollder/a,td of a "grin without a cat". All this seems remarkably 
simple, our mental life is nothing but a product of our physical life; our brains have 
merely evolved to "transform" our environment and my question, above, about thoughts 
(as understood psychologically) below consciousness is undercut. Or is it? Even when we 
accept that the thoughts of the mind are emergent properties of brain activity - the 
process of some recursive loop - we still have not adequately described thought. Suppose 
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that what I call the psychology of thought is no more than the consequence of energy 
particle/waves and that consciousness, in Priest's terms, is no more or less the same - a 
consequence of physical activity - then how does my awareness (consciousness - the 
consequence of physical activity) become animated by thought, again a consequence of 
physical activity? Surely, it is consciousness which somehow turns the spotlight of 
attention onto the multi-input of our senses and cognitive function. It is the view of the 
neurologist, Damasio (1994: 128), that our rationality, traditionally presumed to be 
neocortical, is biologically regulated by the emotions which emanate from the subcortex, 
or old brain, and I hypothesize that it is from the hypothalamus, at the very heart of the 
limbic system, that the torchlight of consciousness is lit and directed. It is the strength of 
our feelings about things that focuses our thoughts upon them while other things get 
pushed into the shadows and often go by unnoticed accept in a subliminal way(4). In an 
age in which the activities of the neocortex occupy so much of our attention, it is 
perhaps a timely reminder that neocortical activity is built upon subcortical structures. In 
the field of vision, for example, our amazement seems biased towards the wonders of 
neocortical processing but as Damasio (p.164) says, vision is not a process of the cerebral 
cortex alone but probably begins in the brain stem, in such structures as the colliculi. 
Such observation is, I believe, relevant to "blindsight"(see my Chapter Five - Illusiotl and 
the Imagilled Se!JJ. 
According to Colin McGinn (1980) conscIousness characterises the mind. Both 
consciousness and the possession of the mind are all or nothing affairs. Consciousness is 
like turning on a light. None of this is inconsistent with both mind and consciousness 
being constructs of the brain but what I wish to emphasize here is what Hofstadter 
(1980) has called the "recursive" elements, the hypothesis that many of the activities of 
the brain, both conscious and unconscious, rely on feedback. Like our finger print or 
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DNA print, our brains are unique. Connections between billions of neurons and their 
supporting glia cells are made and broken faster than it takes to blink our eyes. 'The 
analogy has been made that it is like having made a detailed map of New York ~Uld then 
waking up the next day to find that all but the major roads have been changed - and 
remember, neurologically speaking, this is being done all the time and at fantastic speed. 
While much of what takes place is down to unconscious biological interaction and 
autonomic feedback, it is my conviction that our conscious thought also has an input and 
thus makes a free choice contribution to a system which is neither wholly free nor wholly 
determined. Probably most people will remember times when the more they have 
concentrated upon a task the less able they became; indeed, the term "trying too hard" is 
common usage. I, perhaps, experience this problem more than most people and, for this 
reason, maybe I've been driven by curiosity to ask "what is going on?" I've already 
mentioned my having cerebral palsy, commonly referred to as being "spastic". I believe 
this to have been the result of starvation of oxygen during the birth process causing 
damage to my central nervous system. It is likely that damage to the cerebellum, a part of 
the brain instrumental in seeing that we physically retain our balance, causes me extra 
problems in staying on my feet. But, also, the cerebellum uses feedback to refine the 
grosser movements instigated by the motor cortex and if mine is failing to do this as well 
as it should, then, I am more likely to make the kind of movements which will throw me 
off balance in the first place. As this statement shows, I am aware of the problem I have 
and I attempt, consciously, to correct my failing sense of balance as the need arises. 111e 
trouble, as I see it, is that because the autonomic nervous system, to which the 
cerebellum contributes, is so much quicker in its monitoring of events than is the case 
where things remain under conscious control, trying to correct a failing autonomic 
process is like trying to mesh a slow gear with a fast one. Occasionally, in my case, the 
attempt is successful and I manage to stay upright but, quite often, it is not and I fall 
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over. Sometimes it is a real battle, as when I almost regain my balance but lose it again 
before I can restore the equilibrium and cstablish a position from which my balance can 
cope. There is, also, the possibility that my free-flowing self-awareness becomes acutely 
self-conscious which, itself, interferes with whatever advantage could be derived from 
the unfailing part of my autonomic nervous system. Here, I would argue, is an instance 
where one's ability to stand outside one's own image of the Self is important. As Herrigel 
(1953) writes in Zm ill the Alt qf Annery, tlle skill is not in the concentration of shooting 
an arrow but in correct breathing. The point is in avoiding the over-concentration which 
mars the shot by diverting attention and allowing the shot almost to take care of itself by 
adopting a celltred Self (see my Chapter Three - Hlm,an Nature atld the Se!Jj approach in 
place of a Self centred dominance. Once a process has been learnt by the autonomic 
nervous system tryillg too hard merely gets in the way of a free-flowing movement, as my 
own unusual problem has helped me to realize. 
\Vhat this reveals is the tension between what our bodily machine will do and what we -
as disembodied wills - can make it do. And what that seems to reveal is that the binary 
opposition between body and will, the material and the immaterial, determinism and 
free-will, just is not an adequate characterisation of what is going on here. There are 
things our consciousness simply cannot will directly. To refer again to Herrigel's archery 
example, the Kyudo archer must, once tlle bow has been drawn and the arrow directed at 
the target, maintain complete immobility if tiny bodily movements are not to ruin the 
accuracy of the shot. This is quite impossible. Firstly, because complete immobility 
would mean tllat the string cannot be loosed and the shot made. But, secondly, because 
the more the archer concentrates on willing the muscles not to move under the strain of 
a fully drawn and powerful bow, the more the muscles will twitch and shake with effort. 
The body will do what it will do and tlle conscious mind cannot will it to do otllcrwise. 
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But the whole of Kyudo as a Zen discipline is to teach the archer not to ~ anything, 
not to try and direct the shot or control the muscles - in effect, to efface the conscious 
mind completely and be only a body, a bow and an arrow. And then the shot will make 
itself. 
This suggests that what we cannot will directly, we can learn to will indirectly. The less 
we attempt to control what we can do, the more we are able to do (though this 
conveniently leaps over many years of practice, failures and patient teaching, at least in 
the case of Kyudo); the less we attempt to be a mind and a will and the more we are 
content simply to be our bodies, the more, paradoxically, we are able to control our 
bodies. 
In acquiring a skill, such as driving a car or juggling, we are unconsciously programming 
our autonomic nervous system. Many of these skills are delicate operations calling for 
synchronization - confidence rather than anxiety, but this, of course, is something which 
is gradually built up as errors are removed and the system proves itself. Such detection of 
errors and the recursive feedback of information can be either autonomic, the sort of 
function that a thermostat performs in a central heating system, or under conscious 
control, as when a computer programmer intervenes to modify a program to cater for 
some initially unforeseen occurrence; the former is, of course, a more immediate 
response than tile second is able to be. Hopefully, the effect of conscious intervention is 
beneficial but this is not always the case and, again, the gross amplification of my 
experience, resulting from my balance problem, is a frequent reminder that intervention 
can be more like throwing a spanner into the works rather than using one as a fine 
adjusting tool. There is a common experience in which when self awareness becomes self 
consciousness we all begin to make mistakes. Once educated by experience, the 
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autonomic nervous system will respond automatically like a well written computer 
programme and the so-called unnecessary fine tuning of an over anxious programmer 
has the potential for making things worse as well as for making them better. Maybe, such 
conscious interference (observation) affects the wave/particle flip over at the level of 
quantum physics. Perhaps, at this level, things are in an unpredictable, free flowing, wave 
form and it is at a higher level of conscious reasoning that intelligence/order manifests 
itself. 
Quantum physicist, John Archibald Wheeler, thinks that human consciousness is the 
crucial missing link between the bizarre world of electrons and our everyday reality. It 
should be understood, of course, that there is a limit to the number of possibilities or 
virtual transitions into which a wave fans out. However, Wheeler demonstrated 
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, formulated in 1927, which states that we have the 
option of either measuring the velocity of a wave or determining the position of a 
particle but not both together since our interference, e.g. observation, in performing one 
or the other in some way determines whether the wave-nature or the particle-nature ot: 
say, a pl~oton is exhibited. In his repeat of what is known as the "Young's" double-slit 
experiment, Wheeler released a photon in the direction of a screen with two slits in it and 
two particle detectors on the opposite side. ll1is gave the photon the option of travelling 
through either one or both slits (remember that in quantum physics more than one 
possibility - virtual transition - may take place simultaneously). The result was that the 
photon behaved like a particle and went through just one slit. When, however, \Vheeler 
placed a detector screen between the screen with the slits (Young's interferometer) and 
the detectors, the photon behaved like a wave, going through both slits, interfering with 
itself, and leaving an interference pattern on the detector screen. It seems reasonable to 
point out that, as this experiment shows, the consciousness which seems to contribute to 
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the particle/wave state is not just mediated through human awareness. That Wheeler 
believes in a participatory universe is demonstrated by his comment, quoted by Zohar 
(1991,29 from Wheeler, 1983:199) that: 
l3eyond particles, beyond fields of force, beyond geometry, beyond time and 
space themselves, is the ultimate constituent (of all there is), the still more 
ethereal act of observer-participancy. 
The unique attribute of human consciousness causes us to be acutely aware of ourselves 
when we realize that we are the focus of someone's attention. Although we know that 
staring at someone is an intrusion of their private space we sometimes find it irresistible. 
Staring has this effect, according to Newman and Lonsdale (1996), because we use our 
eyes to initiate social interaction and for that reason they demand a response. Is this an 
observation which disrupts the free flow of self awareness and changes it into self-
consciousness? It does seem that there is a connection but we are not consciously able to 
say what it is. 
McGinn (1993) quotes Schopenhauer (1970) who believed that the intellect exists to 
serve the Will so that it is "a quite abnormal event if in some man intellect deserts its 
natural vocation ... in order to occupy itself purely objectively. But it is precisely this which 
is the origin of art, poetry and philosophy, which are therefore not produced by an organ 
intended for the purpose"(p.127). Like Schopenhauer, McGinn believes that !'eaSOl1 which 
gives us science, mathematics, art and philosophy is the by-product of a biological system 
which has evolved for survival purposes. l3iologically, he thinks, we are educable in 
matters of feeding, fighting, fleeing and mating but the genes constructed human reason 
without so much as a thought to the philosophical powers of the species. 
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Although McGinn thinks that human reason is not suited to solving philosophical 
problems such as that of COllSaOIlSlless, self, free-will, a priori knowledge, etc., he holds that 
it could possibly be that some other epistemic/ semantic system within us has already 
solved the problem but that we have no conscious access to its contents. 111is hypothesis 
he calls TN (Ibnscendental Naturalism). Stating that (p.137ft) m:ysteries are only 
mysteries to a given faculty, he asks whether any other of our faculties could be more 
gifted at philosophy than is conscious reasoning. I -Ie says that the way to act about 
answering this question is to ask whether some other faculty in us lIeeds to have the kind 
of philosophical knowledge or information that reason finds so elusive. The two possible 
faculties he puts forward are the brain and the genes. It is tantalizingly tempting to go 
along with McGinn's argument but although he acknowledges that "the genes are clearly 
not miracle minds privy to transnatural information about our constitution" but that 
"they are brutely molecular compounds, and what they encode is strictly earthbound", 
there does seem to be an implied intelligence at work as though these other faculties, brain 
or genes, purposely set out to solve these paradoxes of philosophical intrigue. By 
suggesting that the brain's self-directed causal activity is theory-drivel/, McGinn risks fa\ling 
into the trap, against which I warn in my Chapter Five - Illusion and tlle Imagined Se1t: 
of unwarrantedly introducing intentionality into the argument. As argued above, our 
development does not depend upon our brains but on the DNA blueprint held within 
any single human cell. This, however, does not mean tl1at our genes, working as a pre-
written and unalterable program that we inherit from our parents, are any better as 
candidates for possessing a worked-out tl1eory of consciousness. If we are to accept the 
theory of evolution, then we must accept that those species (animal or vegetable) that are 
best able to propagate their genes will survive, whilst countless others do not - it is a 
process of random, ratller than intentional, selection. It cannot be that either our genes 
63 
64 
or our brains lleeded fo klloJlJ how to code for consciousness but that once having done so 
by accident this proved to be advantageous to gene survival and, therefore, flourished as 
unconscious beings would not. I do think that McGinn's argument that human reason is 
not capable of understanding consciousness has more than a grain of truth in it. Perhaps, 
if we could understand consciousness then we would not be the creatures we are. 
Nevertheless, as futile as the enterprise might seem to be I cannot see this stopping our 
endeavour, for this too is tied up with being the creatures we are! I am inclined to agree 
with Ward (1996) that evolution can only be understood from the belief that an 
intelligent Mind underpins the exacting laws which our sciences can only partially 
interpret. In this paradigm, mind is an absolute value against which to plot and explain 
other things but I do not claim it exclusively. Perhaps it is just a term to express a sea of 
nothingness along which the force of creation travels giving rise to emergent clustered 
masses just as the force of the sea gives rise to waves. 
It is unlikely that McGinn's supposition that "consciousness is like turning on a light" 
would be supported by Susan Greenfield, the neuroscientist, who in her book Jo"f'II~Y 10 
the eetltm if the Milld (1995) argues that the conscious self constantly changes from one 
group of neurons to the next as each group gains pre-eminence according to what most 
claims the focus of attention. For her a more plausible description of consciousness is 
that it is graded, like turning up a dimmer switch, and grew as the brain did in terms of 
both evolution and individual development(p.132). This view of a/fel/fiol/ flClfS is 
reminiscent of Aldous Huxley in his book The Doors if Perceptiofl (1954) in which he said 
that the brain acts as a redllcillg IJaitJe so t11at only those things we need to know for 
survival purposes become the focus of conscious attention. Imagine being aware of 
everything the brain is occupied in doing such as controlling heartbeat and temperature, 
breathing, regulating fluid balance and hunger and directing learned sequences of actions, 
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like driving a vehicle. Such a situation would produce overload and confusion and, to 
some extent, this is part of the disabling effect of schizophrenia where'different focuses 
of attention overlap so that one line of thought cannot be sustained because it is 
constantly being side-tracked by extraneous and irrelevant associations (5). 
Greenfield's argument is that consciousness is often retained even where brain injury has 
resulted in the loss of large populations of neurons(p.19). What correlates with 
consciousness are different sizes of neuron groupings that form assemblies of 
consciousness. Her hypothesis of varying clusters of neurons producing different 
conscious centres at anyone time is a spatial concept whereas the unitary nature of 
subjective conscious experience could be essentially tetlporaL As she says, many different 
people can stand on the same spot, but only one person at a time(p.88). However, as the 
philosopher, Galen Strawson, points out "correlations are not explanations" - when we 
correlate sensory experiences with certain brain activation we get just that, correlations, 
and these are not explanations (Campbell, 1996). I think that here we are back with 
McGinn's scepticism - it does seem that our best descriptions of neurological patterning 
are unlikely to explain either consciousness or thought. Even our sense of Self is only 
partly open to scrutiny - that part tl1at we are conscious of but, as we have seen, much of 
the input is not under our control. 
Section Two 
Transcendental View 
Ilaving reached this hiatus in my attempt to say what consciousness is I want to !fse 
consciousness to re-focus my attention on how consciousness can be used. This is like a 
driver of a car coming to terms with the fact that there are things going on under the 
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bonnet which slhe still does not understand but being detennined, nevertheless, to 
improve their driving skills. As emphasized throughout this thesis, in one way or another, 
there are things for which we cannot give a full scientific account but whose use is 
undoubtedly beneficial, like a scientist frustrated at not understanding everything about 
quantum physics and yet knowing that his predictions using quantum calculations will 
give precise and accurate results. So, how should we lise consciousness? 
In the early 1950s Huxley, being interested in the profound changes in consciousness 
brought about by chemicals and knowing about the similarity, in chemical composition, 
between the drug, mescalin, derived from turnip-shaped cactus and known locally to 
North American Indians as "peyote", and the naturally produced, adrenalin, took four-
tenths of a gramme of mescal in, which he claimed had caused him to see "what Adam 
had seen on the first morning of his creation - the miracle, moment by moment, of 
naked existence" (1953:7). Such was the intensity of his awareness that he felt that 
objects were being thrust upon him insistent of his attention. One aim of the esoteric 
disciplines of eastern philosophies is to remove "blindness" or the "illusion", to 
"awaken" a "fresh" perception. "Enlightenment" or "illumination" are words often used 
for progress, for a breakthrough in the level of awareness - flooding a dark spot with 
light. The Indian tradition speaks of opening a third eye, of seeing more from a new 
vantage point. For William Blake it was a "cleansing of the doors of perception so that 
everything would appear as it is, infinite". One of the aims of concentrative meditation is 
the opening up, or deautonomisation, of awareness so that, as is said in Zen training, one 
sees something as one saw it the first time even though it may be the five-hundredth time 
of seeing it. This the Buddhists call "mindfulness". We need to be able to break free of 
habits where repetition has dulled our awareness, as when one is used to driving a car 
where the direction indicator control is on the left of the steering column whilst the 
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wiper control is on the right, it is sometimes found that on then driving a car in which 
the controls are reversed the wipers are occasionally turned on in mistake for the 
indicator. The benefits of the autonomic nervous system need not rob us of the 
possibility of seeing things afresh when we really want too. 
Changes in the chemistry of the body may have considerable effects upon the brain and, 
not least, upon consciousness. V./e automatically limit our perception - if we became 
aware of each quantum of energy reaching us we would probably be dead within a day; 
we tune out the constancies of the environment and discard many slow-changing and 
subtle phenomena. However, by reducing the amount of available sugar, as would be the 
result of fasting for example, the brain's biological efficiency is lowered which makes 
possible the entry into consciousness of material possessing no survival value. Yogic 
breathing exercises practised systematically, after a time, result in long suspension of 
breath that lead to high concentration of carbon dioxide (C02) in the lungs and blood 
which lowers the efficiency of the brain as a reducing valve and permits visionary or 
mystical experiences from "out tl1ere" to enter conscious awareness (Huxley, Appendix1, 
p.l04). Huxley goes on to say that in earlier times dentistry was non-existent and there 
were no safe antiseptics. In these circumstances, most people had focal infections 
throughout their lives which [together with a poor diet] would affect the chetpical 
balance of the brain and make them more susceptible to having visionary and mystical 
experiences. To an unbeliever this shows that such experiences are not genuine spiritual 
occurrences but this is, perhaps, to ignore the fact that all our experiences are chemically 
conditioned, and if we imagine that some of them are purely spiritual, intellectual, or 
aesthetic, this is simply because we have never troubled to investigate our internal 
chemical environment at the moment of their occurrence. Such a debunking argument is 
11011 seqllitm; all that has been shown is that knowing the chemical condition of 
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transcendental expertence there are various ways of bringing about such conditions. 
Similarly, we now associate experiences concerning a belief in an Ultimate Being with 
temporal lobe activity but this no more proves that such belief is not genuine th,m it 
proves that God communicates to the believer via his/her temporal lobe (see Chapter 
Six - Spiritllality alld the Creatil!e Se!f - where I mention Augustine's notion that human 
instinct creates a desire to praise God). 
The holistic concept of eastern philosophy invite a more lateral way of thinking in 
contrast with the linear concept of western philosophy which proceeds IOg1cally from 
step to step. Its like puzzling an anagram which is lineal by placing the letters in a holistic 
circle. The holistic character of quantum physics defies our attempts to explain it in the 
IOg1callanguage of classical physics and yet the importance of both is undeniable as is the 
appreciation of both art and science which again defy a common bond. How can our 
logical reasoning be complemented by the creativity which relies upon a more holistic 
experience? Concentrative meditation is intended to alter ordinary, linear consciousness; 
it is a shift from the normal analytical world containing separate, discrete objects and 
persons to one of unity which is intuitively complementary to our more commonly 
recognized conscious dimension in which rational, sequential order is the recognized way 
to think. Meditation is an attempt to alter consciousness in such a way that other aspects 
of reality can become accessible to the practitioner, who then can add personal 
knowledge to intellectual. 
The psychologist, Robert Ornstein, President of the Institute for the Study of Human 
Knowledge, says there are two modes of consciousness, which he depicts as "day" and 
"night". The "day" is the linear consciousness most familiar to western culture; "night" is 
holistic and receptive. He writes(1972:173-4): 
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In many writings, the traditional psychologists stress that thoughts, the "mind" 
in the restricted "left-hemisphere" sense, are the barrier to entering the other 
mode of consciousness. Patanjali, the author of Yoga Slil/ras, defined his 
discipline: "Yoga is the inhibition of the modifications of the mind." In Zen the 
intent is to "stop conceptualizing while remaining fully awake." Our thoughts 
and expectations construct and maintain our personal consciousness as it is. To 
alter the construction, say the esoteric psychologists, ordinary thoughts must be 
placed in abeyance for a while. Thus a function of concentrative meditation is to 
"turn off" the active verbal mode, and especially, to avoid thinking. Some monks 
even take "vows" of silence, to restrict the province of the verbal-intellectual 
mode. Certain highly developed and seemingly bizarre exercises are performed 
to rid the practitioner of a strict reliance on verbal intellectuality. These often 
involve questiolls which can have no possible verbal-rational solution: the koan 
exercise of the Zen tradition is one example. 
Our sense organs, by their very physiological design, detect only a small fraction of the 
available energy, and of the energy to which we are sensitive, it is primarily challges in the 
input that are transmitted to the brain. Any process beyond the "ordinary" sense range, 
as well as any constant process within our normal sense range, usually escapes our 
consciousness. 'TIlis, in the first intense, was probably for survival purposes and agrees 
with what scientific research of contemporary psychology tells us about the brain 
controlling input, building models, and responding automatically to the external 
environment. Eastern, esoteric, psychology refers to this as man lacking full awareness of 
his surroundings and sees it as a barrier to development. TIle practise of meditation is 
seen as an attempt to tum off linear, verbal activity (predominantly a process of the 
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brain's left hemisphere) temporarily and to allow the more receptive and holistic (right) 
side to dominate. Following this, we bring "fresh" resources to sensory input and see it 
as from a new perspective - it is a way of jumping out of well-worn grooves in our 
thinking pattern. Every stimulus is to enter consciousness devoid of normal input 
selection, model-building, and automatic categorizing. In T(nU1scendental) M(editation), 
"cosmic consciousness" is a state of objective awareness which is reflected as by a 
mirror, instead of being filtered through an intellect grown dull by repetition. By 
withdrawing from the light, as in meditation, or by chemically intensifying perception, 
one becomes aware of what has previously been hidden, as when stars are unseen during 
daylight. Ornstein (p.207) illustrates this by recounting an ancient eastern story that tells 
of a teacher who is searching the floor. When his student arrives he asks what his teacher 
is doing and is told that he is looking for a key. The student joins in the search but, after 
some period of unsuccessful looking, he asks his teacher where exactly he had lost the 
key. His teacher says that he had lost the key in his house. "So," asks the student, "why 
are you looking here?" "Because," replies his teacher, "there is more light out here than 
in my house." We are so accustomed to looking for the key to reality outside of ourselves 
that we are in danger of even denying the existence of inner reality. Often we forget that 
the light of daytime, to which we are so acclimatized, prevents us from contemplating the 
stars that, with a little practice, are clearly visible at night. I believe it to be an urgent need 
of our times to rediscover our inner conscious reality. As Schopenhauer saw it, we can 
know tl1e outer world only by reference to our inner world. 
Whilst our development as conscious individuals has proved useful for biological survival 
when we were threatened by predators, much of the adrenalin which now flood our 
alerted systems is unused in our sedentary occupations and our aggressive behaviour 
needs careful management by way of physical exercise and an understanding of our 
70 
71 
evolved condition (6). Many of the threats that we now face are societal and global. This 
, 
is a time when we need, more than ever, to reassess the human con'dition to see the 
threat from pollution, under-development, war, etc. which we face and to come to terms 
with our need for a holistic approach alongside the more linear approach which has been 
our western way for so long but which is less and less able to provide the solutions that 
are now required. Technology by itself can be lethal as well as good. Today, the weakest 
link in the chain of progress is man's own behaviour for that is what governs which side 
of technology, that is, good or bad, will be deployed. For man to control his destiny he 
must control himself, not only as an individual, but as an individual who is part of a 
greater unity. It is now more essential than ever that we recognize that our imagining of 
the Self needs liberating from the tyranny of the ego so as to be realized in what I call the 
"centred" Self. 
In our efforts to demystify the world and limit what we call reality to the result, we 
unnecessarily limit our horizons and lose the freshness and wonder we had as children 
when analyses was less of an issue. By using the left side of our brain in preference to, if 
not to the exclusion of, the right side we have become unbalanced in favour a linear 
approach to the philosophy of consciousness. In this way what we perceive has all the 
mathematical exactness of a body described by science but lacks the breath to make it 
alive. If we were to explain to a people, not accustomed to the power of technology, that 
there existed high-frequency electromagnetic radiation waves in the air which carried 
information, music, and entertainment of all kinds they would find it hard to believe. 
After all, they would not be able to perceive any such thing unless they had a television 
receiver. Likewise, our unaided senses remain ignorant of so much. As we develop 
during childhood we learn to conceptualize and categorize input from our environment 
so that, gradually, we become consciously aware only of what is familiar: we hear our 
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own name at lower volume than other words and become aware of it being mentioned 
among the general cacophony of sound which we would otherwise filter out; we 
recognize an English word more quickly than a random sequence of letters; and, we see a 
red ten of diamonds much quicker than we would see a red ten of clubs. Meditation, 
mantras, mandalas, koans, parables, and the repeated mythical story are all ways of 
avoiding the groves worn by our autonomous, if not lazy, way of thinking so that we do 
perceive the unfamiliar and recognize the familiar as we did when we first perceived it. 
Section Three 
Emergent Integration 
Since it is my intention, stated in my introductory chapter, to look at the neurology 
behind the personality of the Self where some impairment is present in the brain, I want 
to conclude this chapter on Consciousness and the Self by considering the plight, of 
those who suffer from a serious neurological dysfunction - the syndrome known as 
Seasonal Affective Disorder. This is a worrying winter disorder which is caused by sun 
and daylight starvation rather than the cold weather. In the past "winter blues", with their 
mood changes and low energy levels, have been blamed on the effects of the cold and 
being cooped up inside for a long period of time but, more recently (c.1980), it has been 
found tl1at lack of daylight is tl1e cause of tl1e problem affecting around half a million 
people in Britain alone. Clearly, the impairment we are looking at here is chemically 
based. Depression and a lack of incentive to do anything is caused by tl1e pineal gland 
over-producing the morphenous hormone, melatonin. This gland, lying deep within the 
skull, deVelops from the forebrain. Descartes tl10ught of it as "tl1e seat of tl1e soul", there 
being just one soul and one pineal gland, but it is now better known, as it is in Hinduism, 
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by the phrase "the third eye" because, being thought to be sensitive to light, it keeps the 
body informed about changes in day length. 
When photons of light pass through the eye they produce signals in the optic nerve that 
are sent, not only to visual centres of the occipital lobe at the rear of the brain, but to the 
hypothalamus which controls our biological clock(s) or circadian rhythms (biorhythms). 
Signals are then sent, via the spinal cord to the pineal gland, which moderates its output 
of melatonin - light is the signal for ceasing to produce the hormone whilst darkness is 
the signal to make it. Anyone who has wrestled with tl1e attempt to stay awake when 
tiredness is trying to get a hold will know what an unequal task this can be. Not only 
does it appear that our consciousness is mediated by light-produced chemical action but 
melatonin also triggers a host of other activities which operate under tl1e influence of a 
network of biological timekeepers. Along with sleep, these include hunger, sexual desire, 
moods, temperature, alertness and thinking. The bodies biological time-pieces are 
synchronized in such a way as to force heartbeat, blood-pressure, temperature and sleep 
to be regulated together in daily cycles. TI1e female menstrual cycle is another example of 
a regulated biological occurrence. Hormones prepare a lining in the womb ready for 
pregnancy but if the egg is not fertilized this lining is shed and a period ensues. 
Light is the key to the rhythm of life. For thousands of years we have incorporated 
rhythms of light and dark, day and night, into our bodies. Toads, mice and squirrels go 
into a state of shallow hibernation as autumn brings shorter, colder days. Birds migrate. 
Insect-eating species such as warblers, flycatchers and wagstaffs fly thousands of miles to 
tropical Africa in search of food and warmth. Research has shown (Guardian Education, 
SthOct.,1993) that removing the pineal "light-dark" regulator puts animals out of 
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synchrony with nature. In this condition they might mate at a time when food is in short 
supply or when it is too cold for their offspring. 
My argument that consciousness is a subcortical phenomenon emanating from the 
hypothalamus which is stimulated by particle elements, themselves involved in the 
structures of chemicals, is thus supported. Also, as part of the limbic system, it would 
seem that our levels of consciousness and focus of attention are altered by the way we 
feel - our emotional response. In this way we generate our own personal consciousness, 
concentrating on those things that mean a lot to us and are, therefore, uppermost in our 
minds, whilst screening out things of less significance. As architects of our own personal 
consciousness, and with the aid of the process of individuation, we may shift our 
attention away from an ego-driven consciousness, where we are too attached to the 
wheel of desire, suffering, satisfaction and boredom leading back to desire. One of the 
reasons why nonattachment to lt1orfd!y pleasures is a major part of meditative discipline is 
that extended consciousness is an attempt at a total present-centredness where sensual 
pleasures are accepted as they come but have not the clinging hold over us of something 
we must have. Normal consciousness, on the other hand, is constructed in the mind-set 
of past experiences and urged on by our expectations and needs. Ornstein(p.178) says: 
In its effect on awareness, the practice of nonattachment can be considered an 
additional way to remove the normal restrictions on input. If there are no 
desires, there is less bias at anyone moment toward specific "tuning" of 
perception. Our awareness of the external environment becomes less restricted, 
less an interaction, less a function of our desires at the moment, more like a 
mirror. 
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Merely abstaining while still desiring is useless. The obstacle to our development is not in 
partaking of something but being attached to it in an addictive way. St. 'Paul said that he 
had learned to be content with whatever state he found himself to be in (Phil 4:11). Jesus 
emphasized the need to be in the world but not of it (In 17:16), also that we should have 
the mind of a child (Matt. 18:3). 'TIl is involves a process of dehabituation and 
deautonomization. As we develop we build models of the environment against which we 
test and select future input. Such models, partly based on our culture and upbringing are 
limiting, are limiting in that they cause us to be creatures of habit, automatically checking 
new situations against them instead of looking with the flexible mind which we possessed 
during childhood. Concentrative meditation, such as TM (Transcendental Meditation), 
cuts down the input of which we allow ourselves to be conscious (a mantra in the case of 
TM) with the intention of dismantling the automaticity and selectivity of ordinary 
awareness. The Sufis characterise ordinary consciousness as a state of "deep sleep" or 
"blindness" - an over concern with the irrelevant dimensions of the world. George 
Gurdjieff, who was trained by dervishes, says tllat man places shock absorbers between 
himself and the world (Ornstein, p149), "We must destroy our buffers; children have 
none; therefore we must become like little children." This is reminiscent of the teaching 
of Jesus, quoted above, as well as being part of otller eastern wisdom already referred to. 
In Indian thought ordinary consciousness is compared to a "drunken monkey" living 
solely in his own constructs-the world of illusion. The metaphorical meaning of the "fall" 
in Judaic/Christian tradition has the same implication, whilst in Buddhism, 
consciousness of Self is like Jung's individuated Self - ego, as non-existent, being just a 
concession to current terminology. 
Whatever they are, wherever they come from, consciousness and the Selves we create, 
are more than the sum of their mediating neurological parts. We should not allow our 
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lack of complete understanding to stand in the way of the partial enlightenment which 
their employment offers us. For a balanced view, we need both the more scientific or 
neurological aspect of the left brain hemisphere and tJle aesthetic or transcendental 
aspect of the right hemisphere. Just as science and art seem to run on parallel lines that 
never meet but are nevertheless both of value for our survival so, I believe, are both the 
neurological and the transcendental view of consciousness and Selves. Here, indeed, our 
concept of binary opposition must allow us to bring these two seeming separate strands 
together so that, as with DNA, we may see them in their complementary whole (7). 
In this chapter I have looked at the neurobiological input which goes into the creation of 
the Self and the contribution made by both our conscious and unconscious processes. By 
demonstrating the way in which we are in the grip of evolved biological programming I 
have argued tJlat our present environment can be coped with far better when we 
consciously act to turn our imagined Self into a cetltred Self. 
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Chapter Three 
Human Nature and the Self 
"Whereas for K'lnt the thing-in-itself was unknowable, impenetrable to speculative reason, 
for Schopenhauer it is knowable, it is Will, the principle which explains not only individual 
human nature, but the whole world". Thus Copleston (1946:75) succinctly pinpoints one of 
the main differences between Kant (1724-1804) and Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and in 
doing so, isolates what is for me a more Western philosophically individualistic view of the 
Self from the rather psychological and holistic approach of Eastern philosophy. 
Schopenhauer, Copleston tells us, would retire in the evening to consider texts from the 
Indian Upanishads. Although the Upanishads represent for the Hindu approximately what 
the New Testament represents for Christians it is evident tl1at whatever temporary 
consolation he may have gained in the late evening was always undermined by his long-term 
search for philosophical truth. Monk (1990:18) tells us that while Schopenhauer accepted 
man's need for metaphysics, he insisted that it is neither necessary nor possible for an 
intelligent honest person to believe in the literal truth of religious doctrine and, to expect 
him to do so, says Schopenhauer, would be like asking a giant to put on the shoes of a 
dwarf. Although Schopenhauer was atheistic in his approach to westernized religion, whose 
hypocrisy he despised, his own inner quest for peace made him a philosopher who, more 
than most, had things to say about religion. The psychoanalyst, Anthony Storr, believes 
(1988:124) that the borders of our understanding, which are between our subjective world 
and the objective world, are being pushed by our desire to "know" and is the same force 
that fuels our longing for inner unity and integration. 
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In this chapter I want to continue to pursue the trail of our phenomemil neurology, which 
in the last chapter led to the transcendent noumenal, and research ways in which one may 
lead to the other. In this endeavour I will draw extensively upon Schopenhauer's recorded 
experiences. 
Schopenhauer's identification of the Ding-an-sich, or thing-in-itself, with the Will was an 
attempt to go beyond the veil of Maya which oriental thinkers, especially Buddhists and 
Hindus, believe separates the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. 111e business of the 
philosopher is not, for Schopenhauer, to be concerned with phenomena that constantly 
change but to be aware of an underlying noumenon, the Will which expresses itself in such 
phenomenal changes; even the individual is the product of the ~ Will and individuality is a 
delusion caused by the conflict of microcosmic individuals at the phenomenal level without 
regard to tl1e macrocosmic unity at a deeper level. Schopenhauer's use of Plato's (eternal) 
Ideas, or unchangeable forms, is akin to the Gestalt theory of later psychology when for 
example, we recognize, say, a chair, regardless of the diversity of individual chairs, by size, 
shape, and colour. Here, the category of chair takes on a form which is recognized in all 
individual chairs. Towards the end of book two of the first volume of his The l1;7orld as l17ill 
and Representation, Schopenhauer (1966:vol1, 162) expresses the hope that he has: 
succeeded in conveying to the reader the clear certainty that this world in which we 
live and have our being is, by its whole nature, through and through U7i1l and at the 
same time through and through repreSCIltatiofl. Everyone finds himself to be this Will, 
in which the inner n~ture of the world consists, and he also finds himself to be the 
knowing subject, whose representation is the whole world; and this world has an 
existence only in reference to the knowing subject's consciousness as its necessary 
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supporter. Thus everyone in this twofold regard is the whole world itself, the 
microcosm; he finds its two sides whole and complete within himself. And what he 
thus recognizes as his own inner being also exhausts the inner being of the whole 
world, of the macrocosm. Thus the whole world like man himself, is through and 
through Will and through and through representation, and beyond this there is 
nothing. So here we see the philosophy of Thales, concemed with the macrocosm, 
and that of Socrates, concerned with the microcosm, coincide, since the object of 
both proves to be the same. 
I believe that one of the aims of philosophy today should be to search for a more unified 
view of the world. In our scientific, post-modern, pluralist societies it is no longer possible 
to maintain a single paradigm as an absolute against which all others are simply wrong. The 
advance of quantum physics has shown us that thinking in terms of objects, boundaries, 
concepts and categories is insufficient if we are to research the inner depths of nature. 
Categories, for example, no longer exist in the absence of context, as we have seen in the 
illustration of Schrodinger's Cat (see Chapter Two - COllSciOIlSfless and the Se!fj. Rather, we 
need to be able to relate to a web of relationships which take into account the importance 
of the flowing process of balance and harmony. Schopenhauer's foray into Hindu or 
Buddhist writings may have been a combination of both relaxation from a day spent with 
the logical demands of Western philosophy and his hounding quest for something to make 
sense of the world and his existence in it. Whatever it was, Schopenhauer had the intuition 
that we have no notion of the world outside apart from interpretation provided by our 
inner processes. Today, we identify these as being produced by our neurological 
functioning. Perhaps it might be not too bizarre to suggest that our brains behave like 
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virtual reality machines (Deutsch, 1997:98-122). Schopenhauer was certainly of the opinion 
that science, the sufficient reason of the phenomenal world, was not going to provide 
answers to all the questions he wished to ask about the Nature of the World and the Nature 
of Man. Through empirical observation, intelligent analysis and conceptualization, science 
can both describe the material world and point to conflict within the individual ego which 
would jeopardize the safety of others so as to preserve itself but it cannot fill the gaps 
between what we know and how we should behave. As Schopenhauer wrote of man 
(1966:voll,332) ce ••• he is ready to annihilate the world, in order to maintain his own self, that 
drop in the ocean, a little longer." After science has advanced our knowledge the decision as 
to its good or evil use rests, outside science, upon human nature. It is in passing through the 
veil of Maya (Ptit/cipitf!Jl illdividllatiollis) that, according to Schopenhauer's metaphysics and in 
line with Eastern thought, we realize the Oneness of the Will which is manifested in its 
objectification in numerous individuals. This is the process of individuation which, in 
Schopenhauer's theory, enables the participant the more to abstain from that egoistic self-
assertion that injures others. Thus, the ethics of unselfishness can be sustained more easily 
when we recognize the unity of Oneness - that what we do affects the All of which we arc a 
part. 
Chopra makes the same point (1993:259-260) when he tells his readers to: 
Understand that the physical world is just a mirror of a deeper intelligence. 
Intelligence is the invisible organizer of all matter and energy, and since a portion of 
this intelligence resides in you, you share the organizing power of the cosmos. 
Because you arc inseparably linked to everything, you cannot afford to foul the 
planet's air and water. But at a deeper level, you cannot afford to live with a toxic 
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mind, because every thought makes an impression on the whole tield of intelligence. 
Living in balance and purity is the highest good for you and the Earth. 
It is in transcending the veil of Maya, going beyond the individual phenomenon of our 
person, that we accept the Oneness of the Will. This is the basis of Schopenhauer's 
morality, the argument is that the good or bad we do to others affects the whole of which 
we are a part. In this scheme of things, we become better or worse off according to what is 
done to the infrastructure, seen or unseen, on which we depend. Love is that which sees 
through the pnllcipitl11l ifldividllatiol1is and this is why Schopenhauer (1966:vol1, 374) writes, 
"All love (agape, caritas) is compassion or sympathy". This undercuts the deontological 
principle of Kant, whom Schopenhauer may have excused on account of the former's age 
when penning his theory, as he appears to have done on another occasion, "I can explain 
this only by Kant's feebleness through age" (1966:vol1, 336). Kant's recognition of true 
goodness and all virtue only when they are based upon the concept of duty and the 
categorical imperative, together with the implied view that felt sympathy is a sign of 
weakness, appears over-clinical given that we are motivated, often in the first instance and 
more quickly by feelings than by reason (1). It is the way we ftel that informs our reason. In 
order to get a stronger purchase on Schopenhauer's thinking we must bear in mind his view 
that suffering is essential to, and inseparable from, life as a whole; that "desire springs from 
a need, a want, a suffering, and that every satisfaction is therefore only a pain removed, not 
a positive happiness brought" (1966:vol1, 375). It is, therefore, a recognition in others which 
identifies with our own that moves our emotions to act in goodness, affection, and 
magnanimously to alleviate such suffering. Consequently it follows that "pure affection" 
(agape, can/as) is sympathy or compassion, tllis being mixed with and, sometimes, overriding 
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our selfishness, expressed as ems and seen as the Will-to-live in all its evolved phenomenal 
manifestations. One has only to look at the acrimonious proceedings in our divorce courts 
to realise that so called romal/lic love is an insufficient bond between two people. 
The argument is that, although we may think of ourselves as discrete-and independent 
individuals, this hugely down plays the extent to which we are dependent parts of a larger 
whole. From that perspective, what might have seemed like self-interest turns out to be folly 
and altruism turns out to be nothing less than prudence. Though from the perspective 
advocated by Schopenhauer and Chopra, the distinction between self-interest and altruism 
may be meaningless in any case. This, apparently metaphysical, perspective is supported by 
modern science, in so far as cosmic unity is the same as the enormously complex inter-
connectedness of things increasingly revealed by physics, mathematics and biology, together 
with the current research into neurobiology. 
Such a vIew that things are so intimately connected is of interest in the light of the 
revelations of modern physics where, at its quantum end, we see a world so ordered and 
instantly communicable that, in comparison with the larger scale of classical physics, a 
butterfly flapping its wings on the other side of the globe would have consequences of 
earth-shattering proportions on this side. The principle of non-locality, which claims that. 
something can be affected in the absence of a local cause, was first demonstrated by 
Einstein who showed that the equations of quantum theory predicted the necessity of 
instantaneous non-locality. Einstein himself was never happy witll this and, indeed, the 
concept that one body can influence another without reference to the phenomena of space 
and time remains one of the greatest conceptual challenges raised by quantum theory since 
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we live in a world whose acceptance of relativity theory, in which no cause, e.g. a signal, can 
travel from one bit of reality to affect any other bit faster than the speed of light, dulls ollr 
capacity to jump to a different way of thinking. However, such synchronous behaviour 
suggested above is, as the physicist Danah Zohar (1991: 21) writes: 
the basis of all quantum mechanical relationships, lending a very modern note of 
support to the pre-Socratic Greek notion of the "oneness of Being". 
Deepak Chopra, (above, p.227), writes, "Our bodies are intelligent everywhere. Brain 
chemicals aren't secreted just from our heads; our skin, stomachs, intestines, and heart 
produce them. White blood cells floating through the immune system are outt"itted with the 
same receptors for neurotransmitters - they form a kind of floating brain. The skin secretes 
more endocrine hormones than does the endocrine system itself." Chopra has already 
demonstrated this intelligence of the body (pp135-8) which is shown both at the level of 
thought and the level where molecules are produced to carry messages around the body. 
The merging of the two seems to take place at the quantum level, where abstract and 
concrete are less differentiated. That the mouth watering experience, in which salivary 
glands under the tongue start secreting two digestive enzymes, can be caused by the 
expectation/thought of a desired dish as well as its actual presence, was established early in 
the 1900s by Pavlov (1849-1936). Chopra points out that "words and images function just as 
well as "real" molecules to trigger the ongoing process of life." He goes on to say that: 
Nothing in nature is more miraculous than this transformation. Turning lead into 
gold is trivial by comparison, for lead and gold are just minor reshufflings of a few 
protons, neutrons, and electrons. If you hear the words "I love yo/I' and your heart 
starts to pound, a much more astonishing metamorphosis has taken place. An 
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emotion in another person's mind has been transformed into moiecules of adrenalin 
rushing through your bloodstream. These, in turn, activate receptors situated on the 
outside of your heart cells, which in turn tell each cell that the appropriate response 
to love is to twitch faster than normal. More important, the body feels transformed-
knowing that you are loved, you feel a sense of lightness and joy, the world appears 
more vivid, and everyday problems seem to vanish. 
The research work of Clive Backster, the polygraph expert, whom Chopra quotes, also 
demonstrates an amazing quantum connectedness. The purpose of the polygraph or lie 
detector, is to determine the tense or relaxed state of the person being tested. It works by 
measuring the small changes in the skin's galvanic response which is the ability to conduct 
electricity. Not only can lies be detected by this method but the same differences are caused 
when threat or arousal are present. Backster found that the electrical discharge from cells, 
scraped from the inside of someone's mouth and connected to a polygraph, remained even 
and flat while their owner was sitting still but spiked wildly when s/he was roused by 
looking at erotic pictures - this occurred even when the cells and their owner where seven 
miles apart. It is apparent that there is much more happening beyond the range of our 
senses than science can explain. Interestingly, The Amplifled Nell} Testame1lt (1968:583) 
explains "faith" as "perceiving as real fact what is not revealed to the senses". 
A second point worth recovering from Schopenhauer is his theory of the mind and, 
especially, his prefiguring of the concept of repression and the unconscious later to emerge 
in the writings of Freud and Jung which I shall mention later in this chapter. He arrived at 
this by what, to us, may seem a strange route. Also of note is that the young Schopenhaucr, 
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aged 15 yea~s, visiting England for the first time betWeen 24th May and 8th November 1803 
with his parents, following a visit to Westminster Abbey on Tuesday 14th June mused in his 
diary as to whether the poets, heroes, and kings coming from different centuries, whose 
monuments he had seen within the Gothic walls, "themselves are now together somewhere 
where neither centuries, nor social barriers, nor space, nor time, separate them any longer" 
(Bridgwater, 1988: 106). 
Schopenhauer's already questing mind, which had been stimulated by a liberal education 
between 1799 and 1803 at the academy of Dr Johann Heinrich Christian Runge in 
Hamburg, rebelled against the "absurd and revolting superstitions" exemplified for him in 
the joyless, dreary religious atmosphere at the Wimbledon school of the Reverend Thomas 
Lancaster where his parents left him between 30th June and 20dl September 1803. So great 
was the adverse impression made on him at that time that for the rest of his life he was 
always ready to use his excellent command of the English language, much improved by 
Lancaster's tuition, to expose cant and hypocrisy. One commentator (Bridgwater, 1988:370, 
quoting Sutten, 1974:79) goes so far a to write that Schopenhauer's work can: 
most simply be viewed as the attempt to transport to Europe the philosophy of the 
Upanishads and of Theravadin Buddhism, and present this as the natural 
consequence of the true interpretation of the philosophy of Kant. 
It is, perhaps, confusing to refer to Schopenhauer as the philosopher who, more than any 
other, has most to say about religion whilst, at the same time, portraying him as an atheist. 
It is as though the word "religion" is a suitcase-word; its derivation, like that of the word 
"yoga", means whatever binds everything together. Religion is our view of life and cannot 
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be excluded from our thinking just as we cannot pack a suitcase and leave out the case - it is 
the frame around our thinking, our general view of existence that colours the way we see 
the world, and everything we say and do (Morris, 1992:35). Schopenhauer both 
acknowledged man's need for diversion - circuses as well as bread - and warned that man 
has no saviour but himself (Schopenhauer, 1966: voll, 313 & 323). He believed that 
Western religions would never take root in the East; that the ancient wisdom of the human 
race would not be supplanted by the events in Galilee; that, on the contrary, Indian wisdom 
would flow back into Europe, and would produce a universal change in our knowledge and 
thought (1966:vol1, 357). But., even in the final chapter of the first volume of his The If/odd 
as Will afld Representation, he does not sacrifice, what he sees as philosophical truth, for the 
sake of gaining consolation; he writes of death (1966:vol1, 411-2): 
We must not even evade it, as Indians do, by myths and meaningless words, such as 
reabsorption in Brahman, or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. 
Here again we have the picture of a giant realizing the impossibility of stepping into the 
shoes of a dwarf no matter how much he thinks it might feel good to do so once in a while 
- the myth of the Garden of Eden was right in this respect, once you have bitten into the 
fruit of the tree of knowledge there is no going back regardless of how attractive it may 
seem to be. So penetrating has been the insight of Schopenhauer into the nature of 
existence that we can see his influence in later writers such as novelists like Tolstoy, Hardy, 
Conrad, Proust, and Thomas Mann and, particularly, do we find that many of the ideas 
attributed to the psychoanalysts, Freud and Jung, are prefigured in Schopenhauer. The core 
of Freudianism is the idea of the unconscious and our repression of thing'S that we would 
rather not face up to. Perhaps the next most important area of Freudianism is in its 
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recognition of the all-pervasiveness of sexual motivation. Both these concepts had been 
seminal ideas in the work of Schopenhauer but Freud (2) himself, whilst acknowledging 
Schopenhauer's writing about unconsciousness and repression, insisted that he had arrived 
at his conclusions independently. Magee (1983:263) tells us that Schopenhauer had shown 
more insight than anyone else into the role of the unconscious at a time when educated 
people were beginning to encounter that concept for the first time. 
For Schopenhauer, it is the drives of the Will which are the evolutionary force behind 
everything, especially, the Will-to-live demonstrated in the sex drive. Thus, it is the 
metaphysical (or noumenal) Will that is responsible for the creation of the physical intellect 
which is dependent upon the phenomenon of the brain. The Will is the root, origin, and 
controller of the intellect; it's the means by which it seeks to know itself. In this way the 
intellect becomes the knower of the Will which, although known, is unknowing. 
Nevertlleless, Schopenhauer acknowledges that he has only modified Kant's theory rather 
than replaced it in that observation of the Will, the thing-in-itself, is not an immediate 
occurrence but is mediated through the provision of an intellect (1966:voI2, 196). The 
consciousness of an "I" involves the flowing together of the knowing but unknowable 
intellect with the known but unknowing Will. In this respect the "I" still remains a riddle to 
itself since it cannot be said to be completely intimate with itself. Schopenhauer is in 
agreement with Burne til at the "Self' is a bundle of perceptions occurring in quick 
succession, "the mind," writes Burne, "being a kind of tlleatre in which they make their 
'appearances'" (Burne, 1962:302). Nevertheless, the apprehension in which we know the 
stirrings and acts of our own Will is far more immediate than any other, this being the point 
at which the thing-in-itself enters the phenomenon. Such inner knowledge avoids the forms 
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of space and causality which are necessary to bring about all sense perception but is unable 
to do without the form of time in which one act follows another. It is, therefore, a partial 
rather than a complete removal of the veil (of Maya) between the noumenal, absolute 
Oneness, and the phenomenal, transitory, multiple manifestations. 
Both Plato and Freud put forward the theory that the mind has three parts which generally 
equate to 1. reason, 2. activity, energy, liveliness, and 3. the Oower) appetites. There have 
been several versions of this tripartite mind, the most famous being Freud's id, ego, and 
superego. Here the passions are represented by the id and gradually come under the 
supervision of the ego which in turn, is tutored by the superego. A helpful frame of 
reference is one that informs us that the id is the child of our personality, the ego is the 
adult, whilst the superego is the parent, or, as we are told of one psychologist's portrayal, 
the ego is the referee between a sexed-crazed monkey, the id, and a disapproving maiden-
aunt, the superego (Zohar, 1993:66). All this seems to present human beings as explosions 
waiting to happen on a battlefield of the divided psyche. Indeed, in his later work, Freud 
thought the id's coercive "push" force of aggression, together with the seductive "pull" 
force of sexual attraction, both of which he had thought were sublimated by the ego's 
power of reason would cause an unavoidable crisis in society - if tlle id is repressed by the 
conscious ego then neurosis ensues, whereas, if free expression is allowed to the id then 
civilization will be destroyed. Plato writes (Republic, 1955:392) of man being tyrannized by 
uncontrolled drives/passions which especially invade his sleep with thoughts of unnatural 
sexual intercourse. This was the basis from which Freud developed his theory of the 
Oedipus complex. It was because the psyche can be an area of such conflict that, I believe, 
Jung encouraged his patients to follow a path of self-development towards wholeness or 
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integration which he called "the process of individuation" about which he wrote (Storr, 
1988:192-5): 
If the unconscious can be recognized as a co-ordinating factor along with 
consciousness, and if we can live in such a way that conscious and unconscious 
demands are taken into account as far as possible then the centre of gravity of the 
total personality shifts its position. It is then no longer in the ego, which is merely 
the centre of consciousness, but in the hypothetical point between the conscious 
and the unconscious. This new centre might be called the Self. 
Following Schopenhauer, we can say that the "I" occurs at the point where the Will, dittg-
an-sich, emerges as self-conscious phenomenon. It is here that we experience the world as 
Will, here that we become embroiled in the endless cycle of desire, suffering, satisfaction 
and boredom leading back to desire again. And, for the most part, here we stay with our 
consciousness filled by our Will (Schopenhauer, 1966:vol1,195-200). The Will orientates the 
subject towards the wodd in terms of wishes, desires, needs, fears, anxieties, pleasures and 
so on. Every thing is, therefore, seen instrumentally, that is, in relation to the subject and 
the state of the subject at specific times rather than as it is in itself. The Self is skewed by 
this partiality and dominated by its appetites and not, therefore either centred or balanced, 
but self-centred instead of being centred on reality. Neither is this self-centred Self 
genuinely our Self, for it is created by transient and unconsidered drives, needs and anxieties 
rather than our true nature. 
It is only momentarily that we escape from the thraldom of the Will and see the world as 
representation alor~e, free from the motives of the Will. Here Schopenhauer tells us, "we 
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celebrate the sabbath of the penal servitude to willing; peace comes to us of its own accord 
and all is well with us ... a painless state prized by Epicurus as the highest good and as the 
state of the gods". lung's process of individuation seeks to bring together the contributing 
factors of man's personality into an integrated whole. It is important that the whole of our 
resources are not given over wholesale to the Will, which would be to remain a child, but 
that we advance to become balanced personalities. (fhe elasticity, receptivity and wonder of 
a childlike mind need not atrophy in the presence of mature judgement.) This, I have 
chosen to refer to as becoming more a cCfllred Self and less self centred. 
When we look closely, it seems that lung's Self has moved on from Schopenhauer's "I" but, 
again, this same shift is prefigured in Schopenhauer's work in which he went to great 
lengths to explain, what he saw as, the Platonic Ideas that are beyond the senses. It is these 
ideas which the artist momentarily glimpses and tries to express to our grosser perceptions 
that both Schopenhauer and lung, concurring with Eastern philosophical wisdom, saw as 
being beyond the veil of Maya. This affords a limitation to our normal, everyday awareness 
on account of our conscious preoccupation with willing. It is only on the all too rare 
occasions when an external cause or inward disposition suddenly raises us out of the endless 
stream of willing that we contemplate knowledge in its unified form - the species of the Idea 
behind the individual phenomena. This is the state not only prized by Epicurus and the 
Himalayan sage but by Schopenhauer and lung of which Schopenhauer wrote (1966:voI1, 
198): 
... all difference of individuality disappears so completely that it is all the same 
whether the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty monarch or to a stricken beggar; for 
beyond that boundary neither happiness nor misery is taken with us. 
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It is in this state of bliss consciousness, total awareness, that the sage seeks to remain while, 
at the same time, continuing to act in the field of relative existence. It is of no consequence 
whether he lives in an Himalayan cave or in the comfort of Schopenhauer's dwellings for as 
the ancient wisdom of the I3hagavad Gita (1962:53) says: 
He whose mind is untroubled by sorrows, and for pleasures he has no longings, 
beyond passion, and fear and anger, he is the sage of unwavering mind. 
Such a stable intellect gives a feeling of well-being which goes beyond psychological 
theories that have tended to focus particularly on negative effects because of the association 
with medical concepts of disease. Just as Schopenhauer tells us, either an external cause or 
inward disposition can suddenly raise us out of the endless stream of willing so, more 
recently, the psychotherapist Dr Robin Skynner, tells us that the sources of well-being can 
be divided into those that come from outside us and those that have their source within. 
On the external front, not only might we benefit from the contact with nature provided by 
a day in the country or a visit to some work of art but we can arrange other treats like going 
to a restaurant or theatre or having a hairdo. In this respect, although money cannot buy 
happiness it can provide a certain amount of security and comfortable surroundings where 
positive experiences are more easily found or created. However, says Skinner, among a 
number of wealthy people, that he saw in his psychotherapeutic practice, happiness was 
strikingly hard to find. When it comes to inner sources we are told that it is the love one 
feels for others, rather than the enjoyment of being loved, which most enhances one's well-
being(3). 
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It is instructive to re-read Schopenhauer in the light of much current debate, not only in 
philosophy but, between all those with a keen interest in the development of society. Like 
him, we must be aware that science alone cannot supply answers to all the questions we 
have nor, indeed, will it give us immediate solutions to some of our more intractable 
problems involving the way we behave to each other. Even among the clergy of the Church 
of England there are those who realise that a dogmatic approach to some supposed 
absolute truth will do no longer. Such radicals, as they are called, are trying to come to terms 
with a situation in which they have lost out to the more sceptical approach of philosophy, 
science and art. As one of them, Anthony Freeman, says, "There is nothing 'out there' - or, 
if there is we can have no knowledge of it" (Freeman,1993:70). Not only are they less 
dismissive of other religions and cultures but, as Skynner says and as Schopenhauer 
predicted, many are looking afresh at the ancient wisdom of the human race which, thereby, 
is flowing back into Europe. Some of this wisdom can help the celltred Self to remain 
balanced and in harmony when the stresses and tensions of daily life would inveigle us back 
to an ego-driven perspective. Schopenhauer even thought that much New Testament 
Christianity is Indian in spirit and, most probably, in origin, having been informed thereof 
via Egypt (Schopenhauer, 1966: vol2, 488). This view is more recently endorsed by those of 
Gruber and Kersten in their book The Origin of Jesus (1995). For Schopenhauer the ideas 
of eternal life only applies to the Will. It alone has always existed, i.e. had no beginning and 
can have no end. To believe that an infinity of time elapsed before our birth but from that 
point a second infinity begins in which we will be immortal, seems outrageous - only the 
.!J..nborn could be immortal. As the aphorism quoted by Schopenhauer puts it, "Nothing 
comes out of nothing, and nothing can become nothing" (1966:voI2,487). It is the Will that 
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is eternal; its phenomenal manifestations, our bodies of which we are' conscious will die 
since, if birth is an actual rising out of nothing, then death is an actual annihilation. 
Being is the simplest form of awareness. It is the point to which idea..., of Self returns from 
the clutches of ego once the process of individuation is realised. Nothing in the outside 
world is validated apart from the firing of our own personal neural networks, i.e. our brains. 
Not only is our idea of God not "out there" but inside, as Freeman (quoted above) found; 
our idea of everything else is also internal. From here, we not only contact the outside world 
but we create it. What is important, I believe, about the idea we have of Self is that we do 
not allow it to trap us in the past from which it has developed. Self must have both an 
element of the, aptly named, Ego Theory and the Bundle Theory. Our notion of Self has, 
obviously been built up from past experiences and the memories of those experiences 
which are part of our personal neural network but, equally, that network is in the process of 
continual change. The past which forms our emergent ego need not hold us ransom unless 
we mortgage our present to it. If we are to escape the thraldom of past self-images then we 
must be capable of taking a third-person view whereby we are less attached to our own 
limited point of view, realizing it to be the product of our own neurological processes. 
Equally, we should realize that our worldview is culturally defined and should not be 
automatically deemed to be wholly right or wholly wrong. Chopra (above,p.325) writes: 
The highest state of consciousness available to us is unity, which erases the 
distinction between observer and observed. In unity, everything you once thought 
was "out there" is seen to be part of yourself What prevents this experience is a 
false sense built from images of past experiences. 
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Admittedly, we cannot escape an initial sense of Self which is built up from our past - our 
experiences as a child developing in a certain environment at home, with friends, and in 
school - happy and sad memories of these together with achievements and failures, then 
and since, all go into giving us the image we have of ourselves. However, even the seeming 
strait-jacket of the past need not be such when seen from a changed perspective and the 
Self we con"struct 11011' in the present can be liberated; no longer must "the child be father to 
the man" but rather "what we think we are 11011! we are". 
This underlying intelligence which Chopra sees as operating at the quantum level enables us 
to escape from the psychological thraldom of time with its energy-draining regrets and to 
concentrate our whole energy on living nOIP. Our egos would hold us in a crippling grip of 
distortion, albeit regret and dissatisfaction or unrealistic desires, but the individuated 
personality unites both conscious and unconscious in a created Self whose energy flow is 
not drained by either the past nor the future. Our 11011! is supported by unity instead of being 
mortgaged to either past or future. Such a refocusing of our ideas about the nature of the 
Self involve the harmony and balance in freely becoming a celltred Self(4). 
Interestingly, those who meditate seek to enter a field of "calm" similar to the "vacuum 
state" or "quantum void" of the quantum field theory where, although defined by total 
emptiness, there remains the potential for infinite energy. The first two aspects of Buddhist 
meditation are represented by the Sankrit words san/alha and viparyalla. Samatha means 
stoPPiltg, calmil1g, II't1llqlfili(y, whilst vipasyana means illsight, lookiltg deeplY. This same questing for 
inner reality comes to us again in the words of the Old Testament psalm (46:10) "13e still 
(samatha) and kllOIV (vipasyana) that I am God". 
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In this chapter I have shown that the neurological manifestation of human nature can be 
modified as we create a eellfred Self. The fidelity of our neurological system is such that our 
inner subjective interpretation of the objective world cannot possibly be anything but an 
incomplete picture of reality as our intellect strives to present an adequate selection for our 
survival. However, in pushing at the borders between objective and subjective, conscious 
and unconscious, we help to provide for our metaphysical need for inner unity and 
integration. As the phenomenal brain gives us the only intellectual representation of what 
there is to know so it is from here that we create our world from where we communicate 
with those of others. In realizing that all our subjectively created worlds are neurologically 
determined we can adopt a less dogmatic approach as we realize, not only our own fallibility 
but, our own affect upon the environment of which we are a part. 
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Chapter Four 
Morality and the Self 
In this chapter I want to look at our sense of both personal and collective morality within 
the pluralism which defines the post-modern condition. It is only through the moral 
basis of the Self that we can truly create a celltred Self with the potential of being free of 
the desires, fears, anxieties and ambitions by which, otherwise, we repeatedly become 
ensnared. 
At the end of Chapter One - Nellrology alld the S e!f - it was suggested that there are certain 
intangible things, such as our representation of the Self and our values of goodness and 
love which should be cherished for their human survival value, lest, in our desire to be 
independent of our nature we destroy some of the very things on which, unknowingly, 
we depend. Here, I want to suggest that another of these things is our sense of both 
personal and collective morality. It seems that the more we discover about how things 
work at a material level the more we take them for granted and the less value we give to 
their contribution to our inner lives both individually and collectively - similar to the way 
in which children as they develop lose interest in the ,,!ysteries of a conjurer once their 
wonder has been replaced by knowledge of how the "magic" tricks are performed. 
Rudolf Llinas, Professor of Neuroscience at New York University School of Medicine, 
tells (Blakemore/Llinas, 1987:351-2) of a student who, having been particularly interested 
in what he had been taught about the nervous system, said, "But, now that I have learned 
neuroscience, I find that I still do not understand, for instance, how I see". Although the 
student may have been able to recite the functional and anatomical properties of the 
visual system from retina to motor neurons, he felt that even though he could follow the 
whole system, he still had no conception at all of what it is to see (1). As I have argued, in 
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various ways throughout this thesis, there is a need, albeit something as yet unknown to 
scientific analysis, for something that will link what we discover at tI~e micro level to 
possible consequences at tile macro level; it is one tiling to reel off the neurological 
causes of severe back pain but until we are able to relate tIlat, by way of relief, to the 
"whole" man, who is doubled up in agony and unable to stand up straight, then we have 
not dealt with the most serious problem i.e. the overall experienced effect. How do we 
get from the neurology to tile experience? In tile case of vision, "tile point is," as Llinas 
says, "that understanding the function of connectivity of the visual system is not 
sufticient to understand vision". So, in tile case of morality, we should try to link what 
goes on at tile micro level of neurology WitIl our representation of Self, our inner lives, 
and tile social consequences of our actions. Not only should we try to underst'lnd the 
neurology but we should tIlen move on to discover how tIlis can be used in the creation 
of a Self. I want to suggest that we should not see the world in terms of a dichotomy 
between distinct matter and mind, material and spiritual, or even, self and otIlers, but as a 
continuum along which we move easily, back and forth, from one to tile other. In this 
way we will find ourselves not so much becoming independent of our nature as realizing 
just how dependent and co-operative we need to be. 
I want to argue tIlat as with quantum physics tIlere is a unity of which we may be 
unaware between matter and mind, material and spiritual, and self and others. A ceNtred 
Self is aware that the sense of Self is subjectively created tIlrough neurological processes 
and tIlat, as such, it is botIl malleable and less restrictive than was tile old idea of tile Self 
as a fixed objective reality. No longer in tIlraldom to tile ego it is capable of a larger 
degree of detachment and compassion. 
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The dangers of ignoring and neglecting our Selves, what we are, has been well described 
by Jung. Drawing a parallel between the conflict within the Selfs conscious and 
unconscious and that existing between East and West during the Cold War period, Jung 
saw the person like the human race carried away by unconscious powers which are the 
result of collective cultural development. For him the individual, like mankind, is 
threatened by self-created and deadly dangers that are growing beyond his control. In a 
book published shordy after his death he wrote (1964:85): 
... They [Western societies] have begun to realize that the difficulties confronting 
us are moral problems, and that the attempts to answer them by a policy of piling 
up nuclear arms or by economic "competition" is achieving lime, for it cuts both 
ways. Many of us now understand that moral and mental means would be more 
efficient, since they could provide us with psychic immunity against the ever-
increasing infection. 
But all such attempts have proved singularly ineffective, and will do so as long as 
we try to convince ourselves and the world that it is only they (i.e. our opponents) 
who are wrong. It would be much more to the point for us to make a serious 
attempt to recognize our own shadow and its nefarious doings. If we could see 
our shadow (the dark side of our nature), we should be immune to any moral and 
mental infection and insinuation. As matters now stand, we lay ourselves open to 
every infection, because we are really doing practically the same thing as they. 
Only we have the additional disadvantage that we neither see nor want to 
understand what we ourselves are doing, under the cover of good manners. 
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My argument is that becoming a cefltred Self allows us to take a detached, third person, 
view and take account of what Jung called "our shadow". For Jung, the notion that man 
has conquered nature had something of a hollow ring since man has not yet gtlined 
control over his 011/11 nature; the "reason" with which we convince ourselves of our pre-
eminence is our greatest and most tragic illusion. Quoting Pascal's words, "The heart has 
its reasons that reason knows not of", Stuart Sutherland, Professor of Psychology at 
Sussex University, goes on to write that "One must distinguish between rationality and 
morality: attempts to justify morality on a rational basis have always foundered" (1992:7-
8). He goes on to point out that not only are we victims of our instincts and self-serving 
desires but that we are also governed by the state of our bodies, particularly our brains. 
Although not dealing specifically with neurological dysfunction he does instance the 
particular condition where should an epileptic seizure occur due to a focus of nerve cells 
firing simultaneously in the mid-brain of the right hemisphere certain personality changes 
can take place as a result. Such changes can make a person highly religious and cause 
them to avoid sex in any form and to give up all addictions such as smoking and alcohol. 
When the focus is removed the person returns to his previous existence: he may become 
an atheist, go back to cigarettes, alcohol, and the pursuance of sex. Sutherland 
(pp.10&11) speculates that the form that the Christian religion has taken may be, in part, 
due to an epileptic attack suffered by St Paul on the road to Damascus (2). Such 
speculation, however, should not be allowed to detract from the cogency of the teaching 
of this evangelist whose letters to Christians preceded the writing of the gospels. Words 
found in the Letter to the Galatians are apposite to the cetltred Self philosophy that I am 
arguing for. Here we find the crucifixion, not just as an event in time but, as an inner 
experience which transcends time. Paul writes of being crucified with Christ and then 
living a different life. Ifere we have the heart of the conflict with our imagined Self. 
Those who would be nice, unselfish and generous cannot expect any help from their 
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biological nature, as Dawkins says (see Chapter Five - IlltiSioll atld the Imagilled Se!fj but 
such genetic predispositions have to be stood up to as in a personal conflict with oneself. 
In matters of belief, albeit belief in God or prejudice as, for example, against coloured 
people, we often operate on the basis of our "feelings" - our likes and dislikes - rather 
than our intellect - our reason - to decide whether a proposition is true. We sometimes 
create God or dethrone Him/Her not because of sound empirical evidence but 
according to our emotional interaction with our environment at the time; similarly, our 
view of coloured people in general, or any other group whose difforence could be used to 
single them out, may differ considerably alongside our specific interactions at anyone 
moment. Arthur Miller, the playwright O)orn 1915) has written several plays highlighting 
the social problems in America such as his The Cmdble in which the Salem Witchcraft 
trials of 1692 are used as a parable for McCarthyism in the 1950s. In the 1940s he wrote 
his only novel FOCIIS which draws attention to the anti-semitism of that time occurring in 
New York. Briefly, the story has it that a man looking out of his apartment window one 
evening sees a Puerto Rican woman being attacked by a man. He does not interfere 
because he thinks it none of his business and, anyway, the Puerto Ricans should be used 
to such attacks and since she is probably out for no good purpose, she should take care 
of herself. Back at work his boss insists that he buy a pair of glasses to help his failing 
eyesight. TI1cse glasses give him the appearance of being Jewish, and although, in hiring 
people to work in his department, he complies with company policy not to employ Jews 
he himself is demoted so as to give him a job with a less public profile. He leaves and 
seeks work elsewhere. In his own neighbourhood he comes in for persecution from a 
vigilante group who are intent upon forcing all Jews to move out of the area; they've 
already made the only remaining Jewish resident, a newspaper vendor, move. Miller has 
clearly pinpointed the difficulty we have in maintaining a rational conscious hold over 
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what Freud called the "archaic remnants" and lung the "primordial images" of our less 
rational unconscious. Because we are so self-absorbed in an egoistical way our reasons 
becomes informed by negative feelings of fear in the face of change instead of being 
stimulated by creatively positive feelings able to be inclusive, rather than exclusive, of 
others as I am suggesting that a centred Self would be able to be. 
In his book Mall and his SYl1lbofs (1964), lung explains his theory that just as we see all the 
stages of evolution in a growing foetus so there is a "collective unconscious", which 
develops within everyone, that holds the mental expressions, or instincts, of the past. 
These, lung calls "archetypes" and they come from the way our ancestors understood 
their world. lung illustrates this by telling how the primitives of Mount Elgon in Africa 
still follow a tradition passed down by their ancestors in which, every morning, they 
breathe or spit into their hands which they then raise to the sun, I1l1l11ges (from the 
Polynesian root l1Ialla or 111t1l!ltIgll). Such myths, archetypes and symbols have a profound 
affect on the collective unconscious and become part of how we fie! about our existence 
(3). We may recall here the way that God is said to have breathed into Adam the breath 
of life (Genesis 2:7) or, again, into the dry bones to make them live (Ezekiel 37:5&10); 
also, Christ is said to have healed "the man born blind" by using his spittle in order to 
make the clay he applied to the man's eyes Oohn 9:6). Although much of this symbolism 
goes back to what we might think of as a medieval view of life which has since been 
superseded, it remains as part of the collective unconscious behind different cultures. 
The time-hallowed archetypal dream is that of a Golden Age where justice and honesty 
ruled, and when ageing, grief and distress did not exist. Such symbolism, drawn not only 
from the Garden of Edell story but also from other myths which speculated about the 
original conditions of humanity where there was no need to labour, have always provided 
an impetus and symbolism for mankind, particularly noticeable during certain eras like 
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that of Romanticism. Myths of this kind go as far back as the Works and Days of Hesiod 
in Greece which is identified with the time of Kro~os, prior to Zeus, ~r in Rome with 
that of Saturn. 
The Romantic era apart, since the Enlightenment too much emphasis has been placed 
upon "reason" to the detriment of how people feel about things and yet cold rea..<;on 
often lacks the motor it requires to drive it. Many a potentially able student has been left 
behind by those with less intellectual potential but more motivation. The way we feel 
about things is ignored at society's peril. For example, the poor economic conditions in 
Germany following the Treaty of Versailles after the First World War which led to 
unemployment and deprivation among the population and gave rise, during the 1930's, 
to the German government's introduction of the scheme Strength Through Joy and 
compulsory work, for those trapped in poverty, building the autobahns. It was in this 
climate that Hitler mesmerized people, as he did at a rally of some 50,000 people in 
Nuremberg, with his oratory and inHamed their feelings to a point w!-re they overran 
their consideration for the rest of humanity. Once emotions had been stirred, mind 
without heart, rationality without feeling, contributed toward the spirit of Nazism bllt 
naked emotion without sufficient rationality may lead to religious wars as between Jews 
and Arabs, Christians and Moslems, and Sikhs and Hindus. This century has taught us 
just how fragile Kant's "moral law within us" can be, how moral reasoning can so quickly 
be overturned when we feel that we think we can benefit ourselves and escape any 
adverse consequences in doing so, e.g. even corporate bodies might consider dumping 
harmful chemicals into rivers to escape the economic cost of approved disposal methods 
if they could escape detection and the legal consequences. Wilkes (1993:5) reminds us 
(critically) that one test suggested to discover the fundamentality of morality is to ask 
"what if we all had a Gyges ring to make us invisible at will?"(4) If we could escape 
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detection for what we do by occasionally becoming invisible then would we remain 
moral?(5) It is not for nothing that we need independent environmental protection 
agencies, such as Green Peace. Parfit writes of the Samaritan's Dilemma (1984:60): 
Each of us could sometimes help a stranger at some lesser cost to himself. Each 
could about as often be similarly helped. In small communities, the cost of 
helping might be indirectly met. If! help, this may cause me to be later helped in 
return. But in large communities this is unlikely. It may here be better for each if 
he never helps. But it would be worse for each if no one ever helps. Each might 
gain from never helping, but he would lose, and lose more, from never being 
helped. 
So, how can we realize the moral self within us? How can we become celltled Selves? 
Should we even try, as I am suggesting that we should, and is not the answer to this 
question something to do with the way we see ourselves in tl1e world, the way we fed 
about things, whether or not we are seen, and see ourselves, as part of society or whether 
we are alienated or disaffected? I have to admit tl1at initially I find the comment of 
Stephen Hawking (1995) that we are no more than "chemical scum" on planet cartl1 and 
have no other significance to the Universe whatsoever, hard to come to tenus with. It is 
not as though this is a completely new idea but for one thing, it goes against the 
collective unconscious, our common sense kind of thinking, in a way that not only 
requires us to rationalise our own feelings but to do so in a way that could be detrimental 
to our species. For Kant, belief in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul 
were "practical postulates" that give an ordered existence. They provided a universal 
basis for his moral law formulated in his second Critique as a "categorical imperative". 
His principles can be seen has commenting on and amplifying the Golden Rule of many 
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Eastern religions and philosophies, "Do not do to others those things you would not 
. . 
wish them to do to you" (6). First he says, "Act only on that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law". Then he expresses the 
same sentiment as "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the 
same time as an end". What happens when we knock away this basis, if indeed we can 
given our neurological inheritance? Knowing something rationally is not the same as 
making it part of our collective unconscious and this is, presumably, why many people 
under stress, e.g. in battle, pray to a God which is part of an imagined Self that was left 
behind, rationally, as wonder and creativity atrophied and gave way to a more structured, 
and so-called adult, way of thinking. While we are so concerned with the literal truth 
painstakingly unravelled by the application of modern science and mathematical laws we 
often forget that we depend upon another facet of our character, what Gelernter (1994) 
refers to as, "low-focus" thought, as opposed to the high-focus of structured thinking, 
and that without it we would be less capable of the creative processes of lateral thinking. 
(Our capacity for low-focus, flexible thought gives human beings a dimension other than 
the logic on which tl1e function of a computer depends. See Chapter Five - Illusion al/d the 
I11lagillcd Sc!Jj. Without the impetus of such creativity many of the ideas which have 
revolutionized the way we live and our understanding of our environment may not have 
come to light. In this respect the story of how, in 1858, the German physicist, Fredrich 
August Kekule brought great change to organic chemistry when he discovered the 
molecular structure of the benzene ring, is apposite. Quoting from Stanley I3urnshaw's 
The Seamless \Vebb (Penguin, p177), Campbell (1973:138) writes that Kekule had been 
working on a chemistry textbook but without much success. Then, Kekule recalled: 
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My spirit was on other things. I turned my chair to the fireplace and sank into a 
half-sleep. Again the atoms flitted before my eyes ... Long rows, variously, more 
closely united; all in movement, wriggling and turning like snakes. And see, what 
was that? One of the snakes seized its own tail and the image whirled scornfully 
before my eyes. As though from a flash of lightening I awoke; this time again I 
occupied the rest of the night in working out the consequences of the hypothesis. 
Here it was the working of the creative processes, the low-focus thoughts, that provided 
inspiration on which the logical processes of the high-focus thoughts work. Similarly, the 
French mathematician, Jules Henri Poincare (1854-1912), who attacked the logicist 
programme of Frege and Russell by denying that mathematics can be reduced to logic 
and arguing that further intuition is always needed to derive the properties of number, 
described how, despite periods of intensive intellectual effort in his search for a type of 
mathematical structure that he would eventually term "Fuchsian functions", he had failed 
to make progress. Then, he relates (Barrow, 1992:275-6): 
I left Caen, where I was living, to go on a geologic excursion under the auspices 
of the School of Mines. 'I11e incidents of the travel made me forget my 
mathematical work. Baving reached Coutances, we entered an omnibus to go to 
some place or other. At the moment when 1 put my foot on the step, the idea 
came to me, without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the 
way for it ... I did not verify the idea; I should not have had time, as upon taking 
my seat in the omnibus, I went on with a conversation already commenced, but I 
felt a perfect certainty. On my return to Caen, for convenience sake, I verified the 
result at my leisure. 
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Clearly, we are not computers and cannot live by logic alone. Trying to do so, I believe, 
would impoverish life considerably. Certainly, our intellect can present a possible 
scenario in which our existence is no more than an accident and, some might say, an 
absurdity. Leaving aside the fact that this theory has no conclusive proof, it seems to me 
that existence is a gift (intended or accidental) not to be squandered and, like the talents 
in the parable told by Jesus (Matt 25:14-30), it can probably be increased (enriched) if 
wisely looked after, given an environment in which to flourish. As Baier says, " To be 
moral is to recognize that others, too, have the right to a worthwhile life" 
(I-Ianfling/Baier,1987:32). Whether or not this "worthwhileness" comes from the belief 
that life is the gift of God and has an eternal pmpose or whether, having no such 
significance beyond a limited period on this planet, it comes from our own existential 
value judgement, should not matter. Regrettably, it sometimes takes a meeting with 
someone who is blind or deaf for us to recall what wonderful gifts are sight and hearing. 
So, from whatever source, we are the recipients of some truly wonderful resources and 
its down to us to make the most of them. 
One of the points that used to be frequently made to children in Sunday School was, and 
probably still is, that without tl1e work of people in otl1er countries our own lives would 
be very much impoverished. Children would be asked to consider the cornflakes etc. that 
they might have eaten for tl1eir breakfast and think about tl1e different countries from 
which tl1e ingredients had been imported thus giving them an instance of, so-called, 
global dependency. As well as having many personal things to be tl1an kfu I for, we also 
benefit from mutual co-operation and the application of principles of conduct. Again, 
during one Christmas, my daughter, having returned from university, was quite surprised 
to find me watching one or two religious programmes on television. Presumably, she 
thought that despite my having spent over twenty years of my younger life as a lay 
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preacher and, would be, candidate for the ordained ministry, now, as a philosopher, I 
would have grown out of such feelings. I explained that I was still very much interested 
to learn how various people cope with life. Happily, this must have seemed a satisfactory 
answer to her. I suppose, for one thing, my physical diHiculties have made me face up to 
questions that otherwise I might not even have considered and, even if I had considered 
them I might have been satisfied with an answer which more rigorous questioning would 
have shown to be based on unfounded assumptions. In this sense I can appreciate 
Schopenhauer when he says, " ... pleasure and well-being is negative and suffering 
positive" (Han fling, 1987:99). Of course, there can be much sentimentality associated 
with reactions to someone who is viewed as being disabled from which I would wish to 
disassociate myself. There is the view that one is being "courageous" in battling against 
the odds but, while I cannot speak for others, I consider that this is the only viable 
option. It is not that one chooses to do this but that the other alternatives, such as 
vegetating, are much worse. Here is where my imagined Self (see Chapter Five) comes in. 
Like most "normal" people I am shocked when I hear my voice on tape - this is the only 
time that I realize that I have a speech problem (7). I am amazed when I catch sight of 
myself in a full-length mirror since my normal perception of myself is just that, IIOf'IlIaL 
There is no way in which I see myself as being disabled; when I fall over it is just an 
inconvenience and although it happens to me more often than to most people it could 
happen to anyone. I can well understand that this business of my perception of myself 
might be very puzzling to many people but if they compare their perception of the way 
they speak with how they would hear themselves on tape, notwithstanding certain 
recording imperfections, then, perhaps this may give them something of an insight into 
the way I see myself. 
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Clearly, none of us perceive ourselves precisely as we are perceived by others. For one 
thing, we are perceived by others, first of all, as ex/ental bodies whereas we create the 
image of ourselves from our il/lemal neurological experience of being liS. 'I11e differences. 
start to come closer as we are able to C017l11llmicate. One of the things which caused me to 
question seriously the Church's proclamation of a caring God was the frustrating 
experience I had when a candidate for the full-time ordained ministry. Years before I had 
been turned down when I wanted to become a lay preacher. I nevertheless persisted in 
my request which I renewed each quarter year when these matters were considered. I 
also took the opportunity of preaching whenever individual congregations invited me or 
when, for one reason or another, the planned preacher failed to turn up for his 
appointment. Eventually, a new superintendent minister was appointed to our group of 
churches and a friend of mine, himself a lay preacher, took it upon himself to acquaint 
him with my situation whereupon the minister said, "Well, if your friend is so determined 
to preach the Gospel I am going to include his name on the regular preaching plan". So I 
preached acceptably for about five years but when I wished to become an ordained 
minister I again had problems. To try to overcome these I decided to spend twelve 
months at an evangelical training college where students lived in. My hope was that the 
Principal and staff would have adequate opportunity of observing how I coped and 
overcame obvious physical problems and that they would support my candidature. 1his 
the Principal was more than willing to do believing that I should have been permitted to 
go on to theological college. However, the medical officer for candidates prevented me 
going any further by suggesting that I might have epilepsy. Believing this to be incorrect I 
asked the Spastic Society if they could help and they referred me to a local specialist in 
cerebral palsy. After a full medical examination which included an EEG 
(electroencephalogram) test the specialist wrote to the Church authorities that, in his 
opinion, I had no more chance of having an epileptic fit than he (the specialist) had. 
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After this I was asked, by someone high up in the church~s establishment with whom I 
had to meet for him to decide whether or not I co~ld go forward, how I would manage 
to give Holy Communion since my hands are not steady enough to handle the wine. ] 
said that this need not be a problem since there would always be someone present with a 
pair of steady hands and that as long as I was there to see that due respect was given then 
that person could deal with this aspect for me. Obviously, my determination throughout 
my life has been necessary tor me to do almost anything at all and when, on this 
occasion, towards the end of the interview I was told that I could not proceed with my 
candidature I stubbornly asked »;/y? A very frustrated reply was made that I would put 
people qff coming toch1lrch. It was clear for all to see that I had not done so as a lay preacher 
but even I had to see that as far as my hopes of being a minister were concerned I had 
reached the end of the road since I had failed to communicate to a stranger, in the space 
of a single interview, the perception of me which congregations and a college principal, 
had come to see, over time I Apart from this my own perception of the Church might 
have still been filtered through rose coloured tinted spectacles and I may not have 
questioned the underlying false assumptions about the possibility of non-discrimination 
within organized religion on which I had been prepared to build my life. The saying, 
which I recently heard quoted by a rehabilitated drug user that "religion is for those 
seeking to avoid going to hell while spirituality is for those who have been there", would 
surely have been appreciated by Schopenhauer. 
Feelings can obviously mislead us so, to. remind you of Sutherland's remark, quoted 
above, "One must distinguish between rationality and morality: attempts to justify 
morality on a rational basis have always foundered", where does this leave us? Is it true 
that we can neither rely upon reason nor emotion? Well, clearly "yes", both can be 
unreliable in this respect. Reason is, I believe, affected by emotion and lack of knowledge 
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just as light is warped by matter. In the above illustration the Church and I saw the 
situation from different perspectives which were' informed by a li~ited amount of 
knowledge. We both made value judgements that were relafilJe to our differing view 
points of the situation and what we considered to be possible. It would be arrant 
nonsense for the Church to claim that it had a God-given absolute standard against 
which to measure such situations as it ought to have learned from its terrible history 
during the Middle Ages. We are all constrained by incomplete knowledge and experience 
whether we like it or not. In such a situation we can be led astray by the arrogance that 
assumes more reaSOll than it has a right to and by prejudice which is the fieliltg of fear in 
the face of change. To be moral is to have the courage to recognize our own limits and 
not to be blinded to the insights of others because of those limits and the growth-
denying inflexibility of our outlook. To promote reason we should avoid rigid, dogmatic 
viewpoints whilst remaining mindful that not everythittg is for the best in a world where, 
perhaps more tllan we realise, our actions are tlle tllreads that contribute to the web of 
life. 
Undoubtedly, we face a most pernicious dilemma in today's post-modem, pluralist, 
world which is devoid of absolute values, a world in which, as Popper has shown us, we 
can never prove something to be true, we can only prove it to be false. Does this mean 
that while requiring order in society we are condemned to struggle in chaos? Recent cases 
do not give us much reason for hope. A case in point came before the Crown Court in 
Snares brook on tlle 9tll March, 1995: 
A 25 year old 6ft 6in tall, recently qualitled, medical doctor whose wife asked a 
young man not to smoke whilst they were waiting at an underground railway 
station ended up being attacked by the young man and an accomplice (unnamed 
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for legal reasons and expected to be dealt with at a later date) in which he 
suffered memory loss, four broken teeth, a broken nose, and the rupture of a disc 
in his back; injuries that had prevented him from working since the incident 
seven months ago. The court heard that the accused, having been found hiding in 
a wheelie bin, told the police, "I was behaving like an animal or something like 
that. God, 1 can't understand myself." After the verdict, finding the accused 
guilty of assault(8), the doctor is reported to have said that in this day and age 
there is a fine line between being a good citizen and being too good and he had 
warned members of his family not to act, in similar circumstances, as he had 
done. (DailY Mail, 10,March, 1995, p5). 
Must we say that because moral standards are only relative and could be subject to 
revision in the light of future additional knowledge and considerations they can be 
abandoned? For example, traffic lights placed at a busy road junction as a safety measure 
may, at some future date, be replaced by a roundabout but the removal of something that 
is useful, in this case the traffic lights, would not be carried out unless its replacement is 
considered to be more beneficial. Who would go to an airport and confidently wait to 
board an aeroplane if they were told that there was no control tower to direct aircraft 
taking off and landing? Again, it is far better to use a map that guides us in the general 
direction than to travel without any idea at all of where we are going (9). Until Einstein 
.. 
discovered, in his General Law of Relativity (1916), that material objects in space bend 
light it was thought that Newton's Law of Gravity gave an absolute method for making 
calculations in astronomy. Since then, however, because it is known that the bending of 
light rays near the Earth is twice the amount given when using Newton's Law, general 
relativity, which, according to Krauss (1994:182), "generalizes Newton's Law and reduces 
to it in the cases where the gravitational field is small", is used. Nevertheless, the genius 
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of Newton is still that using his Law of Gravity alone scientists can weigh the sun to 
almost one part in a million and predict the motion of the planets around the sun and of 
the' moon around the Earth with extreme accuracy. "Moreover", writes Krauss, 
"Newton's L1.w is all that is necessary to compute the motion of projectiles near the 
Earth's surface to an accuracy of better than 1 part in 100 million" (Krauss, 1994:182). 
Of course traditional use of anything does not guarantee its accuracy and when Haws are 
found then reassessments have to be made as to whether or not the tradition still has 
value. What seems to have happened as far as morality is concerned is that many people 
who think that they have emancipated themselves away from a belief in an externally 
existing God have also thrown away the moral principles which have slowly developed as 
part of our culture. The tragedy has been the assumption that without an absolute God 
all our associated moral values can be falsified and this is just not true. Indeed, just as 
Newtonian physics are still taught in our schools and are used for practical purposes in 
everyday life for planning, say, the construction of a bridge over a river or the calculating 
of the trajectory of a spacecraft flying from the Earth to the Moon (White, 1993:16), so 
too may we use to advantage wisdom that has come via many sources and, sometimes, 
over centuries of time. 
Unfortunately, the world of morals, as with economics, deals with human behaviour and 
cannot be' expected to be as predictable as physics. Ever since the time of Locke the 
executive, e.g. an arresting authority like the police, have applied the absolute law 
established by the legislature of Parliament which the judiciary of the courts have 
modified relative to individual circumstances. This seems to be the best that we can 
manage and in present conditions, where increasingly moral consensus cannot keep pace 
with change, social tensions are all too visible. The argument that says we should not 
accept a principle until it has been prolied to be absolutely true is false. We have never 
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been in a position to prOlle that something is absolutely true, we only thought that we 
. . 
could. To prove that something was absolutely true we should have to k'IOJlI that it is in 
accord with everything that exists but we will never know whether we know everything 
that exists! Notwithstanding these problems no one in their right mind would turn away 
a fire engine and crew when their house is on fire just because they were unable to 
prevent the fire from starting in the first place. Yes, we might need a new system but it 
seems sensible not to get rid of what we have until something which may work better has 
been rigorously tested and installed. 
Looking back and learning from history it would surely be beneficial if we treated with 
caution the panaceas sometimes being offered for individual and social moral malaise. 
We dare not allow science alone to be responsible for the formation of a moral Self and 
we should be especially vigilant in an environment where science has undoubtedly 
improved the lives we live that we do not allow ourselves to think that no other input is 
necessary. In their biography EitlSteilt:A Life itl Sden.ce, White and Gribbin tell us that what 
appears to have shocked Einstein at the onset of the First World War was what he saw as 
the totally insupportable attitudes of his colleagues and co-workers (1993:117): 
The majority of scientists on both sides supported the war effort of their 
respective nations. Einstein was wholly against this. He was appalled by the fact 
that the men for whom he had the greatest respect as intellectuals and thinkers 
should be taken in by the stupidity of hostile governments. He found it most 
impossible to reconcile what he saw as simple-minded barbaric actions with the 
refined intellectual heights of scientific endeavour. Above all, he could not 
believe in the principle that science should be applied to developing means to kill 
people, whatever their political affiliation. 
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Partial scientific knowledge can too easily be applied unwisely to social problems. In the 
Victorian era eugenics, associated with Francis Galton who was Darwin's cousin, was 
thought of as a way to inprove mental and physical inheritance by controlling human 
breeding through selection. Galton thought that the human race could be improved by 
selective breeding in the same way as can be done for sweet peas or Hereford cattle. This 
idea was abused by the Nazi Party to justify either the sterilization and, later, the 
extermination of entire groups of people during t11e 1930's. The exterminations followed, 
after a Bavarian health inspector said, in 1933, that Germany's Nazi sterilization law 
would not be enough to stop the hordes of psychopaths, feeble-minded and other 
"inferior types" t11reatening the race. Since then, several countries have introduced 
programmes of eugenics with, perhaps it could be argued, a little more humanity. The 
Hutchinson Encyclopedia under "eugenics" tells us that: 
.. .in some Chinese provinces there is compulsory sterilization of people regarded 
as physically or mentally defective .. .In 1986 Singapore became the first 
democratic power to adopt an openly eugenic policy by guaranteeing pay rises to 
female university graduates when they give birth to a child, while offering grants 
towards house purchase for non-graduate married women on condition that they 
are sterilized after the first or second child. 
The eugenics movement in Britain ended with the great socialist and geneticist, J.B.S. 
Haldane, who suggested the separation of the act of reproduction, in which children 
would be developed outside their mother's body, from that of love. 111is idea, which he 
called "ectogenesis", was satirized by Aldous Huxley in his novel Brave NeJlI U7or/d. Today 
we are on the verge of exciting genetic breakthroughs in which vegetable crops might be 
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genetically manipulated to make them immune to certain diseases and rot, ~Uld genetic 
defects causing such disabilities as ~ystic fibrosis in human children might be prevented. 
But there is clearly a need for safeguard against abuse of what Stephen Rose, Professor 
of Biology at the Open University, has called "neurogenic determinism". Such 
determinism argues that since behaviour is partIy due to a person's biology then anti-
social behaviour might be treated biologically rather than sociologically. Concern is 
sometimes expressed that unscrupulous people could use genetic testing as a reason to 
carry out a policy of eugenics. Rose himself was reported to be alarmed by a United 
States proposal for a Federal Violence Initiative to identify inner city children "whose 
alleged biochemical and genetic defects will make them prone to violence in later life" 
(Radford,· 1995:3). Radford argues that there are good and bad in all families and says 
that most geneticists· argue that genes only provide the blueprint for potelltial and that 
environment plays a part in lJJhat and I/Jho you are. It could be that the biology of an 
entrepreneur may very well have given rise to a criminal under different environmental 
conditions. In an article about a criminal case in America, Radford claims, lawyers are 
hitching their defence argument to a study in genetics to show that their client is the 
victim of his own genetic determinism. This study, carried out by Dr H. Brunner and his 
colleagues in the Department of Human Genetics at the University Hospital in 
Nijmegen, Holland, involved the investigation of a Dutch family spanning four 
generations in which the males had a tendency to borderline mental retardation and 
impulsive aggressive behaviour which manifested itself in arson, attempted rape and 
exhibitionism. Some of the women in the family had approached the department for 
genetic testing because of concern that they could be passing down the persollality difect 
seen time and again in their menfolk. It was found that the affected males in the family 
had a genetic abnormality of the X chromosome which led to a deficiency - MAOA - in 
one of the enzymes that send messages round the brain. However, such metabolic 
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defect, thought Brunner, might only be part of the equation; they could, for instance, 
give rise to the males reacting violently to substances in the environment such as drugs 
or, even cheese (10). Certainly, Brunner had not found a clime gel/e: 
I don't tl1ink tl1ere are going to be master genes for aggression or any other 
hlfman emotioll (my emphasis). There are not going to be ten behaviour genes, not 
100, but thousands of genes and environmental factors as well. ll1cre is no way 
we are going to be able to make that particular sum. What we have reported is a 
single observation .. olf tl1e next family with MAOA deficiency is completely 
normal, that gives a whole set of new questions. 
One of tl1e aims of the Human Genome Project is to discover where our genes are on 
our chromosomes. Looking for a gene tl1at carries inherited susceptibilities to things such 
as colour blindness or haemophilia seems to be an admirable tl1ing to do, particularly, if it 
may leads to treatment and, even, tl1eir eradication but to search for "behavioural" genes 
seems to be a futile and morally dangerous enterprise to engage in. Notwithstanding that 
our behaviour is probably as individual as are our fingerprints, tl1e injudicious application 
of partial scientific knowledge to social problems can have the most horrendous 
consequences. For example, some IQ tests, which tested a child's logical ability while 
ignoring tl1eir creative side, have now been discredited but were used, not only to 
condemn many children to tl1e educational scrap heap and thereby possibly adversely 
affect tl1e rest of their lives but in some States of America were used alongside very , 
suspect hereditary details to incarcerate. and sterilize young women as recently as the 
1920's. My own parents were told on several occasions by different doctors tl1at I was 
ineducable! I eventually went to primary school when I was six and a half years old. 
Later, I was unable to take the 11-plus examination because my slow writing ability 
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prevented me from completing the papers in the time allowed. To get round this 
problem an educational psychologist was asked to carry out some psychological tests to 
give an indication of my potential ability. Unfortunately I scored very badly in the non-
verbal intelligence task of assembling oo/ects and the opportunity of a grammar school 
education was denied me. To this day, I have problems in this area but the same cannot 
be said of my verbal intelligence (where, for instance, recent tests have put my 
vocabulary in the top 4% of the population) as reference to figures quoted in my 
concluding chapter to this thesis will show. In the introduction to his book, Emotiollal 
Itltellige!1ce, (Bloomsbury, 1996,p.xii) the psychologist, Daniel Goleman, argues that 
emotional illtelligel1ce, which includes self-control, zeal and persistence, and the ability to 
motivate oneself, matters more than IQ (11). 
Sartre said, in his Being and NothbtgfteSS, that not believing in God reversed the order in 
which we view our existence; we do not believe that essence, that is purpose, precedes 
existence but that existence precedes essence. Starting from nothbtg man makes himself 
and, therefore, becomes responsible for the result. This is the first principle of 
e:><.istelltialism and, in as far as he is referring to bebtg-ill-itse!f as opposed to what he chooses 
to call beittgfor-itse!f, I believe that he is correct. What needs to be questioned, however, is 
his assertion that there is no human nature because there is no God to have a c~nception 
of it. For Sartre, being-in-itself is the material, unconscious thing such as a stone, 
--. 
whereas, being-for-itself is consciously aware and, therefore, able to decide what action it 
participates in. We are condemned to be free in as far as having no absolute standard, we 
are at liberty to "choose". I-Iuman nature is as determined as ever it could be via DNA. 
People are not free to choose, for example, whether they have muscular dystrophy and 
having it limits many other choices; some of these are imposed by the disability itself and 
others by the public's perception and the extent of their tolerance and acceptance. 
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It is neither true that essentialists are wholly determined by what they receive from nature 
or that existentialists are wholly free but what does seem to be true is that people have 
different potential for good and evil and that different environmental conditions may 
encourage one or the other. If society makes it impossible for someone to escape the 
poverty trap then they encourage a condition where those who have no stlke in society 
may feel unwilling to uphold it. Yet, in the complex developed society in which we live 
we could not exist a single day if all law was suspended. In order to have more freedom 
we have to choose to give up the freedom to be evil. To take a simple illustration: having 
borrowed money we are free to choose whether or not to repay it but, all things being 
equal, there is surely no grounds on which we could justify not doing so. 
I believe that Schopenhauer was right when he gave cot1lpaSSiOll the first place as far as 
morality is concerned. But I consider that compassion should be shown according to 
expectation of reasonable behaviour within particular circumstances. I do not think that 
we show compassion by allowing that all things are desirable simply because someone 
desires them. Someone, for example, might wish to drive at 100mph in a built-up area 
but it is not desirable that lives should be put at risk by allowing him/her to do so, nor 
are the long-term consequences of drugs desirable even when, in the short-term, some 
heightened experience is desired. 111e freedom of the celltred Self can only be gained by 
our being willing to give up license. Here, in Schopenhauer's terminology, we escape the 
thraldom of the Will. 
I conclude this chapter with the following paraphrase of Jesus' parable of The Good 
Samaritan (Sangster, 1956:15): 
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There was once a man who went on a journey through a narrow mountain pass 
and suddenly was attacked by robbers who stripped him and flayed him and left 
him half dead. A certain priest came that way. A Priest! ... Oh have no fear. All is 
well with this unhappy man. A priest is coming; a student of the sacred writings, 
a scholar of the book. And he saw the man .. .looked on him and ... passed by!!! 
Then a Levite came. A Levitcl ... Take heart once more. This man will not fail. Is 
he not skilled in all the Levitical law? Is he not master of the code? And he saw 
the man .. .looked on him ... and passed by! Finally came one of no position, no 
profound learning, no boasted birth; simple of heart and full of the spirit of love. 
And when he saw that needy man, he melted with compassion and bound up his 
wounds, pouring in oil and wine. 
We see here a connection between the Self that we create - the imagined Self (which is 
the subject of the next chapter) - and our moral values. It is important, I argue, for the 
flourishing of human beings that a paradigm shift occurs in the way that we think of the 
Self and it is becoming increasingly necessary for the survival of the human race. Our 
imagined Self, in thraldom to the ego, must become the celltred Self able to see beyond its 
own confines - ego consciousness - which is so limiting to our compassion and moral 
vision. 
In this chapter I have looked at our sense of both personal and collective morality within 
the pluralism which defines the post-modern condition. I have argued that it is only 
through the moral basis of the Self that we can truly create a centred Self with the potential 
of being free of the desires, fears, anxieties and ambitions by which, otherwise, we 
repeatedly become ensnared. 
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Chapter Five 
Illusion and the Imagined Self 
Introduction 
In this chapter I want to look at the psychological, or what I call the "imagined", Self. 
This is the Self that we are acquainted with, as opposed to the "strict" self, or person, 
that others identify us as being. Like the strict physical person who develops and ages, so 
the imagined Self is subject to change and it changes not only in response to the passage 
of time but according to how we think about ourselves. Our physical growth, therefore, 
is "goal-directed" in the way acknowledge below by Schopenhauer but our imagined Self 
is a consciously formed intention as we try, not only to establish, but to create who we 
are. In line with one of the main themes of this thesis my argument will demonstrate 
that, while we are at liberty to create various "imagined" Selves, e.g. egotistical or self 
deprecating, what I call the "centred SeW' is most beneficial for us both as flourishing 
individuals and contributors to the humane world to which we would belong. ll1is 
notion of the Self is both abstract and non-experiential; it is not found in the material 
world but is "imagined". 
When watching television programmes about natural history it is all too easy to assume 
that the behaviour of plants and animals suggests some kind of conscious intentionality. 
Yet, when we think seriously about these things such assumptions are illusionary and 
must be questioned. For Schopenhauer, all phenomena are· a manifestation of the Will 
and differ only in the causes that precede them. These physical causes he divides into 
three: cause pure and simple (as happens in mechanical and chemical changes), stimulus 
and motivation. Plants have no minds and their turning towards the sun is caused by 
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stimulus rather than by a motive. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer is prepared to call such 
plant behaviour a manifestation of the Will, becaus~ he thinks it can only be understood 
as goal-directed, even if there is no mind present to entertain the goal Ganaway, 1994:37). 
As Janaway points out, it is clear that both human beings and animals also respond to 
stimuli as the example of the involuntary contraction of the pupil of the eye 
demonstrates. We share some kind of motive with animals that perceive the world; they 
are motivated, for example, by their perception of a predator or their hunger, whilst we 
bring to bear on the matter our reason and judgement of the most appropriate action to 
take. Bearing in mind the basic tenets of evolution, including the passing on of genetic 
information through DNA, it is important that we differentiate between what happens of 
which we are unaware and conscious intentionality. Whilst some simple analogies can be 
helpful, they can sometimes also be misleading as they fudge the distinction between 
what is actually known and the lacuna in our knowledge which is being hidden by too 
simple an analogy. I am thinking of statements that seem to imply that certain plants 
consciously develop in such a way as to encourage bees to act as agents of pollination, 
animals such as elephants to spread seeds by feeding off plants in one area and planting 
those seeds through the act of defecation in another, and even that trees themselves 
consciously design the most ingenious packag-ing for their seeds so that the wind will 
carry them far afield. For example, the naturalist, David Attenborough, in the 
Introduction to his book The Ptivate Life of Plants (1995), which accompanied the 
television series of the same name, writes, "The venus fly trap closes when its trigger hair 
is touched not once but twice. It can count". Yet, however innocently, to attribute 
intentionality here is as misguided as it would be to imply that intentionality is involved 
in the case where two positive inputs are required to activate the "and" gate in a 
computer's circuitry. I believe the Self to be the product of tl1e COIISdollS brain; like a 
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colony of bees or tennites, our brain cells work in a goal-directed way but it is in the 
mind that our brains produce consciously fonned intentions. 
Section One 
Analogy in Neurology 
The confusion that occurs in some of our thinking about the Self is analogous to the 
confusion caused in our thinking about neurology in which we so easily fail to 
differentiate between what is simply goal-directed and what is governed by consciouslY formed 
ifrtelltiolls. We talk about the brain receiving encoded messages from our senses which it 
decodes so as to produce a representation of the outside world. For example, we might 
be told that the cells of the retina, being stimulated by light reflected from an object, 
transmit coded messages in the form of impulses along the optic nerve to the visual 
cortex which then decodes them so as to produce a representation of the object. But this 
appears to attribute to the visual cortex and, perhaps, to individual brain cells, 
ifltelltiollali{y, which they do not possess. In a paper in which he draws attention to the 
dangers of wrongly used analogies and, especially to the false idea that the brain has a 
language of its own, Hacker (Blakemore/Hacker, 1987:492), rejecting the idea that cells 
use inductive logic, writes: 
... it is literally unintelligible to suggest that the brain, let alone a part if the braifl, 
might ask a question, have or express an intention, make a decision, describe a 
sunset, undertake an obligation, explain what it means, insist, assert, instruct, 
demand, opine, classify, and so forth ... Brains and their parts can, in one sense, 
actually do very little - just as a computer can do very little, namely pass minute 
electrical currents through very complex circuits at high speed. 
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Hacker goes on to distinguish between a code and a language. A code merely substitutes 
or transposes letters and any coded string of signs lacks any flIeanitzg until it is decoded so 
as to reveal information contained in a language which conforms to agreed and learned 
conventions. What we must do is to distinguish between it!fOrmatioll and flIea/lillg, the 
k'loJl'll and the klloJl'e!: A filing cabinet, encyclopaedia, or, even a computer, may contain 
lots of information but it does not kllOJI! anything. Likewise, the brain could be said to 
hold lots of information and those who maintain that it is a sophisticated computer must 
address the question as to "who" or "what" is accessillg it. If the answer is "a self" then 
this implies some immaterial concept such as a "soul" or "mind". But are not such 
conceptions products rather than producers of the brain? Could it be that Anaxagoras 
and Schopenhauer are right in their concept of a universal force or mind which manifests 
itself as phenomena and which, according to Schopenhauer (1966,voI2: 197), is known 
but unknowing and has evolved the intellect which, although knowing is unknown (see 
Chapter Three - HUflIatl Nature and the Se!!J. And could it be, in line with Schopenhauer's 
thinking, that the Will has an agenda of which we remain unaware, namely to propagate 
and manifest itself whatever the cost? Is such an agenda intelligent or simply a force that 
drives evolution in a blind, yet limited, way along an undirected course of replication and 
mutation? 
Dawkins tells us (1995) that in writing his best seller The Se!fish Ge!ld1976) he was trying 
to correct a misconception common at the time following a spate of popular books that 
had suggested that Darwinism worked at the level of the group or species and that 
natural selection favours the fittest group. 111is had led to the idea that individuals are 
expected to be generous and unselfish and work for the good of the group because any 
such group whose individuals were selfish would tend to go extinct. Whilst Dawkins 
acknowledged that it would be nice for all sorts of ideological reasons should this be the 
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case, he thought that it was a straight conflict between what was simply ideologically nice 
and what was true and his main interest was the latt~r. The true message was that anyone 
who wanted to be nice, unselfish and generous could not expect any help from their 
biological nature but that such genetic predispositions would have to be stood up to as in 
a personal conflict with oneself. Here again, there is a correlation between what is being 
said and Schopenhauer's whole concept of the Will. What does seem to be an issue is the 
conflict between Will and Intellect to which there is the seed of a solution in Jung's 
process of Individuation (again, see Chapter Three). In such an application we should 
have to equate the Will with the Unconscious and the Intellect with the Conscious; the 
one being goal-directed whilst the other gives access to consciously formed, and 
reasoned, intentions. 'TI1e Ego, which usually emerges from the conflict between the Id 
and the Superego is now displaced by the "seW' which endeavours to unite Will and 
Intellect, Unconsciousness and Consciousness. But here we are on slippery ground -
what is our idea of a "Self"? 
My attempt to answer the above question would be to say that the "Self" is imagined or, 
at least, indescribable except in so far as we are able to say in what way we are IISitrg it; but 
then again no more can be said of the "ego". In a similar way the word "love", for 
example, is only describable in terms of how it is expressed. In the well known chapter 
13 of the first letter sent to the Corinthians by the apostle Paul we have an attempt to 
define love as: 
1) being al\vays patient and kind, 
2) keeping no score of wrong, 
3) never being rude nor selfish, 
4) not being quick to take offence nor become resentful, and 
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5) not coming to an end. 
Love does not exist as a thing in itself. It is primarily a symbol within language. We create 
it as we put into action those things that we believe define it, albeit expressed in the 
above terms or in some other way. This is the way we stand up to our possible 
predispositions in an effort to be nice and considerate. "Love" cannot be absolute or 
static except as an ideal since in the changing circumstances of our phenomenal world it 
must adapt and express itself according to relative needs that are apparent at anyone 
time. In the same way, our notion of our "imagined" Self, is changing all the time; even 
the opinions that we once held so vehemently, say twenty years ago, can sometimes make 
us squirm with embarrassment nowl111e thought of Self we had then is not the Self we 
are now, it has been adapted and continues to be adapted. Notwithstanding, change is a 
fact of life and will continue to be so unless, tl1at is, per impossibile, we are to escape the 
evolution of our own nature and that of our species; we clearly live in a world that 
changes and, tl1erefore, we must learn how to cope with change. What we should not do 
is express these non-absolute, relative terms such as "love, goodness, beauty, ego, and 
self" as if they existed outside the consciousness of the human mind. I am slightly 
reticent about including the idea of God in my list of things tl1at may change but I 
understand the developed thought, expressed to and recalled by the archaeologist, 
Charles Pellegrino (1995:XV1), of the paleoanthropologist, Raymond Dart that his God 
"was not necessarily a conscious being separate from man who created the universe 
through a deliberate act; but rather a spiritual God that lived within us, and came into 
being with man." Apparently, tl1erefore, he believed that it was through this spiritual 
God that spiritual works, like the books of tl1e Bible, were written. It seems to me that 
such a thought is the result of much thinking in the light of meditating upon the varied 
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experiences and changing understanding of one's life and relationship to what we have 
come to accept as constituting the world of which we are a very small part. 
"Self" is a complex concept or idea made up from the instant memory of several 
consciously perceived impressions but which we never experienced simllltwleoflsfy despite 
ourjeeliflg that the contrary is true. 111e only thing that is experienced simultaneously with 
a perception is the emotion it engenders. 111ere is no personal idmt1ry beneath or behind 
these perceptions which come and go "as if" in an instant. As I mentioned in the 
Introduction, this idea, which was put forward by Hume, is in line with the teachings of 
the Buddha some 2,500 years ago. As Hume writes (1962:301-2): 
... self or person is not anyone impression ... when I enter most intimately into 
what I call "!lsef[, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of 
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch "!lsef 
at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the 
perception .. .! may venture to affirm to the rest of mankind, that they are nothing 
but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other 
with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement. 
However, whilst the Self is a construct of our brain, the- perceived impressions we 
experience can have profound psychological implications for the imagined Self that the 
brain constructs. As William James maintains (1890:353) such is the working of the brain 
that in the strea", qf COllsdoflS1less our separate perceptions take on an experience of Imiry. 
Modern physics now pose such questions as to how light can behave like discrete particles 
and also as continuous waves and I have already discussed how such things could be tied 
in with cOflsdof(slless (see Chapter Two - COl/sdol/slless alld the Se!fj. 
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The "as if" factor, mentioned above, should be taken into account in o~r use of analogy 
if we are to avoid becoming ensnared in a semantic loop which leads us into building 
literal supports for what started out as illustration. An example can be given by 
considering the way we sometimes think, loosely, of the telephone as an instrument that 
encodes our speech, transmits it along a telephone wire, and decodes or translates it at 
the other end. But, as Harris points out (Blakemore/Harris,1987:509), "If it could do 
that, the telephone would have been a far cleverer invention than it was; and it was 
certainly a clever invention in any case." Since the telephone works by direct process on 
energy conversion it does not require a language comprised of complex grammar any 
more than the brain requires one to function in conjunction with outside stimuli supplied 
through the sense organs. It is, therefore, like following one's own tail to try and explain 
what the brain or the telephone does in terms of decoding or translating; one might just 
as well say, suggests Harris, that when we switch on the light, the bulb understands that it 
must light up. As the neuroscientist, Greenfield (1995:42) says: 
Computationalists frequently refer to the "encoding of vectors," implying that at 
some stage a signal, a message, or information is about to be decoded. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. There is no little person inside the brain 
translating nerve impulses back into light flashes, tones, and tastes. 
Looking back from Hume to Descartes it is easy to see that the latter's Cogito Ergo SII!?I is 
undercut as a "clear ,md distinct" idea (i.e. something so easy that the attentive mind can 
be in no doubt about understanding), since in Hume we see such a personal identity as 
no more than a collection of sense impressions. 'TIle existence of two separate thoughts 
does not prove the unity of the identity who is thinking as we learn from people whose 
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corpus callosum has been cut thus dividing the two hemispheres of the brain; in such 
cases the same person may put the same type of g<lrment over the top of another because 
one half of the brain selects the one whilst the other wishes to wear another even though 
the final result causes some consternation to the commissurotomy patient. Whcre 
Descartes has bcen criticised the most, however, is in his belief that animals are no more 
than automata, perceiving things salis sensation or without conscious awareness. He 
wrote, in the Fifth part of his Discourse 011 the Method (1969:139-140): 
It is also a very remarkable fact that although there are many animals which 
exhibit more dexterity than we do in some of their actions, we at the same time 
observe that they do not manifest any dexterity at all in many others. H.cnce the 
fact that they do better than we do, does not prove that they are endowed with 
minds, for in this case they would have more reason than any of us, and would 
surpass us in all other things. It rather shows that they have no reason at all, and 
that it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, 
just as a clock, which is only composed of wheels and weights is able to tell the 
hours and measure the time more correctly than we can do with all our wisdom. 
While such a view might seem incongruous, particularly to an animal lover and in the 
light that we share a common ancestry with the chimpanzee - 98.4% of our DNA being 
the same - it does bring into focus the fact that we do not need to be aware of things for 
them to function successfully; we remain unaware of our heartbeat, breathing, and 
digestion. Indeed, many things function better without our conscious input; perhaps, if 
we did not consciously decide when and what to eat then we might even be healthier. 
The evolution from autonomous to conscious control involves the mid or hind brain as 
welI as the hemispheres and cerebral cortex where the contents of consciousness lie. 
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Humphrey (1986:59) tells of the condition which Professor Larry Weiskrantz at 
London's National Hospital first called "blind sight", or recognition without conscious 
awareness, in 1974. Prior to this, sometime during the 1960's, Humphrey was himself 
involved in research at Cambridge in which he tried to teach a blind monkey, whose 
cerebral cortex had been removed in a study of the effects of brain damage in humans, to 
"see". At first the monkey, Helen, did not bother to use her eyes but after much patient 
encouragement and coaxing she slowly began to use them again after six months. 'I1le 
lower visual centres of her brain were still intact and over the following few years she 
learned to move deftly among furniture and to pick up tiny pieces of chocolate from tlle 
floor. Humphrey writes (p.58): 
To a stranger she would have appeared to be quite normal. But I was sure that 
she was flot normal. I knew her too well, knew how much effort her recovery 
had cost her, and how bewildered she sometimes seemed to be. It was as 
though eyesight now had an entirely different meanmg to her. Perhaps, I 
thought, in one sense it did not mean anything at all. 
Unfortunately, of course, the monkey could not tell Humphrey what she was 
experiencing and it was not until 1974 that Professor Weiskrantz began to work with a 
patient known to us by the initials DB whose primary visual cerebral cortex on the right-
hand side of his brain had been removed because of a growth. As might be expected, it 
was found that DB could not see, through either eye, anything on the left side of his 
visual field. Professor Weiskrantz, believing that DB's brain was still somehow 
processing visual information, persuaded him to consciously override his knowledge that 
he could not see and to "guess" at what he might be seeing of the objects put before him 
if he could see. To DB's amazement he found that he was able to do so. He was able to 
130 
locate objects accurately which were in his blind field and even guess certain aspects of 
their shape. Yet he remained consciously unaware that he could see. Humphrey goes on 
to say that this phenomenon is not confined to vision but has been noted also with 
regard to the sense of "touch" where one woman, although not being able to feel 
anything, could tell which of her fingers were being touched. 
It is difficult for the human psyche to accept the fact that so many things happen of 
which we are not consciously aware, especially when those things are happening to us. 
For Descartes, humans have privileged and incorrigible access to all their own thoughts 
which lie within a unified conscious state and constitute the essence of a non-physical 
mind. Our habit of mind tells us that "Ie should conquer and be in control. After over 
half a lifetime of struggling to prevent myself from falling over when my autonomous 
nervous system lets me down, or when an unintended irregular movement throws me off 
balance, I still get angry with myself and find it almost impossible to accept that such 
things will inevitably occur no matter what I do. But, as I stated in Chapter Two -
C011SciollSlIeSS alld the Self- so many of our conscious thoughts seem to spring from areas of 
the mind over which we have no awareness. To this extent we have to concede that we 
are biologically determined, our freewill, inevitably, being limited to what can be 
controlled consciously. Our bodily rhythms and even our moods, to some extent, are 
controlled by hormonal! chemical secretions, and despite all attempts to put off the 
ageing process, we are incapable of escaping what has been described as the last enemy, 
death itself. 
Our concept of Self, whilst understandably orientated around the human brain, is in 
danger of paying too scant attention to human beings as a whole. It is not the brain alone 
which acts but our whole being. As well as being dependent upon a nervous system 
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which sends electrochemical messages around our bodies, we are also equally dependent 
upon a cardiovascular system through which nourishment is derived and waste products 
expelled. Dr William Goody of The National Hospital in London pointed out that both 
in the cardiovascular as well as the nervous systems we find large cel/tml orgllns 
(heart/brain) to which special attention, emotional and scientific, have been directed (The 
Wflcet, 7thSept.,1957:451-453). l30th systems are interdependent, both nerve fibres and 
red blood cells producing effects by mediating biochemical reactions and, wrote Goody, 
the nervous system should be viewed as a circulatory system in the same way that we see 
the cardiovascular system. For example, the motor impulse from the brain along the 
efferent system which causes, say, a muscle to contract is immediately recreated by that 
very contraction and sent back along the afferent system. Illustrating his contention that 
the brain has occupied the chief position in controlling both mind and body only for as 
many hundreds of years as the heart held it for thousands years he quotes the following 
Psalms of David: 
Ps. 51 - l3ehold thou desirest truth in the inward parts: and in the hidden part 
thou shalt make me know wisdom. Make in me a clean heart, 0 God; and renew 
a right spirit within me. 
Ps. 45 - My heart is inditing a good matter: I speak of things I have made ... my 
tongue is the pen of a ready writer. 
Ps.147 - He healeth the broken heart, and bindeth up their wounds. 
Goody continued: 
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The large central organ is almost always used for the mentational point of the 
system, so that it is customary to consider the blood as flowing from the heaft, 
through the circulatory channels, back to the heart, however miles of tube there 
may be, however many backwaters and traps there are, however many vital 
functions the blood is required to maintain outside the heart. Similarly, the brain 
is regarded as the chief organ of the nervous system to which the rest of the 
nervous tissue is an appendage, subordinate in functional importance, even 
though animals survive when only the "vital centres" of pons and medulla are 
intact. We regard the peripheral nervous system and spinal cord as the "message 
bearing" equipment of the brain. 
Both the nervous system and the circulation system are engaged in the co-ordination of 
our limbs and the extent to which we function as people depends upon our ability to 
relate and communicate our inner lives to the outside world. Much of this ability, or at 
least the finer part of it, has come about through the evolution of the cerebral cortex. 
Had Descartes known about this then perhaps he would not have been so much at pains 
to draw such a clear and, perhaps, artificial distinction between animals and humans, and 
especially he would not have felt so threatened or been so defensive regarding the 
dextrous ability of monkeys. Perhaps, even the knowledge that we share over 98.4% of 
Our DNA with the ape would have made sense to him. In the fourth part of his series on 
Time and the Nervous System for the journal of neurology - Brain (1965:756), in ~hich 
he considers the significance of the human hand, Goody, referred to above, quotes F. 
Wood Jones (1946:301): 
... it is not the hand which is perfect, but the whole nervous system by which the 
movements of the hand are evoked, co-ordinated, and controlled. In one thing 
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Man certainly shows marked anatomical advance from basal mammalian 
simplicity, in one feature every monkey and ape compares but'iIl with him, and 
that is the wonderful development of the cerebral cortex. What we are admiring 
in the multitude of actions of the useful human hand is the human cerebral 
perfection, not the bones, muscles, and joints that carry out the complex 
volitions. 
I know from my own experience the sense of frustration when difficulty is experienced 
in getting one's hands to carry out one's intentions. Cerebral palsy has left me with more 
control over my left side than over my right. Doing things that require me to use both 
hands at the same time is extra troublesome; for instance, when using the air line to 
inflate my car tyres at the garage it is difficult simply holding the nozzle onto the tyre's 
pressure valve with one hand whilst trying to press the lever on the air control unit with 
the other. This makes me especially aware that there is more to action than simple willing 
(volition). Clearly, the distinction between other animals and us is the vast development 
of our cerebral cortex enabling us to have greater conscious control over our own lives 
and environment. We also have lclearer, not to say inflated, opinions as to what or who 
we are. Indeed, as we seek to sanitize and control more of nature by way of combating 
diseases it is as though our humane ideals are engaged in a war against biology, as 
Dawkins noted (see above). As more antibiotics are produced and over-prescribed in 
some countries, so bacterial strains become stronger and more diversified and we know 
that even should this problem be overcome then we would be faced with the alarming 
rate of the world's population growth which this century has gone from less than one 
billion to the current 5.6 billion and increases at the rate of a quarter of a million per day. 
The growth of the human race and more conscious control has given rise to 
deforestation and the current loss of three species per day. Hence, together with the 
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pollution that we cause, we face a situation where the oxygen supply will become less and 
the vegetable and animal life on which we rely for ~ost medicines will 'also decrease. So 
much for our evolved freedom within a nature which produces the thorn along with the 
rose, the wolf to eat the lamb, the greedy to exploit the poor, and death to vanquish life. 
Yet, in a way God or nature has made the contest more interesting. By making us 
conscious and thus, as Schopenhauer would remind us, sufferingly aware, nature has 
given us the capacity for compassion and the ability, within our short lives, to choose the 
path we tread. What choice we make depends upon the integrity of the imagined Self. 
Some people might see this as a "spiritual" tension between the unbridled drive and the 
acknowledgement that total freedom may lead to chaos as when we give way to the 
impulse to jump a red traffic light. Although it is naive to think that the individual will 
always comply with socially imposed traffic lights, especially when s/he may stand to gain 
more in the short term by not doing so, maybe the benefits of a more just society will 
have some impact before it is too late. It is no part of the philosopher's role to make 
predictions. His/her discipline, perhaps, more than most others, makes it clear that the 
future cannot be foretold but knowing the facts can help to direct our compassion 
provided, being freed from our egos, we are orientated around a tefltred Self open to 
compassion. Hopefully, having the facts before us, we will make compassionate use of 
our highly developed brains to integrate the forces of nature for the good of all, not least 
our own. 111is would be "flourishing" in the truest Aristotelian fashion. 
Section Two 
A11aJogy in Computer Science 
A further illustration of our confusion regarding the concept of Self have been the 
analogies we have drawn with man-made things. Just as Descartes used the analogy of 
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"clockwork" to describe the movements of the material body so many people since have 
used the growing developments both in mechanisation and, later, com{JUter technology 
to describe what might be taking place in the neurology of the brain. Some theorists even 
turn the question on its head, suggesting that computerised robots might develop the 
same sense of "self" that we have. 'TIle current debate is between those in the camp of 
strong AI (Artificial Intelligence) and their opponents in that of weak AI. Strong Al 
maintains that computers and robots will eventually possess "minds" as humans do. 
Those opposed to this view, like the American philosopher John R. Searle, argue that 
computers are not capable beyond syntactical logic, that we cannot, for example, ever 
hope that they will be developed in such a way as to give them semantic ability -
following logical rules is, he says, very different from understanding them. Human beings 
are not just processors of information but infer meaning from modal perceptions where, 
for instance, the acceptable interpretation depends upon the context in which it takes 
place. 
Searle, in a paper - "Minds, Brains, and Programs" - published in the journal The 
Behavioral and Braill Stief/ces (1980), vol 3, pp. 417-457 introduced an analogy which has 
since become a classic and has been discussed, perhaps, by most people interested in AI. 
He imagines a Chinese Room in which he sits receiving problems posted through the 
letterbox. These problems are written in Chinese, a language that Searle does not 
understand. The answers, passed back the same way, must be in Chinese. To help him 
Searle has a manual, written in English, but showing, in Chinese, all possible problems 
and their corresponding answers. When he receives a problem through the letter box 
what he must do is find the problem shown in the manual whose Chinese characters 
match exactly and then push a copy of tile corresponding answer back through the letter 
box by way of answer. In this way, Searle claims, he is doing what the computer does and 
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that is, by a process of matching providing the answer which syntactically follow from 
the question but without Imderslallding either. For Searle, semantic ability can come only 
from consciousness which, for him, is confined to biological wetware and cannot be 
produced in computer hardware(1). 
In the opposing strong AI camp we have people like Daniel Dennett with what he calls 
his Multiple Draft Theory of consciousness which he puts forward against what he 
dismissivcly calls the redundant Cartesian Theatre concept and describes as a von 
Neumann single bottle-necked accumulator (Dennett, 1991:431). Dennett sees his theory 
being in line with PDP (parallel distributed processing) in the world of computers and, 
using a computer analogy, he likens it to a "virtual machine", a sort of evolved and 
evolving computer program which shapes the activities of the brain. He quotes 
(1991:101) the philosopher and psychologist, William James, who said: 
There is no cell or group of cells in the brain of such anatomical and functional 
pre-eminence as to appear to be the keystone or centre of gravity of the whole 
system. 
Dennett argues that there is no centre of consciousness; consciousness being diffused all 
over the brain. 'I11e brain is continuously processing information from the senses and 
forming ideas, or multiple drafts, most of which never come to "conscious" fruition as a 
final draft. Nonconscious assessment of Self and its environment is constantly taking 
place and of the many drafts produced only those appropriate to the demands of the 
moment come into consciousness for final selection. 
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In a discussion on BBC Radio 4, in the Blfle Skies series chaired by the biologist, Stephen 
Jones, following the publication of Dennett's book Consaotlslless Explailled, Jones together 
with Professor R.L. Gregory, Dennett himself, and the neurophysiologist at The Open 
University, Stephen Rose talked about the book. In a frank exchange of views, Rose 
expressed his unhappiness with Dennett's reference to the brain as some sort of super 
computer and went on to say that, in his view, the brain is not a computer in any sense in 
which a computer is thought of today; for him, computers deal with it!fOf'l1lalioll whereas 
brains deal with ",eat/iI/g. Indeed, we should make the point even clearer by stating that 
brains deal with ideas, which are derived from e..-.:periellce, and it is these that make-up 
h!fOrma(ioll. 
The arguments of both Rose and Searle illustrate that the matching process used by the 
computer is akin to the way we should think of codes and not languages, as shown by 
Hacker (above), in relation to computers. The idea that the mind might stand in relation 
to the brain in much the same way that the program stands to the computer Oohnson-
Laird,1 988:8) needs to be rejected rigorously. Apart from "applied" (see below) AI all 
that a computer is able to do is to simI/late human behaviour and this is a far cry from 
being alive and consciously aware. Without such awareness modal reference with regard 
to context cannot be made. Johnson-Laird (P27), believing that mental life can be 
explained by computable theories, tells us that the main tasks of the mind are: 
1. to perceive the world 
2. to learn, to remember, and to control actions 
3. to cognate and to create new ideas 
4. to control communication with others 
5. to create the experience of feelings, intentions and self-awareness 
138 
. . 
I do not argue that most of these things cannot be simulated but that they have no 
mealling for the computer/robot. As an introduction to Part 2 - Vision - of his book The 
COII/jmler alld the Millt/, Johnson-Laird uses the following quotation from David Marr, 
who, before his tragic death from leukemia at the early age of 35, did some astounding 
research in theoretical neurobiology on vision and its artificial simulation: 
... the true heart of visual perception is the inference from the structure of the 
image about the structure of the real world outside. TIle theory of vision is 
exactly tile theory of how to do this; and its central concern is with the physical 
constraints and assumptions tllat make tllis inference possible. 
Marr, who according to Francis Crick had become a partial convert to the AI approach 
to vision, believed that the main job that vision had to do was to derive a representation 
of shape; brightness, colour, texture etc being secondary. He devised a theory of a tllree 
tier visual system in which, writes Crick (1994:76), the pTimary sketch makes explicit some 
important information about tile two-dimensional image, primarily the intensity changes 
tllere, and their geometrical distribution and organization. It deals, among other things, 
with edge segments, blobs, terminators, discontinuities, boundaries and so on. 'I1le 2'hD 
sketch makes explicit the orientation (and rough depth) of the visible surfaces and their 
contours, in a viewer-centred frame. 11le 3D model representation describes shapes and 
their spatial organization in a object-centred frame. Crick continues (p.77): 
This at least divides the visual task into separate stages and is of some use if only 
because it makes us realize how much has to be done in seeing something. It is 
unlikely to be correct in detail. 11le three stages are probably only a first 
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approximation-for example, colour, texture, and motion must be added to 
"shape." 11lere may be more than three stages and they are unlikely to be as 
distinct as his description implies. They probably interact in both directions. 
Nevertheless, his scheme does suggest the sort of processing that may be taking 
place when you see something. 
In commenting on the above I wish firstly to draw attention to the difference between 
what Gelerntcr (1994:45) has called cognitive and applied AI. Cognitive AI is orientated 
towards discovering how humans do things; it concentrates on reasoning, problem 
solving, and language. Applied AI is not interested in how humans do things but in 
whatever method becomes available for accomplishing a given task. Notlling has been 
learned directly from applied AI about how humans think but a large degree of success 
has been achieved in the writing of software which will enable computerized diagnosing 
of disease, chess playing, and the synthesizing of sounds made by various musical 
instruments. 
What must be taken into account is the severe restrictions placed upon any computerized 
equipment when it comes to making an it!ftmlce. As with Searle's Chinese Room, it is one 
thing to compare a specific group of shapes against a list of such shapes so as to find a 
match but it is quite another to it!ftr a !?leaning when no exact match is available. Again, 
one can match a code so as to give a message in a foreign language but without someone 
who knows that language it is no more understandable than was the code itself. When 
Marr talked about the theory of vision being about drawing an it!ftretlce from the structure 
of the image to the structure of the real world outside he also mentioned the physical 
constraints and assumptions that make it possible and, I believe, tllat without COl1saOIlS 
aJlJaret/ess no computer will be able to h!ftr jilt/eliotl from form. TIlis same limitation, 
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although not tied to the absence of conscious awareness, was conceded by Johnson-
Laird as being the current situation with regard to computers after he and a colIeague, 
George Miller, had undertaken an analysis of concepts. 111ey found that an item, such as 
a table, cannot be recognized from its canonical shape since it does not have one. 
Accepting that an object can be recognized, by humans, as a table even though it is not 
like any other table one has come across before, Johnson-Laird writes (p.120): 
We were forced to conclude that an artefact can be identified as a member of a 
category, not because of any intrinsic aspect of its three-dimensional shape, but 
because its form, dimensions and other physical properties, whatever they may 
be, are perceived as appropriate for a particular filllctiofl. 
But, we may ask, is the difference between human intelligence and AI simply down to 
being "consciously aware"? It must be, surely, that there is much more involved of 
which, at this stage, we simply do not understand. However, one thing that we may 
consider is the way that the conscious mind puts a problem into context and, working in 
its problem-solving mode, selects from possible solutions including those inferred by and 
thrown up from its subterranean or unconscious part. That our mental processes have 
access to such a wide range of possibilities, as for example of both "form" and 
, 
"function", is owing to the remarkable features of different parts of the brain whose 
memory functions are constantly storing information. Nevertheless, it is not just a case 
of laying-down and matching data as being able to bye!' relevance and meaning in varying 
, 
situations where lateral, rather than logical, connections are required. 
Interestingly, Johnson-Laird claims that a leading British neuropsychologist, Elizabeth 
Warrington, and her colIeagues have found a "double-dissociation" between brain 
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damaged patients who, on the one hand, can perceive the three-dimensional shape of an 
object but are unable to discern its function, and those on the other: who are able to 
discern the function even though they have difficulty perceiving its three-dimensional 
shape. TIle first instance occurs in patients with a lesion of the parietal lobe in the left 
brain hemisphere, while the second involve a right parietal lobe lesion. (Compare 
Sperry's commissurotomy patients - Chapter One - Neurology of the Se!J.) 
There is a difference, of course, between matching an object with an obvious function 
and making an itffire"ce about, say, an unusual table which one has never seen before. 
ltffimtdng is something that the human brain does Imconsciotlsfy, for example, although our 
perceptions occur separately we do not, as it were, see the joins; everything appears to 
flow. Again, our brains make up the hole that would otherwise occur due to our blind 
spot where the optic nerve joins the eye. TIle psychology of vision has several examples 
that demonstrate the brain's Gestalt struggles to make sense of what is seen by trying to 
separate "figure" from "ground". One of the best known ones shows a number of 
differently shaped black blotches on a white background. When looking at this for the 
first time nothing meaningful is seen but then the "figure" of a dalmatian dog begins to 
emerge from the "ground". Similarly, there is a picture which shows both a left and a 
right profile ora vase centred between what had previously been seen as the two profiles; 
these alternate as one continues to look at them in the same way as the Necker cube 
changes its shape. Such an ability, I would suggest, requires a flow between 
unconsciousness and consciousness and, as Gelernter, referring to an "observer" Self, 
says (1994:161): 
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... despite the lack of any actual observer, the brain is nOlletheless capable 0/ creatillg the 
illusioll 0/ all obsert-'(!r. The "mystery of consciousness" inheres ex~ctly in this: that 
our brains have the knack of creating an "observer illusion" for us. 
Here I understand Gclernter's reference to an actual observer or an observer illusion to 
be a psychological construct as opposed to the strict Self or person observed by others. 
He holds that tile brain is "wired" to create an imagined Self just as it tries to make sense 
of tile world given by the senses, even to filling in what seems to be missing - if we formed 
an imaginary equilateral triangle on paper by placing three black discs, each with a 60 
degree sector cut out facing its centre, then our brains would create tile illusory 
boundaries of a triangle. It is this illusion that Dennett wants to demolish but as I have 
tried to show throughout my thesis there are certain intangible things, such as, our 
representation of the Self and our values of goodness and love which should be 
cherished for tlleir human survival value, lest, in our desire to be independent of our 
nature we destroy some of tile very things on which, unknowingly, we depend. We may 
be able to demolish tile Self in the laboratory of a philosophical think-tank but our 
everyday lives, I would suggest, would be diminished by doing so. The Self is a construct 
of the psyche to which both unconscious and conscious input contribute. I am quite 
satisfied that whilst I, obviously, realise that I have cerebral palsy which causes me one or 
two problems, this fact has no input to the personal persona, i.e. my imagined Self, which 
my brain creates for me and so, in this regard, I suppose that other people are more 
aware of it than I am (2). Admiring philosophical and scientific enquiry as I do, I am 
reticent about making a claim to the effect that they are going too far; after all, it would 
be unrealistic to try to limit human curiosity. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that there 
needs to be a division between knowledge tllat results from such enquiry and its 
application to everyday life which takes into account tile nature of the beings we, 
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unavoidably, are. So many of the benefits that science could provide to the world can not 
be applied because of political unrest, human greed, alienation and po~erty. Instead, the 
fruits of science arc being used destructively to equip for human conflict and war. The 
fruits of knowledge are being squandered because of a lack of wisdom-the wisdom to live 
within our unchangeable biological and neurological condition while benefiting from 
research which is able to go beyond such restraints. Surely, whilst we would be rid of 
self-centred egos, we do not require a philosophy of 1/0 self so much as one to create a 
cetlfredSclf - see Chapter Four - Aforali!J of/he Self. 
In his book The Afllse i1/ the Machille, Gelemter argues for what he calls the cogllitil!fJ specfmm, 
the whole idea of which he freely admits to being apostasy coming, as it does, from an 
establishment computer scientist (1994:35). 111e Spectrum covers the whole range of 
human experience from what he refers to as highfoclls to 100VfoctfS thoughts. High-focus 
thoughts are centred upon the "logical" process which we would associate with the left 
hemisphere of the brain, whilst low-focus thoughts are those centred around the creative 
processes of lateral thinking that are associated with the right hemisphere. Emotion, 
claims Gelemter, is right at the heart of the cognitive spectrum; thought is not a matter 
of brains alone but is inextricably linked to bodily states which feed and help define it. 
We do not think solely with our brains but with both our brains and our bodies. He writes 
(pp.46-7): 
... emotions are not a form of thought, not an additional way to think, not a 
special cognitive bonus, but are fundamental to thought. If we subtract emotion, 
the only part of the cognitive spectrum remaining is the radical high end-and to 
identify this narrow high-focus band with thought in general is absurd. 
Emotions are fundamental to thought; but the body, inconveniently enough, is 
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fundamental to emotions. After a bit of reflection it becomes inescapable that 
you don't)lIst think 11lith your braill; you think with your body too-this holds in the 
sense, roughly speaking, that a violin uses its strings to produce a sound; but take 
away the sounding board-the instrument's bridge and its body-and the sound 
you wind up with is a thin parody of the real thing. 
So crucial is this interaction between our bodily senses and our brain that Gclernter 
suggests that our very concept of a Self as an "observer", so vividly captured in medieval 
paintings that depict the moment of death when the soul leaves the corporal body in the 
form of a miniature body, is modelled closely on the relationship between the body and 
the external world. This itltrospectiftg Self is endowed with all the capacities that the body 
uses in exploring the world. lbe relationship between the Self and its thoughts is much 
the same as that between the body and the external world; to see is to I/Ilders/mld, ideas 
IfIOve or tOllch us, we say that things slfIellwrong or do not sOll1ld right and that we want a 
thing so much that we can almost taste it. Gelernter quotes Coleridge (P184): 
I seldom feel without thinking, or think without feeling. 
It seems to me that we should be able to traverse the cognitive spectrum between high 
and low-focus thoughts in the process of individuation and that there should be a 
blurring of distinction between both just as in quantum physics there are several possible 
transitional realities expressed "virtually" which conscious attention fixes in a permanent 
state. TIle low-focus creative state which gives us "art" also gives us fresh ideas which 
can be realised scientifically in the state of high-focus thoughts. Our world increasingly 
lives at the high end of the spectrum but its achievements are not being shared 
"imaginatively" and "creatively" through the inclusion, rather than the rejection, of the 
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lower creative and compassionate spectrum end. For balance, taking into account the 
nature of beings we are, we need the whole, and not just part, of the 'spectrum-we are 
brain aNd body, thought afld emotion, conscious and unconscious, and high aNd low-
focus, all of which has a part to play in a unified, or centred, Self and a unified, or 
centred, society. 
Towards the end of his book The COf?1f>"/er alld the MimI, Johnson-Laird fonnulates the 
following syllogism (1988:385): 
Human beings are animals (Darwin) 
Animals are machines (Descartes) therefore 
Human beings are machines (La Mettrie) 
He maintains (p.388) that there is nothing that we know for certain that renders it 
impossible to equip computers/robots with the mechanisms needed for motives, internal 
sensations and consciousness. Whilst I am, of course, not able to refute this with 
certainty I do maintain that its unlikely since I believe that human beings are dependent 
upon their unique biology and neurology. It is their combination that makes us what we 
are. My own view would be: 
The idea of cefllred (individuated) Selves is essential to humane beings 
IIumane individuals are essential to a humane world therefore 
The idea of cell/red Selves is essential to a humane world. 
In this chapter I have looked at the psychological, or what I call the "imagined", Self. 
This Self that we are acquainted with, as opposed to the "strict" self, or person, that 
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others identify us as being is, like the strict self, subject to change and it changes not only 
10 response to the passage of time but according to how we think about ourselves. 
Alluding to both the world of neurology and that of computers and information 
technology I have drawn a distinction between what is a consciously formed intention 
establishing and creating who we are and what is merely "goal-directed". In line with one 
of the main themes of this thesis my argument has demonstrated that, while we are at 
liberty to create various "imagined" Selves, e.g. egotistical or self deprecating, what I call 
the "centred Self' is most beneficial for us both as flourishing individuals and 
contributors to the humane world to which we would belong. 
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Chapter Six 
Spirituality and the Creative Self 
In this chapter I want to look at the way in which our spiritual vision expands our 
consciousness and enables us to become centred Selves as, creatively, we resolve the 
conflict between our conscious and unconscious being. By means of such a vision, I will 
argue, that we arc capable of adopting those values which transcend our ego-driven 
desires and are justified by their support of our collective and individual survival. 
Many of our most treasured values, values upon which I have maintained our very 
survival, not to mention our flourishing, depends, such as personal integrity, peace, joy, 
goodness, love, compassion, wisdom, freedom, justice, mercy, courage, generosity, 
loyalty, patience, kindness, self-control, etc. are transcendentally necessary in their 
support of life and are themselves supported by religion which itself is supported by a 
belief in God. Unfortunately, the latter is subject to more philosophical doubt than 
Descartes was prepared to admit. Therefore, such values must be examined both 
phenomenologically as we encounter them in our experience of the world and in 
themselves as they transcend our wishes, desires, fears and ambitions. They should be 
seen as worthy of being accepted on their own merit as we realise our responsibility in 
shaping what we are to become. Our brains and nervous systems automatically filter the 
environment of information so that we do not perceive what is not needed for our 
biological survival and from this we construct our perceived phenomenal, or outer, 
world. However, what we overlook from a biological standpoint may very well be crucial 
to our inner lives and reflect the way we see and conduct our outer lives. 
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St Augustine of Hippo (354-430), following a lengthy religious and philosophical search 
described in his COI!fessi01IS, came to the conclusion' that human instin~t creates a desire 
to praise God(l). Indeed, according to Augustine our hearts (minds) find no peace until 
they rest in Him(2). For Augustine the finding of such peace, which was neither 
dependent upon sensate nor environmental influences, was of far greater value than the 
pleasures of the senses that he had indulged and that had to be subordinated if he was to 
achieve it. In the twelfth section of his C01!fessiol/s he tells of his procrastination in the 
realisation that the decision had to be taken. In circumstances which read like the 
account of a nervous breakdown followed by conversion, he tells that after repeatedly 
deferring until tomorrow he heard what seemed to be the voice of a child saying, over and 
over, "Take it and read, take it and read". At first, he thought that it was children playing 
but not being able to recount any children's game in which this chorus was chanted, he 
eventually took up his Bible and read in Romans 13:13-14 
.. .let us conduct ourselves becomingly as in the day, not in revelling and 
drunkenness, not in debauchery and licentiousness, not in quarrelling and 
jealousy. But put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, 
and its desires" (RSV). 
This was enough, he tells us, for as he reached the end of the sentence it was as though 
the light of faith "flooded his heart and all the darkness of doubt was dispelled" 
(Dowley,1977,200). This is what psychologists, like Laing(1967:113), have referred to as 
ego-loss or trallSCe1Idcfltal expcfie1lce. 
Whether or not we believe in an Absolute God is a matter for faith; neither cognitive 
science nor the five senses at our disposal can prove it one way or the other; it is more 
to do with transcendental ontology than with transcendental values. Nevertheless, 
transcendental ontological vicwpoints(3) can, and probably do, influence the 
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transcendental values that we adopt but we need to treasure such values, even in the 
teeth of ontological doubt and feelings of absurdity, for their own sake as having 
positive survival implications. Undoubtedly, faith in a caring God does lend buoyancy 
and impetus to the way in which we live our lives but, unfortunately, the human 
condition has its moments of despair, when faith seems to be too difficult, as well as its 
moments of inspiration and elation when our minds are at peace and we are content 
with our concept of Self and our place in the world. At times of ambivalence when 
conflicting thoughts assail us and we see that nature is at once both beautiful and cruel, 
wonderful and terrible, then transcendental values need to be able to stand alone as 
providing resources which will best enable us to survive and flourish. Transcendental 
values are what give added vallfe to our biological lives bringing with it a spiritual 
dimension and anchoring an inner life from which we confidently communicate with 
others. 
What does seem relevant to my research into the concept of the Self, approaching from 
a neurological viewpoint, is the brain's capacity to create the world in which we live. As 
Schopenhauer makes plain right at the outset of his The World as U7ill al1d RepreselltatiolJ 
(1969:3) "The world is my representation"; both what you perceive and the values you 
adopt construct the only world you know. I must admit tllat it is very strange, almost 
unnatural or counter-intuitive, for us to appreciate the extent to which our brains filter, 
organise and arrange sense data without us being so much as aware of what is going on. 
To take just one simple example, if we became immediately consciously aware of what 
appeared on the retina bifore our brains had processed it, we would see the world upside 
down because this is how it is presented by the lenses of our eyes where the reflected 
light rays meet and cross over. Experiments have taken place in which volunteers have 
worn special glasses that reverse this process so that they see things upside down and 
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backwards. Soon their brains have adjusted and they begin to see the world "normally" 
. . 
again. This is, indeed, amazingly speeded up evolutionary adaptation unique to the brain. 
After a few weeks, however, when the glasses were removed, they saw everything upside 
down and had to learn the vision they had previously taken for granted (Pirsig, 
1991,120). Of course, the term upside dOJl/fJ is meaningless biologically; it is not that our 
brains turn the image around as one might do to a photograph since, as Ornstein 
(1975:42) tells us, we never do see the world right-side tip but our brains construct what 
we become consciously aware of from selected input. If the visual input is inverted then 
the learned correspondence between input and objects is disturbed and it takes time to 
learn the new correspondences. Our brains are wired to make setlse of the world as, for 
example, they try to make sense of alternating profiles, as in a vase/face shape or a 
Necker cube (see Chapter Five - IlltlSiofl and the Imagifled Self- Section Two). 
Along with making sense of the world the brain's own process of constantly re-wiring 
itself is aided by every thought as new dendritic pathways are created linking up various 
neurons (again see Chapter One - Nettrology alld the Se!Jj. Dy giving children our time and 
enriching their experiences we help to stimulate the growth of dendritic connections. 
l11e electromagnetic force of tl10ught creates an electrochemical process in which 
thoughts are materialised. As Einstein demonstrated, energy and matter are both 
expressions of the same thing. Baron (1990:181) writes: 
Quantum physics states that the basic building block of all matter is 
electromagnetic wave energy.... if matter is broken down to the level of 
electrons and even more basic components, the ultimate form will be 
electromagnetic Qight) wave energy. In other words, electromagnetic waves give 
rise to atoms, which ultimately we experience as matter. 
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111e selective process of our brain and nervous system is demonstrated by the visual 
. . 
field of consciousness which responds to radiant electromagnetic energy in the visible 
spectrum which is just a tiny part, between 400 and 700 billionths of a meter, of the 
entire energy band ranging in wavelength from less than one billionth of a meter to 
more than 1,000 meters. In addition to electromagnetic energy, many other forces arrive 
at the eye - pressure, mechanical vibrations in the air, gaseous matters, etc - but the eye 
has evolved to be ignorant of these (Ornstein, 1975:36). Our sensory system as a whole 
has evolved to disregard information such as X-rays, infrared, radiation and ultrasonic 
sound. The function of the brain and nervous system is to protect us from an overload 
of information to perceive and remember. This function sometimes malfunctions in 
some cases of schizophrenia where the person's centre of consciousness is pulled 
between multiple inputs all vying for attention. Ornstein cites Huxley'S The Doors of 
Perception where - following his experiment with the hallucinogenic drug, mescaline, 
which produced similar effects to those of schizophrenia - he says that we are Minds at 
Large but that as animals our concern is biological survival for which purpose Mind at 
Large has to be funnelled through the reducing valve of brain and nervous system. 
Also, as we emerge from childhood, we lose the elasticity of mind which received every 
new stimulus with a freshness which our growing conceptualizing and categorizing blunt. 
At the end of the introduction to his book, The ClIOStiCS, which accompanied his 
television series, the writer and television presenter, Tobias Churton, says: 
Naturally I would never have embarked upon the project of bringing the 
Gnostic experience to a hungry public if I was not convinced that an 
understanding of the subject could "change the world". All it takes to do so is to 
imagine the world differently. That will certainly change your world. The 
integrity of the vision of your world is worth living for. Television and films and 
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things may seem important but they are not "minds". That's what you've got 
that no work of art can reproduce .. .! wrote the section called "A Mystery Tour" 
in Part Two with the idea in mind that the reader may wish to visit the places 
mentioned within and perhaps relive the events described, in the imagination -
the true home of reality. This you knew when you were a child. Know it again 
(4). 
Later on, Churton tells us how Giles Quispel, a professor at the University of Utrecht, 
showed his translation of the Gnostic Codex 1 (now known as the Juttg Code:",) to the 
psychoanalyst, Carl G. Jung at the latter's Swiss home at Lake Bollingen. Jung said, "I 
have worked all my life to know the psyche - and these people knew already." Quispel 
says, "And it is true that the Gospel of Tmth [the most important and the most beautiful 
document in the Jll1Ig Codex] is such a vivid illustration of what man's predicament is 
according to Jung, that it could have been a falsification by a Jungian, which it is not!" 
Jung believed that every man needs a myth by which to live, and that if he does not 
appear to possess one, he is either unconscious of it, or else sadly alienated from the 
roots of his being. Apparently, Jung was fond of saying of patients, "Thank God he 
became a neurotid" ~That he meant by this is that depression or whatever symptoms a 
person suffered from had had positive affects in compelling him/her to look inward 
(Storr, 1989,192). It seems that the case of Augustine, above, may have been such an 
instance. According to Storr (p.199), Jung began to think of religion as a personal matter 
which had little to do with accepted creeds. Although not being able to subscribe to the 
faith in which he had been brought up, his father being a church minister, he continued 
to believe that individuals could neither be happy nor healthy unless they acknowledged 
their dependence upon some higher power than that of the ego. During a period of 
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adolescent doubt, recalled in his Memories, Dreams, atld Rejlectio1lS, Jung read Schopenhauer 
of whom he wrote: 
Here at last was a philosopher who had the courage to see that all was not for 
the best in the fundamentals of the universe. He spoke neither of the all-good 
and all-wise providence of a Creator, nor of the harmony of the cosmos, but 
stated bluntly that a fundamental flaw underlay the sorrowful course of human 
history and the cruelty of nature: the blindness of the world-creating Will. 
This unpanglossian approach appealed to Jung, and Storr, himself an eminent 
psychoanalyst and prolific writer, continues to say that a good deal of Jung's thought 
seems to be directly derived from Schopenhauer who considered that individuals were 
the embodiment of an underlying Will which is outside space and time. In Storr's 
opinion, Jung is endorsing a similar view when, at the beglnning of his a1ltobiogrqp4y 
MeltlOries. Dreams. attd &,flectiot/S, he writes, "My life is a story of the self-realisation of the 
unconscious". I3orrowing from the Gnostics he used the word ''pleron/d' to express a 
spiritual realm which transcends consciousness. In the pleroma, all is one. 111ere is no 
differentiation between opposites like good and evil, light and dark, time and space, or 
force and matter. Jung's belief in the unity underlying all existence led him to believe that 
physical and mental, as well as spatial and temporal, are human categories imposed upon 
reality which do not accurately reflect it. What is significant, however, is that whereas 
Schopenhauer thought that the way to obtain deliverance from the bonds of 
individuality was by the ascetic denial of the Will, Jung believed in the affirmation and 
realisation of individuality, i.e. the process of individuation (See Chapter Three - Hilma" 
Nature aNd the Se!fj. lfere the centre, true Self, is shifted away from the id-driven ego and 
holds the ring between consciousness and unconsciousness. This is partly the kind of 
deliverance for which Schopenhauer longed - freedom from the thraldom of insatiable 
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drives which, he thought, had their origin in the Will. It is as though, with the same goal 
in sight, Schopenhauer believed that there was no other option but that the intellect 
should ride and, thereby, seek to control the Will from the perspective of one struggling 
with a team of wild horses, whilst Jung thought that more would be achieved from the 
perspective of one handling a team of broken-in and, therefore, more manageable 
horses. In the final paragraph of his book, HIIIJ/all Aggressio1l, Anthony Storr (1968:122) 
writes: 
I would like to make a plea for further research. We are threatened as a species 
by our own destructiveness, and we shall never learn to control this unless we 
understand ourselves better. Throughout history, man has been bedevilled by 
ignorance about his own nature, and has filled the gap by Utopian fantasies of 
what he wishes to be like rather than face the reality of what he is ... our lack of 
knowledge is still appalling. There is so much that we do not know, so much that 
we could find out. If man is to survive, we need to know all that we possibly can 
about ourselves, our development, our needs, our intuitions, our advantages and 
our failings. Man, though successful biologically, is in many ways an 
unsatisfactory species, but whatever he is, we have to live with him. 
Whilst man finds within himself a nature which is often conflictual, he also has a strong 
desire to resolve it. 111is tension has always been the spur to creativity and change. 
Armstrong (1993:36) tells us that during a period which has become known as the Axial 
Age, between 800 and 200 BC, people in all the main regions of the civilized world 
created new ideologies that have continued to be crucial and formative. For reasons that 
are not fully understood religious systems developed along parallel lines reflecting the 
new economic and social changes that were taking place. In a new atmosphere of 
commercial prosperity power began to move away from kings, priests, temples and 
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palaces and go toward the market place. Each region developed a distinctive ideology to 
cope with the problems brought about by these changes: Taoism and Confucianism in 
China, Hinduism and Buddhism in India, monotheism in the Middle East expressed in 
terms of Zorasterianism in Iran and the revolt, against pagan practices and social 
injustice, of the Hebrew prophets such as Isaiah, Amos, Hosea, and Jeremiah in Israel. It 
is interesting to note that the concept of God influenced the Hebrews to develop the 
first known system to aid the poor. In the Book of Deuteronomy (15:11,NRSV) we 
read, "Since there will never cease to be some in need on the earth, I therefore 
command you, 'Open your hand to the poor and needy neighbour in your land.'" Even 
though he later spent 45 years preaching Enlightenment to the people, Gautama 
Siddhartha who became the first Buddha - The Enlightened One - was at first tempted 
to enjoy his "bliss" or transcendence by keeping it to himself. Indeed, some of his later 
followers during the first century BC seem to have forgotten that it had been Gautama's 
compassion that had caused him to overcome his initial desire to simply enjoy the fruit 
of his six years search as they retreated into monasteries to commit themselves to 
personal devotion known as bhakli. About this time, however, a different expression of 
Buddhism arose in which followers, bodhisaltvas, were willing to put off their own 11;1Vafla, 
sacrificing themselves for the sake of the people. Little wonder that Schopenhauer saw 
the influence of India in the teachings of Jesus (See Chapter One - Neurology and the Se!fj. 
Within an Eastern tradition like Hinduism we find the belief that individuals can merge 
with God whereas in \Vestern tradition, such as Christianity, the emphasis is more on 
the relationship between the Creator and the created. The possibility of divine 
incarnation within living memory demonstrates a non-\Vestern way of thinking about 
religion. For example, the female Hindu saint, Sri Anandamayi Ma, was born 30th April, 
1896. She was respected for her knowledge of the vedic tradition, botl1 its scripture and 
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philosophy. As a mentor of two Indian prime ministers, Nehru and his daughter Indira 
Ghandhi, her simple teaching was: 
... remember God as much as you can but at least 10 minutes each day, this 
being the most important thing you can do; None of life's pleasures bring lasting 
fulfilment but rather pain (reflections of Schopenhauer); Laugh as much as you 
can and do it with your whole being; God's grace flows perpetually, all you have 
to do is be receptive to it; Above all, desire the knowledge of God. Hindus 
believe that what was discovered deep within the consciousness of the 
enlightened ones, the Buddha, Christ, Mohammed, or Krishnamurti can be 
discovered by everyone. Spiritual practice aims to transform the individual from 
within and give lasting peace. There must not be incongruity between external 
actions and inner thoughts as when, even though we refrain from physical 
violence, we burn with anger within (Bradbury, 1996). 
All our external behaviour is moderated by internal processing strategies which we form 
during our development by putting a series of internal and external experiences together, 
by forming opinions and beliefs, or in making decisions. As the above illustration shows, 
although there may be inner conflict in need of resolution, external actions result only 
from whichever is the stronger. In a section called Faustian selves, in his book The 
Alf(/tiple Sef(1986:9-11), Elster quoting from Part 1 of Goethe's Fallst "Two souls, alas 
do dwell within his breast" points out that people are often commonly torn between 
different desires in which they want to do several things that, as a matter of fact or logic, 
are mutually exclusive but that it would be absurd to elevate all such cases to the status 
of "split selves". Augustine's conflict between wanting both to satisfy his sensual desires 
and to have peace of mind came to focus and resolution in his commitment to change 
and centre his mind on Jesus Christ. This again, I see as a process of Individuation in 
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which our beliefs attempt to unite conscIous and unconscIous processes or where 
Sartre's etl soi enjoys momentary harmonisation· with pOllr soi. Sartre's passion for 
freedom almost sabotaged his equal passion for justice which, it seems to me, we cannot 
have without responsibility. The young's urge for freedom from all restrictions and a 
return to nature does not seem so attractive, if things go wrong and plans do not work 
out as expected, when there are no structures on which to fall back. Structures civilize 
our baser instincts. If, for example, we do not bother to institute laws or, at least, codes 
of conduct that protect the vulnerable in society then they will not be in place should 
we, in this uncertain world, ever need them. In his trilogy of novels under the all-
embracing title, The Roads to Freedom, the central character, Mathieu Delarue who teaches 
philosophy, never finds the freedom that he most earnestly desires. In the first novel, 
The Age of ReasoN, Delarue evades his responsibility in respect of the woman, Marcelle, 
who is pregnant by him but he cannot overcome the dissatisfaction he feels with 
himself. Nor is the situation improved by him again trying to evade responsibility by 
enlisting in the war in the second novel, The RepnezJe. When, in the last novel, Iroll itl the 
S 01l~ Delarue breaks with all the final vestiges of civilized behaviour, flying in the face of 
all prohibitions of a dying culture based upon the Decalogue, his final freedom is that 
from respotlsibili(yas he becomes a P.o.W. We may be "condemned to be free", as Sartre 
thought, but it is a freedom limited by our own biology, neurology, psychology and the 
input senses at our disposal. Existentially, while being is becoming in that we choose 
what we are to be, we remain unfree when our lack of knowledge and power prevents us 
from doing things, e.g. no matter how much a homeless person may want a warm meal 
and comfortable bed for the night, his lack of resources probably prevents him from 
having them. A desire for total freedom may lead to the undermining of the very 
superstructure on which we unknowingly depend resulting, not in freedom, but in chaos. 
Maxi11l1111l freedom seems to be a more desirable aim for here we would work with 
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absobfle boundaries prescribed within the knowledge available at the time. Taking these 
things into account - our human condition - it would seem to be pragm~tic if we were to 
accept those restrictions that lead to, rather than curtail, those freedoms we most 
treasure. For some, like Augustine, this means subjecting their free-will to the aged 
wisdom that they have grown to perceive and respect as divine guidance - it is not so 
much a restrictive freedom, as an enabling one. 
Although Wittgenstein (Traclallfs, 4.116) thought that generally, whilst «everything that 
can be thought at all can be thought clearly and everything that can be put into words 
can be put clearly", when we contemplate religious and moral ideas we must face the 
truth that one of the problems of philosophy is that, given the information provided by 
our senses, our attempts to express our thoughts about it is limited by language. Indeed, 
in these areas Wittgenstein (Tractallls, 6.522) conceded «There are, indeed, things that 
cannot be put into words. They make themsellJCs "'a1ri.ftst. They are what is mystical". 
Another view is that our thoughts are already in an unspoken language whose grouped 
elements are replaced by single words to be uttered. Not surprisingly, as in any 
translation, they lose something in the process (5). Huxley (1954:52) tells us that: 
We can never dispense with language and other symbol systems; for it is by 
means of them, and only by their means, that we have raised ourselves above 
the brutes, to the level of human beings. But we can easily become the victims 
as well as the beneficiaries of these systems. \Ve must learn how to handle 
words effectively; but at the same time we must preserve and, if necessary, 
intensify our ability to look at the world directly and not through that half-
opaque medium of concepts, which distorts every given fact into the all too 
familiar likeness of some generic label or explanatory abstraction. 
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Penrose (1991:480) tells us that one of the major points that Hadamard, the 
distinguished Prench mathematician, made in his study (published 1945) of creative 
thinking is an impressive refutation of the thesis, so often still expressed, that 
verbalization is necessary for thought. Hadamard maintained that words were totally 
absent from his mind when really thinking. He wrote that even after reading or hearing a 
question, every word disappeared the moment that he began to think it over, and that he 
fully agreed with Schopenhauer when he wrote that "thoughts die the moment they are 
embodied in words". In a letter on the subject that Hadamard received from Albert 
Einstein, Einstein wrote: 
The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play 
any role in my mechanism of thought. The physical entities which seem to serve 
as elements of thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can 
be "voluntarily" reproduced and combined ... The above mentioned elements are, 
in my case, of visual and some muscular type. Conventional words or other signs 
have to be sought for laboriously only in a second stage, when the mentioned 
associative play is sufficiently established and can be reproduced at will. 
\Vriting that the geneticist, Francis Galton, also felt words to be a drawback, Penrose 
quotes him as saying " .. .! have to translate my thoughts into a language that does not run 
very evenly with them ... " The musician, Paul Robertson tells us that the composer, 
Mendelssohn, once said that "music is too precise to be expressed in words" while the 
biologist, Richard Dawkins (Bragg, 1996) says: 
Our brains are isolated from each other. Your brain is in your skull, mine's in my 
skull and there's a limited capacity to interact between them. Music, it seems to 
me, is potentially a very powerful way in which it's almost as though nerve 
impulses were rushing from the musician's brain to the listener's brain; its 
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happening in the time domain; its very rich. Bird song is often represented as 
though it were transferring rather mundane information about the sex and 
species of the singer. I'm associated with the view in biology that bird song is 
much more like music and that something like a nightingale's song or a 
blackbird's song is a very subtle, almost rhetorical, kind of manipulative hypnotic 
influence of one bird on another and I suspect that primitively music played the 
same role. You see it in the hypnotic drum beat of primitive peoples and the role 
that music plays in primitive ritual, and even, most of us as we wander around 
the world, I think I'm not at all unique in finding that all the time I'm tormented 
by a tune, not great music, it will just be a tune that's going on and on around in 
my head with a kind of mathematical pattern that I can't get rid of until the next 
day when it'll be a different tune. 
Our language is not always the representation of our thoughts that we could wish but 
more an approximation, hence, our many misunderstandings. If only those nerve 
impulses that Dawkins imagines rushing from the musician's brain 'to those of the 
listeners' could be down loaded, computer-style, when it is crucial that the verbal or 
written message received should be precisely the same as that thought to have been sent. 
Dut we are not machines and all human relationships are founded on the 
communication of, not just intellectual thought but, emotion in which music plays a vital 
part and shows us how intertwined it is with our neurological make-up which is 
compatible with the simple tempo relationships we prefer. There is a very intimate and 
complex relationship between words and music and it seems that we have evolved to 
respond to the musicality in language. The composer Janacek used to collect sentences 
which he would set to music and then discard the words and use the music as the basis 
for his compositions. His Spling Qllaltet No.1 expresses a tale in which a man murdered 
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his wife because he could not share her love of music. Emotions reflect the way we 
process time at the most basic level. David Epstein, Professor o"f Music at The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says that music captures time, makes it unique, 
structures it in a unique way, and, in doing so, reveals to us a great deal about ourselves 
and the experience of living. It also gives us the experience of movement and motion 
which is one of the most important aspects of life itself. His research of different 
cultures confirms that the ultimate controlling influence is pulse - all music embodies 
motion of the same sort. Motion and emotion are deeply tied together. Emotion in 
Latin is &" .... 'I110IllS which means "stemming from a sense of motion" (Robinson, 1996). 
When it comes to the realms of religion and morality, as Pears writing on Wittgenstein's 
philosophy (1971:56-8) points out, "there is no Archimedian point outside all factual 
discourse on which the philosopher can take a stand and still speak in factual terms". 
This is not to reject either religion or morality but to place them outside the factual 
discourse whose source of information is via our senses. Whether, having placed them 
there, we must accept that philosophy can never make a constructive contribution 
towards providing solutions to some of the problems we face, using Wittgenstein's 
much quoted assertion that "philosophy leaves everything as it is", I believe we have no 
option but to try. Given that "we feel that even when all possible scientific questions 
have been answered the problems of life remain completely untouched" (Tractatlls, 6.52), 
I do not believe that a (relative) sense of the world must lie outside the world itself nor, 
therefore, that we should not argue for honest, creative, attempts to offer constructive 
opinion. Since people do make sul?Jective sense of the world for reasons of personal 
survival, I believe that it is the philosopher's vocation to explore ways in which we 
escape our moral vacuum, survive and, even, thrive and flourish both as a species and as 
individuals (6). rrom our present position, however, there does not seem to be another 
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side to the limit of factual discourse, there being no sense data, we are always in danger 
of arriving at nonsense. Trying to plot that other transcendental side does, indeed, seem 
like endeavouring to plot the curvature of space itself which, without the logical points 
or planets of sense data as a guide, would seem to be impossible. Yet, venturing into the 
kind of abstract thought which led Newton and Einstein to both map objects in space 
and account for their trajectory, there must be the possibility of postulating the existence 
of un sensed points from our observation of how personal and species-specific space 
bends in relation to events, that is, seeing what consequences How from our actions and 
adjusting our behaviour accordingly. 
Since Jung, many people have come to realise that they can have a religious attitude in 
which they can trust something within themselves, call it their own personal integrity, or 
trust in some higher power, without having an orthodox faith - Jung, himself, had soon 
become disillusioned by conventional religion. Unlike Freud who had written in his book 
on religion the famous last sentence, "No, our science is no illusion but an illusion it 
would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere", and was 
mostly concerned with early childhood experiences and their knock-on effects for later 
life, Jung concentrated on the essentials for the latter half of life (7). He was primarily 
interested in the process by which one comes, in later life, to fulfil those potentialities 
which, earlier in life, one had had to neglect because of the force of circumstances. 
Recognising that just as a round physical object has to have a centre, so he saw that the 
development of a fully rounded, mature personality had to have a centre of some kind 
and that, for him, that centre was intimately bound up with religion. In the now famous 
interview with John Freeman toward the end of Jung's life, Freeman asked, "Do you 
now believe in God?" to which Jung replied, after a long pause, "It's difficult to answer. 
I know. I don't need to believe. I know". Obviously, that knowledge cannot be verified 
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any more than it can be refuted but what Jung had observed was that when his patients 
had a focus in the centre of their lives they did so much better. He wrote (1958:24): 
The individual who is not anchored in God can offer no resistance on his own 
resources to the physical and moral blandishments of the world. Por this he 
needs the evidence of inner, transcendent experience which alone can protect 
him from the otherwise inevitable submersion in the mass. Merely intellectual or 
even moral insight. . .lacks the driving force of religious conviction, since it is 
merely rational (8). 
Humphrey (1995:15) writes that several recent studies have specifically compared the 
mental health of religious believers with that of non-believers, and found that the former 
show many fewer symptoms of psychological disturbance. He quotes a publication in 
1992 in which John Schumaker cites his own study of a group of undergraduates at an 
American university where he found that 45 per cent of the irreligious individuals had 
more symptoms of mental disturbance than their religious counterparts. "Although such 
correlational data may have to be interpreted with caution", writes Humphrey, "they all 
point to the remarkable effectiveness of supernatural belief systems in combating 
feelings of worthlessness, lifting depression and calming fears." 
It is this transcendental centre - call it God or just my own integrity - around which 
personality, personal identity, revolves. It is here I derive a positive stance and know the 
lJIifld-itl-itse!f. Just as Plato used the shadows on the wall of a cave to explain the 
phenomenological world, so I have chosen to explain our projected identities, especially 
in the cases of neurological impairment, as reflections seen through a mirror which, 
because of distortion, impairs the image. It is as though the flot/lJlellal existence, or mind-
in-itself which unknowable to others, remains intact while the phenomenal projection, 
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perceivable by others, is grossly distorted. The crossroads at which personal identity is 
forged is where the conscious and the unconscious mind come together. Here traffic 
goes both ways and the other feeder roads of experience become part of the flow, 
creating and recovering memories. The process of individuation helps to hold the centre 
together so that personal identity, mind-in-itself, is not shattered along with its 
phenomenological mirror image. In this respect, the problems and frustrations faced by 
the neurologically impaired are the same as those faced by everyone else except for their 
intensity and gross exaggeration. It is the resilience of mind in maintaining its own 
integrity, despite the intensity and frustration felt in the face of one's restricted ability to 
communicate, that I am studying so as to better understand how personality holds 
together. Many things make up this personality and all revolve round a centre of focus 
which, like the hub of a wheel, transmits strength to its perimeter. Bennion (1991:125) 
paraphrases from Let There Be Love by Gunnel Enby, a Swedish young woman living in 
an institution for people with disabilities where sexual intercourse is banned, "If a 
person's faith in their own lovableness is denied by ignoring or dismissing the sexual part 
of their personality, the whole process of rehabilitation is undermined". Such pressure, 
brought to bear by unenlightened public opinion can only be tolerated and fought 
against from a centre which, in spite of everything, holds together. Indeed, as Churton 
said (above), "The integrity of the vision of your world is worth living for" since, as the 
wisdom of the Book of Proverbs tells us, "when there is no vision the people perish" 
(29:18 AV). 
It is our tision of the world that transcends our phenomenological representation and 
empowers the mind. The phenomena are created from filtered sense data which our 
vision transcends by widening the reducing valve of experience. This we do when we are 
aware that there are more things in this world than is instantly apparent. Looking 
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beyond mere biological survival, we transcend to a level of expanded consciousness 
which, along with language, has the power to provide experiences bey~nd those of our 
animal origins. 
Illustrating just how powerful the human mind can be, Dr Vernon Coleman begins his 
book Jovfilld O,ler Bocfy (1989:8) by relating how a friend had suffered from a number of 
uncomfortable chest symptoms, including a persistent cough and breathing difficulties, 
over several weeks. Although these symptoms were serious and failed to respond to the 
drugs his family doctor prescribed the patient remained at work. Some time later he was 
admitted into hospital for a few days whilst tests were carried out. After returning home 
his condition remained the same until, several days later when, a spokesman for the 
hospital telephoned the man's wife to say that the test had shown that her husband had 
a fast-growing cancer which would result in his death within a month or two. In just a 
couple of days the hospital's predictions began to come true and, for the first time since 
the start of the illness, he could not get out of bed. In his weak state he felt that he was 
unable to eat properly and began to lose weight. He soon needed constant nursing and 
relatives came from near and far to await the end. Then a second telephone call was 
received from the hospital to say that a mix-up had occurred and the patient had not got 
an incurable cancer but an infection that could be treated with special drugs. Within 24 
hours he was out of bed, walking, eating, and back at work. He still had chest symptoms, 
but he was no longer dying from an actual physical condition, nor was he being kiffed by 
his mind, i.e. mental events building up anxious states(9). 
The values we treasure should be seen in terms of survival. Even when someone bravely 
gives up their own life it is usually so that others can live. The illustration in the above 
paragraph shows how a negative thought, bearing no verity in factual discourse, can have 
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death-producing consequences whilst positive thoughts can reverse the whole process, 
creating life-enhancing powers. Words of ancient wisdom from the Book of Proverbs 
(14:30) tell us that "a tranquil mind gives life to the flesh" and that fear of the Lord (3:8) 
"will be a healing for your flesh and a refreshment for your bones (body)". Today's 
scientific wisdom makes it clear how important healthy bone marrow is if our immune 
systems are to continue to produce the one billion white defender cells needed daily to 
keep us free from the effects of infections. Whilst this process requires no thought on 
our part but goes on below the level of our awareness, conscious, negative thoughts 
seem to have a detrimental effect not yet fully understood although medical science has 
been aware of the placebo effect for a long time. Some theories of psychology, such as 
NLP (Neuro-Linguistic Programming) optimise a patients recovery chances, for instance 
in the case of cancer, by a process called "visualisation" in which the patient is 
encouraged to make a positive visual image in which the white defender cells of their 
immune system keep cancer cells in check (10). Cancer cells are not foreign invaders but 
are in many ways just like healthy cells except that the program of their production has 
gone wrong. In experiments using cells in petri dishes, it has been shown that sometimes 
cancer cells will go back to being healthy cells. NLP encourages patients to persuade 
their minds to work in harmony with and for the health of their bodies, rather than 
against them, and in so doing to see their illness as a communication and, when 
responded to, the symptoms will clear up on their own. Dilt tells of a patient in her early 
thirties, to whom he taught this method, who had had leukaemia since childhood and 
had now developed cancer of the colon. The surgeon wanted to schedule her for surgery 
to take out a significan t portion of her colon but she asked for a delay during which time 
she practised her newly learned technique. After only a few weeks further tests showed 
her cancer to be in remission. Dilt comments (1990:159-161) that "remission is a funny 
concept" and continues "I could say that my cold has been in remission for five years. 
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All the things that cause colds are still present, but my immune system is preventing 
them from getting out of control"(ll). A future m~dical check-up failed to pick-up any 
sign that this patient had had either cancer of the colon or leukaemia (12). 
Nature already provides means whereby the survival of our genes is progressed through 
replication and natural selection but at this level cruelty results for the individuals of a 
species in that their survival is so often subject to a contest between them and others. 
We have now reached the stage where the destruction of the planet is possible and, if 
our species is to survive, we need to resist the basic drives which make nature red in 
tooth and claw and, when yielded to by humans, advances the course of destruction by 
putting the world at risk from ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and many 
environmentally unfriendly things. Our social environment has evolved quicker than our 
biology; we are still coping with a fight and flight mechanism which is redundant in 
many of the situations in which we find ourselves today. It is vital that we take the reins 
of our own survival since if we do not then nature's arrangement of gene survival for the 
continuance of life itself will cease along with the demise of all their carriers. After 
describing the path of self-development upon which Jung encouraged his patients 
toward wholeness and integration (the process of individuation), Storr (1988:192-5) 
quotes Jung himself: 
If the unconscious can be recognized as a co-determining factor along with 
consciousness, and if we can live in such a way that conscious and unconscious 
demands are taken into account as far as possible, then the centre of gravity of 
the total personality shifts its position. It is then no longer in the ego, which is 
. merely the centre of consciousness, but in the hypothetical point between the 
conscious and the unconscious. This new centre might be called the Self. 
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For Storr, reaching this point is achieving peace of mind. People come to themselves, 
accept themselves, and are reconciled to themselves and to adverse circumstances and 
events. l11is, he says, is almost like what used to be expressed by saying: He has made his 
peace with God, he has sacrificed his own will, he has submitted himself to the will of 
God. But this is a hard-won peace consisting of a temporary cessation of the conflict 
between the conscious and unconscious mind. It is our striving to bring harmony out of 
discord which is the spur to creativity. The artist brings about reconciliation, re-ordering 
and bringing into balance the tension of form and space and, writes Harrison Gough, in 
so doing moderates the inner tensions of the observer, giving him a sense of encounter 
and fulfilment (Storr, 1972:236). Again, the concept of time is mentioned (see my note 9 
to Chapter One) whereby the musician seems to reconcile the difference between clock 
or objective time and psychological or subjective time. The first, being external, is fixed 
and holds one in bondage, whilst the other is more bound up with internal perceptions 
and fluctuations. By drawing the two together, the composer enhances one's sense of 
well-being. Storr quotes from Terence McLaughlin's Mllsic and CO!1lfJIIlllicatioll (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1970,1'1'.104-5): 
\Vhen collaboration occurs, when, for a while, the lines of conscious and 
unconscious thought run along the same track, we achieve the feeling of 
wholeness and satisfaction which is characteristic of our response to great art 
and other transcendent states of mind. The patterns of music, translated, 
analysed, shorn of detail, are able to simulate the patterns of emotions on"many 
levels simultaneously, thus bringing various hierarchical states of consciousness 
and unconsciousness into harmony with one another during the existence of the 
music for us, whether this is a performance or purely in the memory. As this 
happens we experience the sense of unity which arises from the cessation of 
conflict between conscious and unconscious. 
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Much creative tension comes from dissatisfaction and frustration with things as they are. 
Resolution of the conflict between conscious and unconscious is momentary and may 
come about in many ways - music, as mentioned above being one of them, meditation 
being another but, perhaps the most common way is by becoming thoroughly engrossed 
in what takes our interest. At a neurological level we e.",,·dle our own natural frequency or 
signature vibratory energy level by doing what we enjoy. Every structure, not just living 
beings, has its own natural vibratory frequency, e.g. a bridge has its natural vibratory 
frequency which, if matched by what is passing over it, will cause it to become unstable. 
Also, everyone will probably have heard tales about opera singers who have broken a 
wine glass by matching voice pitch with the glass's natural frequency. Everything -
matter, liquid, air - is basically energy. All matter, both solid and liquid, is composed of 
molecules, which are composed of atoms, which in turn are electrons circling a nucleus, 
themselves made-up of protons and neutron, which again are quarks. Quarks themselves 
are light beams of varying lengths. What is known as the sine wave has amplitude, 
wavelength, and frequency, anyone or two of which may change while the other(s) 
remains stable. The human body is composed of matter/energy molecules and the sum 
total of the energy we contain is our natural frequency. Music with sixty beats per 
minute, such as the Baroque music of Bach, Vivaldi, Coelli, and Handel, especially the 
slow or largo movements generally has a relaxing effect on all listeners. Once we sense 
our own energy level, natural frequency, we recognize it as our true state ~f beingness 
and feel a sense of completeness and peace (Baron, 1990) . 
In his 1951/2 Charles Eliot Norton lecture, Music and Imagiflatioll, the composer, Aaron 
Copeland said: 
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The serIous composer who thinks about his art will sooner or later have 
occasion to ask himself: why is it so important to my psych~ that I compose 
music? What makes it seem so absolutely necessary, so that every daily activity, 
by comparison, is of lesser significance? And why is the creative impulse never 
satisfied; why must one always begin anew? To the first question - the need to 
create - the answer is always the same - self-expression; the basic need to make 
evident one's deepest feelings about life. But why is the job never done? Why 
must one always begin again? The reason for compulsion to renew creativity, it 
seems to me, is that each added work brings with it an element of self-discovery. 
I must create in order to know myself, and since self-knowledge is a never 
ending search, each new work is only a part-answer to the question "Who am I?" 
and brings with it the need to go on to other and different part-answers (Storr, 
1972:223). 
I believe that unease pushes us in search of harmony, our own natural frequency, of 
which we occasionally get a glimpse before losing our balance like a novice tight-rope 
walker. In creating we not only discover a Self but we actually create an imagined Self in 
that the very act of creation adds building blocks to bring about a clearer, though 
changing, image. In a flawed world we seek a vision of flawless reality of which our 
phenomenological perceptions and categories become a more accurate reflection; where 
language, for example, is closer to our thoughts. If there is such a thing as a "literal" 
God's-eye-view, what is certain is that we cannot partake of it without faith, sometimes 
over and above our powers of sense-perception and reason. Whether or not this leap of 
faith is enlightening seems paradoxical for when we have faith our perspective changes 
from the position where we do not have faith and are unable to benefit from any 
possible effects which it could have - if we do not trust, say the bus driver, then we 
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refuse to board the bus and, therefore, we never discover whether or not the journey 
could have been bendicial. It does seem that 'pessimism and co~scious negative 
awareness can be detrimental to the unconscious internal systems that work for our 
health. A positive attitude which sees a glass as being half full seems to be more 
beneficial to our general health and well-being than a negative one that sees it as being 
half empty. I Iuman beings have evolved, it seems to me, in such a way that a healthy 
mind and body are more likely when thought, our conscious reasoning, works in harness 
with our powerful unconscious belief system. Our emotions mediate between both 
reason and belief and add energizing impetus just as the spokes of a wheel relays support 
to its outer rim. Jung's teaching that people need something at the centre of their lives, 
whether they realize it or not, echoes the teaching of Jesus for less scientifically aware 
listeners (Matt 12:43-5 RSV): 
When the unclean spirit has gone out of a man, he passes through waterless 
places seeking rest, but he finds none. Then he says, "I will return to my house 
from which I came." And when he comes he finds it empty, swept, and put in 
order. Then he goes and brings with him seven other spirits more evil than 
himself, and they enter and dwell there; and the last state of that man becomes 
worse than the first. .. 
Whether Augustine was right in his assumption that man's restlessness is attributable to 
his search for God is something a philosopher cannot prove but it docs seem that 
nature abhors a vacuum at the centre of our lives as much as anywhere else. If we do not 
choose something to live for then we are in danger of being taken over. An instance of 
this could be where a person does not feel valued for themselves, is unemployed with no 
hope of changing the situation and/or has nowhere to live. Without these positive 
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things at the centre of one's life it is easy to see how drugs and crime could get a hold 
and take over. 
Like the scientist, conscious thought wishes to understand and to wrap some model or 
some rigor around the creative intuitions of the unconscious. However, we might here 
be in a similar position to when we try to measure both position and velocity of a 
particle in quantum physics where observation appears to collapse the wave - maybe 
conceptual thought, with its learned habit of categorization, acts like a straitjacket and 
inhibits creativity (13). Experience seems to show that, at least for many of us, creative 
energy must precede thought which is then able to cause it to become a material entity 
(refer to my discussion of "real" and "virtual" transitions in Chapter Two - COllSciOIlSlICSS 
and the Se!Jj. Until creative energy throws something into the ring it docs not even exist 
to be of use. Our wish to transcend self-conscious selfllood is both religious and 
creative; it is a desire to resolve the tension between our world of unsatisfied being with 
that of becoming a satisfied being at peace with oneself, not as a being apart but, as a 
whole part of just being. 
In this chapter I have looked at the way in which our spiritual vision expands 
our consciousness and enables us to become centred Selves as, creatively, we 
resolve the conflict between our conscious and unconscious being. I have 
argued that by means of such a vision, we are capable of adopting those values 
which transcend our ego-driven desires and are justified by their support of our 
collective and individual survival. 
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Conclusion 
I set out to look at the neurology which underlies the Self, including instances where some impairment 
is present in the brain. By drawing on my own experience as someone coping with cerebral palsy I have 
tried to advance my research by looking both into what is happening neurologically and also into the 
phenomenology of it - into what it "feels" like to have and to cope with those experiences. Fascinated 
by the thought that the loss of a limb seemed to leave the personality intact I wondered about the 
central nervous system? If the brain is damaged, does this necessarily affect the mind, diminishing the 
"I", or is it just that it may make communication so difficult that it only appears to do so? If the "I" of 
personhood is not just the sum total of our parts, what is it? What is worth living for and how can we 
survive change and seeming contradictions in our value systems? Although we can no longer depend 
upon tradition to provide us with an absolute life's goal, or destination, 1 have argued that to jettison 
some of the traditional values may be to put our very survival at risk. 
My findings have led me to believe that "persons", in so far as they are seen by others, vary according 
to which part of the personality is seen to dominate in our relationship with another person. We will be 
seen by a wife or a husband in a different way than by a manager or a colleague. Our own view of 
ourselves, however, is imagined and this Imagined Self needs to include far more than a brain 
orientated central nervous system which is compared to an information-gathering computer database. 
As I have shown, we are much more than this. We are complex Beings whose unity of body and brain 
transcends our neurological hardware to make us what we are and what we are Becoming. \Vhen we 
look back on our lives and squirm at some of our past attitudes, this is not just because we have 
changed intellectually but because our "feelings" have changed also. Our capacity to choose, alongside 
our genetic dispositions, have made us what we are now. As living biological organisms we do not have 
• 
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absolute rational control but are, to a degree that most of us are unaware of, subject to our feelings . 
Bennion says (1991:74): 
The inteIlect and the will may seek to reject what the emotions impose, but they are not likely 
to succeed. We do not have emotions, they have us. 
For such reasons, I now realise that I may have underestimated, even post Hume, my ability to remain 
totally emotionally detached from the subject matter. 
I have argued that the Self is an imagined construction of the brain and I have found that, not only is it 
formed by the intellect but by the emotions, over which we have only partial control, and which 
provide the stimulation our nervous system requires to function. Goleman (1996:19) diagrammatically 
shows that most of a sensory input, say sight or hearing, goes via the sense organ to the thalamus and 
then to the neocortex (the thinking brain) or visual cortex and, finally, to the amygdala; part of the 
input, however, bypasses the cortex and goes straight to the amygdala so that a response in an 
emergency can be activated without waiting for it to go through the thought processes (1). Similarly we 
have no conscious control over the brain's autonomic nervous system or the chemical hormones 
produced by the endocrine glands that control such things as heartbeat. It is not difficult to understand 
how the heart was and, in folk psychology, still is pictured as the seat of the emotions. The heart, of 
course, is the organ we all depend upon to circulate the blood, carrying oxygenated nutrients to the rest 
of the body. As an organ, a muscular pump about the size of a fist which beats about 100,000 times a 
day, it stands in relation to the cardiovascular system as the brain stands to the nervous system. We are 
both biologically and neurologically influenced and limited. It is fascinatingly thought provoking to 
read Burne discrediting cause and effect and inveighing against the unreliability of induction, there 
being no God to guarantee that today's natural occurrences, like the rising of the sun (Burne, 1975:26), 
will recur tomorrow. Nonetheless, we should remember that such radical scepticism is not the way we 
conduct our everyday lives. And indeed, science since Hume tells us that our biology and neurology do 
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anticipate such events. As Campbell (1988:92) tells us, our biological clock systems treat tomorrow's 
sunrise as something that can be relied upon and arrange inner timetables accordingly. Autonomic 
mechanisms that prepare the body for activity are set to reach the peak of their cycle in advance of 
waking. In the same way, we must be aware of and on our guard against the subtleties of Sartre's 
existentialism which again argues that, since there is no God to have a conception of human nature, 
there cannot be any human nature and, therefore, existence precedes essence (Sartre, 1948). Here 
again, science has moved on and since Sartre formulated his philosophy DNA has been discovered so 
that regardless of whether there is a God to influence our essence our genetic inheritance certainly 
does. 
So, what other influences have been considered? It was asked whether damage to the brain necessarily 
affected the mind, diminishing the "I" or did it just create a communication problem which may cause 
others to suppose that it did? All damage causes "loss" and in that sense is regrettable. It is not true 
that the loss of a limb does not affect the personality. Of course it does in as far as our bodies are a 
part of what we "are". What is tme is that sooner or later we come to terms with the loss, not because 
we are particularly brave, but because there is no choice. The personality is affected because it develops 
in an environment where, on account of the loss, certain everyday things are that much more difficult. 
For example, someone who has lost an arm has no choice but to rely more on their remaining one to 
provide for their needs and while they may become extremely adept it cannot be as simple managing 
with only one arm instead of two. I imagine that, as good as a prosthesis might be, no-one would 
prefer it to t1leir natural limb. All such "losses", together with countless otller struggles that everyone 
faces in life affects our personality, our character, and our personal identity. They go towards making 
us what and who we "are" and, may, affect the Selves we imagine ourselves to be although not, 
perhaps, in the way one might anticipate. 
\. 
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The problem is that whilst we come to terms with the situations that we encounter, albeit a lost limb or 
whatever, and try to get on with life, others looking on may seem unable to do so. The lost arm that 
someone has come to terms with, learning to cope adequately without it, is still visibly a lost arm to an 
onlooker and this not only makes the person different but limits and reduces them in the eyes of the 
onlooker who, unless very perceptive or having experience of someone coping with just one arm, 
cannot understand that as a personality this is still a whole person. It's as though fearing the unfamiliar 
and, sometimes, the thought that it could happen to us we build a wall of protection around ourselves 
and in doing so, perhaps unintentionally, we force those who are "different" to st,'md outside. Even 
those who have some handicap themselves can be just as protective when it comes to their view of 
others; after all, its no easier for them to override their feelings of apprehension when facing 
unaccustomed situations in spite of their experience of some aspect of disability. There is something 
about seeing someone with a physical problem that we find hard to come to terms with and it seems to 
be this: our brains autonomically create our "imaglned" Self and, in doing so, they make up for any 
deficiencies just as in vision we see things "whole" rather than interrupted by a gap where our blind 
spot occurs. Onlookers do not have this advantage; as far as Selves are concerned they are able only to 
see their own and to glean information about others from what those others manage to communicate. 
Even the actress, Zoe Wanamaker, says that when something is shown on television in which she 
appears, she either walks out of the room or else covers her eyes with her hand since what she sees on 
the screen does not match the version of her performance edited by her brain for her personal viewing 
(March, 1995). Projecting our own Self-image, which is something we all do, is especially difficult for 
someone with a neurological impairment. Getting others to see us exactly as we see ourselves is, of 
course, impossible for anyone but when one is noticeably different from most other people the 
difficulties are much greater. For one thing, body language can be very deceptive, especially when 
misconceptions arise because others find it difficult to decode both verbal and non-verbal 
communication, as when, in the former case, there is a speech impediment and, in the latter, there are 
irregular bodily movements or spasms. The following is a good example of this. I was in an unfamiliar 
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area and decided to go alone for a drink in a public house. The place was packed, a situation which 
,- . . 
, 
only adds to my problems of making myself understood against the clamour of other people. 
Eventually, I managed to get a stool at the bar but then, having asked for a drink, the barmaid told me 
that I had had enough already. Of course, I had not had an alcoholic drink that day either there or 
anywhere else but I understood that my cerebral palsy had, once again, been mistaken for inebriation (I 
was once asked by a policeman, who spotted me unlocking my car door, whether J thought that 1 was 
in any fit condition to drive.) Normally, I would have been able to explain the situation without too 
much difficulty but I had had a particularly trying day and the feeling of annoyance got the better of my 
rational understanding of the situation which ended up in me embarrassingly confronting the manager 
- still, I did get my drink. One has only to look at my graduation photograph to realise how much just a 
little tension can be registered in the expression of someone who has cerebral palsy. After seeing the 
photograph a mere acquaintance at the time said that he would certainly be wary of such a character. 
I~ He has since come to know me better and, I think, feels more relaxed about being in my company. For 
someone, like myself, although misunderstandings can be frustrating, there is often opportunity to 
explain one's difficulty. I am, however, mindful of the difficulties faced by people who suffer from 
other neurological and psychological problems where the idea of Self is either little understood or else 
so locked into its own world tllat there are added difficulties to communication. Also, hearing the 
theologian Professor Frances Young, speak about her grown up son Arthur, who has no language 
ability (1995), I recalled how insen.sitive and thoughtless we can all be in our "throwaway" comments 
which, themselves, can be the cause of much suffering. 
I have sometimes given a wry smile when hearing someone being described as challenged ratller than 
"disabled", and yet I dislike the latter word even more. Maybe I do not like words that separate and 
pigeon-hole people as if they do not belong to the rest of society, not to mention, the human race. But 
,~ 
~. 
i when I give it due consideration, I suppose that being challenged does give some people tile 
opportunity to respond positively and create sometl1ing to stand in the place of what has been 
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diminished. In this way too, it can be personality-changing, character-forming, and identity-creating. It 
is not a situation that anyone would choose no more than we choose other knocks that we encounter 
in life. 
Whilst acknowledging that we are influenced by our biology and neurology through DNA and the 
traditions which some accept as part of the collective unconscious, I am as keen as most people to 
challenge traditions that have had their day and can be replaced by something better. However, I see 
no sensible reason for the wholesale destruction of things that have been found necessary to our 
survival. We need to accept those things that we are given by our biologically and neurologically 
developed brain which, whether designed for the purpose by God or evolved over time to cope with 
its environment, are supremely placed for directing the creatures we "are". TI1e "imagined" Self, along 
with a less than absolute vision of God, love, beauty, goodness, joy and peace are none the worse for 
r being the self-fulfilled prophecy of a brain that actuates and confirms its vision in deeds. It is a Self, 
"" I ~ however, that is preferably manifested in individuated "wholeness" rather than a "destructive" ego. 
This "wholeness" is the flowing together of the known Will with the knowing Intellect into the 
consciousness of the "I". It is an imagined Self which, in standing up to some of the least worthy of 
our biological traits, becomes a centred Self contributing to a life worth living for all. 
The world of science where, say, in quantum physics, particles are smashed into each other in 
enormous acceleration chambers, is a world of empirical observation, data collection and analysis . 
. -
These are logical, high-focus operations from the results of which we could all benefit. But these are 
areas that are not sufficient by themselves to satisfy all the needs of human beings. There are areas of 
art that we will probably never understand scientifically but which make much of life worthwhile. 
Philosophy is not a science but just as the science of medicine is made beneficial for people through 
the practice of the art of medicine so, I believe, that science in general can best be used for the benefit 
•• j 
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of mankind through the practice of the art of a philosophy of encouragement. As in many other areas, 
the t.1Sk of describing the world has been ceded to science by philosophy; perhaps now we can 
concentrate on how it might be changed. Accepting our values as earthbound, we need also to accept 
our responsibility for them, for on such our survival depends. We are all inescapable composers of our 
own world. Our nervous systems do not produce a copy of the world out there, they create an 
interpretation which enables us to survive and cope. When there is damage it tries to adjust and may be 
helped by the environment to which it belongs; an environment we help to create. 
Whether God has created us or we have created God science, which is unable to penetrate beyond the 
Big Bang, cannot tell us. Augustine was right when he said that "our hearts are restless ... " but whether 
God has determined us that way or whether we detennined ourselves, even down to influencing our 
own biology, again science cannot tell us. What does seem to be apparent is that whichever it is, we 
r function better when we go along cooperatively with our evolution as my thesis, particularly Chapter 
" Six - Spirituality and the Creative Self, has shown. Those who are, as 1 have been, sceptical about ~he 
extent to which mind affects body should consider the work of the neuroscientist, Candace Pert, and 
her colleagues at the National Institute of Mental Health in Maryland who, in the mid-eighties 
identified a group of molecules called peptides which act as messengers between three distinct systems 
- the nervous system, the immune system, and the endocrine system - combining them into one single 
network. Pert sees this network as a psychosomatic network extending throughout the organism 
interlinking and integrating mental, emotional, and biological activities. Not only are peptides produced 
in the brain but, also, in the immune system and other parts of the body so that Pert asserts "1 can no 
longer make a strong distinction between the brain and the body" and "White blood cells are bits of 
brain floating around the body". Our biology is linked to, and affected by, the way that we think, 
peptides being the biological manifestations of our emotions. The cause of "gut feelings" is accounted 
for by the peptide receptors that line the entire intestine (Capra, 1996:274-7). I would argue that it is far 
r 
better to be wisely guided by a system that has shown itself to be beneficial, like the quantum physicist 
I 
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trusting the results of his/her mathematical formulae because they give reliable predictions even 
though much about quantum physics is still unknown, than to either reject ev~rything because we do 
I 
not possess full understanding or to go along with those things that are destructive of both our 
individual and collective survival. As in quantum physics, we should see life as a seamless whole, 
embracing the wisdom and knowledge of both religion and science. Only as we strive to resolve the 
existing tensions will we address the distortions in our mirrored, imagined Selves. 
The philosopher should seek the truth by examining every facet of a problem to which he can gain 
access. I do not accept that philosophy can do nothing but "leave the world as it is". True, we may feel 
a great deal of frustration at our inability to transform the world's worst situations-starvation, war, 
poverty, cruelty, pollution etc. but as with any huge problem the best thing to do is to break it down 
into manageable chunks. As far as we are concerned the first chunk to be tackled is our imagined Self. 
r Here, if we do not like the reality we perceive then it's down to us to change it and this I certainly 
:j believe is possible. Then we can do something about the way that we interact with the world. Just 
/ 
because tradition has embedded something into our culture does not mean that its efficacy should not 
be reviewed from time to time in the light of current knowledge and the problems we face. It may be 
possible, for instance, for anyone who wishes to celebrate Yuletide by giving a meal to someone in 
need(2) - maybe, by volunteering as a helper to a charity such as Crisis - or, for anyone, who not being 
in need themselves, to prefer to have a donation made to a needy cause rather than to be given a 
personal Christmas present. Maybe this latter suggestion would give some measure of relief, not only 
to the poor but also, to harassed shoppers fearful that their choice might be inappropriate and end up 
gathering dust at the back of a draw (3). At a critical phase in the history of humanity, where our 
philosophy flounders and long-term survival balances on a biological knife's edge, what we need is 
vision embracing wiHes, not stale argument and outmoded customs. All reality is neurologically 
interpreted and, in this sense, gives us a viewpoint that is unique. Generally, except for genius or 
extraordinary experience, our interpretations, at least within our own culture, seem to be similar 
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enough to allow for a wide measure of democratic agreement and, where they differ more widely, they 
can usually be accommodated, hopefully, by the exercise of tolerance and a willingness to broaden 
one's own experience. 
1110se of us with neurological impairments may interpret the world and the Self in slightly different 
ways but some could enrich the argument if they were not ignored. As every adolescent knows, the 
loneliest place to be is outside the group, but when the group is heading for the rocks it is the only 
place to stand for the philosopher with the courage to say so. 1here may be always an opposing 
philosophical argument, which is intellectually stimulating to consider, but this is a treadmill with no 
output. As much as we owe to and admire the analytic tradition within western philosophy, in a world 
which is changing so rapidly in many directions and whose values are under threat for want of both 
creative and constructive thinking, arguments that simply analyse and point out the inadequacies of 
current information can be dangerous, destabilizing and destructive of society. So too can be the 
• actions of those who incorrectly think that they possess truth, as Socrates was keen to point out and as 
history since confirms, but energy needs to go into the best arguments as absolutes against which to 
plot the future. What is needed is not a total demolition of our values but support for the best of them 
which should be left untouched until something better can take their place. Such absolutes that I 
propose should not be carved in stone of everlasting duration but they will hold "true" so long as 
current knowledge does not show otherwise. Without such absolutes we can only threaten our survival 
and even the cleverness of persisting with action-stagnating philosophical arguments just is not worth 
--
that. Rather than continuing with argument for argument sake let action be taken on the best position 
so far, until genuine falsification provides the motivation to find a better way to deal with the changing 
current situation. 
I do not make these observations from some idealistic position more commonly associated with 
adolescence but as someone who, from a very early age, realised that I faced some quite unique 
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problems. It was useless to think that I could look to my peers, or even to professionals, for solutions 
since my difficulties were beyond most of their experiences. My physical unsteadiness meant that if I 
was going to achieve the things that others do then it could only be by devising alternative ways to the 
same ends. In this way I have been driven to ask, not only "why" but "how" from quite an early age. 
Perhaps it is this experience which caused me to score highly for creativity (in the top 5% of the 
population) and for independence (top 6%) in psychological tests carried out when I was 49 years of 
age(4). The report of these tests states that I am a fairly single minded person who is in close touch 
with reality and suggests that, because of my imagination, my work will have a sense of perspective and 
flair. However, it warns that others might not be able to appreciate this flair and will tend to dismiss it 
as idealism or impracticality. I think that it is important for me to point out that I realise that others do 
not always see things the way that I do - how could they, not having had to experience and cope with a 
reality similar to mine. When things work out for me the way I anticipate, it is not that a miracle has 
happened but that a hitherto unseen reality has become apparent. To take just one very down to earth 
~ example; I realised from a very early age that one of the things that would give me greater freedom is 
mobility. I used to save my pocket money so that when I became old enough I could have a car but 
when this time came some people were incensed at the thought that I should get behind a wheel and 
be in charge of a motor vehicle. If they could have prevented me (5) then that would have put an end 
to my hopes and grounded me for life but, mercifully, I managed to buy a car and have a few lessons, 
after which I passed the driving test and my license became legal protection against the curtailing 
opinions of others. Some problems do seem to be intractable and, as a philosopher, I do not wish to 
be impracticable but, as someone who has needed to come up with some pragmatic answers, I must 
insist that there are more workable answers than most of us dream possible. 
Like the psalmist (Ps.139: 14) we can stand back and admire the wonderful works of creation including 
the complexity of man. Whether we attribute this to God or to evolution does not alter the reality that 
most of us have lots of neurological potential which should be wisely understood and it is there as a 
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gift for us to confidently use. From my perspective, some of our greatest problems come from failing 
. . 
to see the illusion which is the imagined Self. Trying to pin down the Self in a literal way is a distortion 
of the ego which prevents us from becoming well-balanced, Centred Selves, who enjoy the wholeness 
of just Being. 
To summarize: this thesis has been concerned with knowledge of the Self. Starting from the 
neurobiological foundations it looked at the philosophical and psychological vIews of Self which 
transcends this basis. It argued that our consciously imagined Self can be liberated from a dominating 
ego and can progress to becoming a centred Self whose values are robust enough to stand alone as 
adopted absolutes which are beneficial both to ourselves and the world of which we are a part. I have 
shown that the neurological manifestation of human nature can be modified as we create centred 
Selves. The fidelity of our neurological system is such that our inner subjective interpretation of the 
objective world cannot possibly be anything but an incomplete picture of reality as our intellect strives 
to present an adequate selection for our survival. However, in pushing at the borders between 
objective and subjective, conscious and unconscious, we help to provide for our metaphysical need for 
inner unity and integration. As the phenomenal brain gives us the only intellectual representation of 
what there is to know so it is from here that we create our world from where we communicate with 
those of others. In realizing that all our subjectively created worlds are neurologically determined we 
can adopt a less dogmatic approach as we realize, not only our own fallibility but, our own affect upon 
the environment of which we are a part. 
Our imagined Self is not created simply by our brains but by the combining of brain and body, thought 
and emotion, the conscious and the unconscious, and the spectrum between science and art. Out of 
this we create the Selves we would be. 
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Notes on General Introduction 
1. In Meditatioll 6, Descartes wrote: 
... there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by nature 
always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For ... when I consider the 
mind .. .1 cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly 
one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, 
yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is separated from my body, I am aware 
that nothing has been taken away from my mind. And the faculties of willing, 
feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one 
and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in feeling and in 
understanding. But it is quite otherwise with corporeal or extended objects, for there 
is not one of these imaginable by me which my mind cannot easily divide into parts, 
and which consequently I do not recognise as being divisible ... (Wilson,1969: 219-20). 
2. See the gospel according to Matthew chapter 16, verse 24. 
3. In discussion about the Self (Aitken,1996:13) with the Benedictine brother David 
Steindl-Rast, the Zen master Robert Aitken made the following point: 
... The popular idea is that in Buddhism there is. no self. A more complete expression 
would be that there is no self, and the self realizes this fact. To put it another way, no-
self and self are complementary. A similar point can be made about existence: people 
r 
understand superficially that, according to Buddhism, nothing exists. In actuality, 
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nothing exists, and that is the nature of what we see. Existence and nonexistence, self 
and no-self - these are complementarities, like the notion of light as waves and the 
notion of light as particles. Both notions are correct at the same time. But if we get 
stuck on light as particles, then we can't see it as waves. If we get stuck on matter as 
eternally substantial, then we can't see it as empty. It's important that we see into the 
emptiness in order to fully appreciate the substance. 
r 
i 
: ... 
~ . 
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Notes on Chapter One 
1. Edward Lorenz, the American meteorologist, gave a lecture which has since become 
known for the now famous Butterfly Effect theory. His paper was entitled "Does the 
Flap of a Butterfly's Wing's in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?" Using a computer 
model for tracking weather, Lorenz had become tired of typing numbers with strings 
of decimal places behind them and thinking that it would make no difference if he 
rounded them up to a few decimal places, he did so. He was surprised to find that 
this threw the world's weather predictions completely out. A tiny change in the right 
place can have huge consequences and suggests that the whole of nature is a system 
in which the observer must be considered along with, and as a part of, the 
observation. To get an objective result would mean that another observer would 
have to monitor the first observer. This creates the same difficulty for us as when the 
painter cannot become part of the picture he is painting without infinite regress. 
(O'Connor, 1990:193). Publication in 1963 of Lorenz's model showing that minute 
changes in a system's initial state will lead over time to complex behaviour with large-
scale consequences marked the beginning of chaos theory. 'TI1e role of tl1e conscious 
observer will be considered in Chapter Two - COllsciousness and the Self. 
2. Interestingly, since Einstein's famous equation E=mc2 (where E stands for e1lelgy, 
mc2 matter and the speed of light squared) we are told that all matter contains energy 
and that visa versa all energy can be measured in terms of weight. Thus it is possible 
to calculate that every second the earth is being hit by two kilograms of light. 
According to Einstein, energy is hidden in matter just as a miser conceals how rich 
he is by hiding his wealth away. (DBC Horizoll programmes 17th and 18th March, 
1996). 
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3. 111e physicist, Richard Feynman, in his The Character of Pf?ysical LallI (p.27) writes, "I 
can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics"; also, the physicist, John 
Houghton, in his Neill Ideas of Chaos ill Pf?ysics (p.49) writes, "Initial conditions can 
never be specified absolutely precisely, so that the predictability horizon represents a 
fundamental limit to our ability to predict" (quoted from Ward 1996, pp.33&81 
respectively). The uncertainty at the micro quantum level, giving rise to seemillg chaos, 
manifests itself at the macro level of classical physics as eminently predictable and 
determined; this allows us to postulate the view that God is active at the quantum 
level of reality, which remains beyond our understanding, and thus creates a world 
whose laws are accessible to human reason. 
4. In arguing tllat the explanation for any observed feature of the universe resides in the 
fact that we are here to comment about it the "antllropic principle" prevents proper 
requests for more substantive explanations. Lewis (1986:132-3), whilst 
acknowledging that it is remarkable that the world exists given the necessity of 
precise values of the fundamental physical constants and boundary conditions of the 
cosmos, rejects tl1e anthropic principle as not providing "an explanation because it 
gives no information about the causal or nomological ways of our world". Whilst 
advocating a theory of the "plurality of worlds" in which there are many worlds, all 
of which have different values of constants and boundary conditions such that one 
would produce the evolution of intelligent life, he does not believe that appealing to 
the anthropic principle would strengthen his case for modal realism. 
5. Locke (1976:333) too thought that a primary rational being must have preceded the 
creation of conscious, tllinking intelligent beings. He writes, " ... it is as impossible to 
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conceive that ever bare incognitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent 
being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter". 
6. Wilkes (1993:38) writes, 
"Hemispherectomies do not entail the removal of a whole half-brain. Only the 
half of the coffe.:\( is surgically eliminated. Commissurotomy does not split the 
brain in half. Only (part ot) the COlt ex' are divided. The subcortical regions are left 
intact and untouched in each case, and these areas are crucial to all psychological 
functions. Indeed, Dimond thinks that they are in a sense more important than is 
the cerebral cortex: 
From this perspective (from the inside) the brain appears more like a 
busy map room or an operations room, where the most important 
actions take place right at the very centre, whereas the surround is used to 
display the information and to provide the back-up facilities. If we look at 
the brain from without, we tend to think that the cortex is the most 
important structure and that the rest of the brain becomes progressively 
less important in a gradient from there on. If, alternatively, we adopt the 
perspective from within, not only do we re-evaluate the centre structures 
at the very heart of the machine, but also the more peripheral parts take 
on a different perspective more like the display facilities of an operations 
room (Dimond [1980], p. 515). 
7. \Vriting about ethics and value theory, Nagel (1979:137-8) says that progress in these 
areas "need not wait for the discovery of a general foundation (even if there is such a 
thing)". His ensuing illustrations of this point give a clear indication of progress 
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which has been made in other areas of study even though no "theory of everything" 
yet exists, if it ever will: 
Chemistry went through great developments during the century before its basis 
in atomic physics came to be understood. Mendelian genetics was developed long 
before any understanding of the molecular basis of heredity. At present, progress 
in psychology may be pursued to a great extent independently of any idea about 
its basis in the operation of the brain. It may be that all psychological phenomena 
are ultimately explainable in terms of the theory of the central nervous system, 
but our present understanding of that system is too meagre to permit us even to 
look for a way to close the gap .. .! myself do not believe that all value rests on a 
single foundation or can be combined into a unified system ... Ethics is unlike 
physics, which represents one point of view, that which apprehends the 
spatiotemporal properties of the universe described in mathematical terms. Even 
in this case, where it is reasonable to seek a unified theory of all physical 
phenomena, it is also possible to understand a great deal about more particular 
aspects of the physical universe - gravitation, mechanics, electromagnetic fields, 
radiation, nuclear forces - without having such a theory. 
The if/completelless of Newton's Universal Law of Gravity does not make it lmtme or 
invalidate it as a tool of extreme accuracy for practical purposes in everyday life. (See 
my Chapter Four - Mora/iry alld the Se!J5. 
8. The Santiago Theory was proposed by the neuroscientist, I-Iumberto Maturana, and 
Francisco Varela. According to this theory the mind is not a thing but a process of 
cognition which bfillgs forth a lI!orld. It is not that lIothiltg e~"ists but that 110 thillgs e.'Xist 
independent of the process of cognition. As Capra says (1996:264) "There ,lre no 
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objectively existing structures; there is no pre-given territory of which we can make a 
map - the map-making itself brings forth the features of the territory". 
9. An extract from a letter written by Mozart in 1789, and quoted by E. Holmes (The 
Life if Mozart, il/clflding his Correspotldetlce, Chapman and Hall, 1878), about how he 
composed, reads: 
All this fires my soul, and provided I am not disturbed, my subject enlarges itself, 
becomes methodised and defined, and the whole, though it be long, stands 
almost complete and finished in my mind, so that I can survey it like a fine 
picture or a beautiful statue at a glance. Nor do I hear in my imagination the parts 
successively, but I hear them as it were, all at once. \Vhat a delight this is I cannot 
tell! (O'Connor,1990:179). 
10. Insects have been around c. 400 million years during which time moths have evolved 
to navigate by the moon and the stars. Because these are so far away they appear to 
be fixed in space so that they can be used as navigation beacons to fly a straight 
course. (It would also appear that glow-worms have evolved to use their glowing tails 
as decoy beacons to entice unwary moth navigators. In New Zealand, fly larvae have 
draped cave roofed with sticky threads that are invisible to moths but where the 
glowing tails of the glow-worm appear like stars. When the unsuspecting moth tries to 
use the false sky to navigate by, it just spirals upwards to become another meal for a 
waiting glow-worm). [Akefl Empires -A JOU11Iry illto the Wodd ifblsec{s, narrated by John 
Shrapnel, Channel 4, March 1996]. 
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11. Afferent nerve fibres are those which relay sensory input to the brain, whereas, 
efferent nerve fibres send control signals to the muscles. 
12. Here I wish to note the difference between neurology and psychology. Interestingly, 
Patricia Smith Churchland in her book NeJ(rophilosopl!J (1986:pp330-333) refers to 
Frank jackson's thought-experiment (1982) by which he denies the reducibility of 
psychology to neuroscience: 
Briefly, suppose Mary is a neuroscientist who has lived her entire life in a room 
carefully controlled to display no colours, but only shades of white, grey, and 
black. Her information about the outside world comes to her via a monochrome 
television set. She knows everything there is to know about the brain and 
understands a completed neuroscience that, among other things, explains the 
nature of thinking, feeling, and perception, including the perception of colour. 
The argument is that despite knowing all there is to know about the brain and 
about the visual system she does not know JI!hat it is like to see red when say, 
looking at a tomato. This implies that there is something in psychology that is not 
captured by neurology. However, Churchland herself is not convinced by the 
argument that mental states, being essentially private, have an irreducibly 
phenomenological character. 
Also, I note the warning given by Sir Peter Medawar in his Pillto's Republic (1982:4) about 
the damage that can be done when neurological disease is misdiagnosed and treated as a 
psychological problem. For, example, Dystonia mtfsCl/lortln/ diformans (DMD) is a nervous 
disease in children and young adults marked by involuntary muscular movements and 
grotesque postural fixations. If DMD is incorrectly treated or not recognized as a 
physical disorder of the brain it can destroy tile patient's personality. Dr Irving S. 
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Cooper, whilst Director of the Department of Neurosurgery at the St Barnabas Hospital 
in New York devised a neuro-surgical treatment which depends upon the destruction of 
a nerve centre in the thalamus, a part of the brain that exercises an important controlling 
influence on the discharge of the nerve impulses that control muscular movement. 
Because the precise small area cannot be known with certainty beforehand the patient 
must remain conscious during the operation so that observation can be made of the 
direct improvement it brings about. (Illis is not as horrific as it may seem since the brain 
has no pain sensors). "Sufferers from DMD," says Dr Medawar, "who had the bad luck 
to fall into the hands of psychoanalysts are among the 'victims of psychiatry' ... " 
In my own case, I was among a generation of children who had to sit the ll-plus 
examination to decide whether or not I could go to a grammar school. Because I can 
only write very slowly due to poor co-ordination of my limbs as a result of cerebral palsy 
I was sent to an educational psychologist for assessment instead of having to write the 
exam under a time limit. I was found to be deficient in my ability to deal with spatial 
puzzles and, therefore, failed. In November 1989, at the age of 49, I took some 
psychological tests which showed me to be in the top few percent of population for 
innovation, creativity, comprehension, and vocabulary but, again, showing me to have a 
poor ability for solving spatial problems. It seems likely, to me, that neurological damage, 
in a particular area, rather than lack of psychological perception (representation), pointing 
to overall low ability potential, is the most likely cause. 
\Vorse still has been some neuro-surgical operations carried out for psychiatric 
symptoms with horrendously damaging consequences. The first of these involving 
frontal lobotomies were performed in 1888 but then not repeated until the 1930's when 
the Portuguese neurologist, Egas Moniz, devised an operation which he called 
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"prefrontalleucotomy" and performed on patients suffering with such things as anxiety, 
depression, or chronic schizophrenia. This "psychosurgery" took ~ff, especially in 
America where the neurologist Walter Freeman used an ice pick which he thrust up 
between the patient's eyeball and eyelid into the frontal lobe where he "made lateral cuts 
by swinging the thing from side to side". By 1949 ten thousand operations had been 
carried out in the United States and in 1951 Moniz received the Nobel Prize - the climax, 
in Macdonald Critchley'S words of, "this chronicle of shame". What had been achieved 
had not been a cure but a pathetic "docile, passive" state, some patients, as Sacks 
(1995:59) tells us, being psychically dead, murdered, by their cure. Further operations 
were, mercifully, not repeated since, about this time, tranquillizers were found to be a 
more acceptable way to treat such problems. 
13. The new psychological discipline, neuro-linguistic programming, recognises this in 
one of its basic teachings which says that "the map is not the territory it describes" 
(O'Connor, 1990:24). 
14. Since writing this the Professor of Radiology, G.H. Whitehouse, at the University of 
Liverpool's Magnetic Resonance Research Centre kindly arranged for a MRI brain 
scan to be carried out. After looking at the printouts Professor Whitehouse writes, 
"The only abnormality that I can detect is a moderate degree of generalised atrophy 
of the left cerebral hemisphere. No focal abnormality is apparent. The cerebellum 
and brain stem appear normaL .. This was a disappointment as far as my research 
goes since I was hoping to be able see a connection between specific physical 
difficulties that I have and the parts of the brain that are malfunctioning. However, 
the generalised atrophy of the left cerebral hemisphere would, presumably, account 
for the fact that the right side of my body is affected much more than the left side by 
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cerebral palsy. Here the recursive loop between ac~on and response is not being 
stimulated as it should be. 
15. Gregory McCulloch (The Mind and Its World, 1995, pp.144 writing about reflective 
consCIousness says: 
.. .it is clear that ordinary skill coping ... does not comprise elements all of which 
are accessible to explicit reflection. Normally I act and adjust myself to the things 
I am aware of without reflecting explicitly on this, and even if I do start to 
reflect ... lots of my ongoing intentional movements and adjustments will not be 
available to me. Indeed, excessive self-consciousness can easily disrupt practical 
fluency. 
McCulloch then goes on to quote Sartre's observation in A Sketch for a Theory oj the 
Emotions (trans. P. Mairet, London: Methuen, 1971): 
Now it is certain that we reflect upon our activity. But an operation upon the 
universe is generally executed without our having to leave the non-reflective 
plane. For example, at this moment I am writing, but I am not [reflectively] 
conscious of writing. Will someone say that habit has rendered me unconscious 
of the movements made by my hand in tracing the letters? This would be absurd. 
I may have the habit of writing, but not at all that of writing such words in such an 
order .. .In reality the act of writing is not at all unconscious, it is an actual 
structure of my consciousness. Only it is not conscious ojitself. 
16. In his criticism of religious postmodernism Carson (1996:146) accuses the 
theologian, John Hick, of being the current most influential religious pluralist. In 
order to accommodate other faiths Hick moved from a Christ-centred teaching to a 
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theo-centred one and then, to further accommodate those with an impersonal view 
of God, Hick moved to Reality-cetltredtless. Hick relics on the Kantian distinction 
between the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds. 111e former exists independently 
of human perception or consciousness whilst the existence of the latter is dependent 
upon human consciousness. Both theistic and nontheistic religions, he suggests, are 
nothing but phenomenal responses to the noumenal Reality. The actual belief 
systems do not correspond directly to Reality. The New Testament's "heavenly 
Father" or the Qur'an's "Allah" is mythological speech about the Real. He states 
(Hick, 1989:248): 
I define a myth as a story or statement which is not literally true but which tends 
to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude to its subject matter. Thus the truth 
of a myth is a practical truthfulness: a true myth is one which rightly relates us to 
a reality about which we cannot speak in non-mythological terms. 
17. In his book The Se.,\· Code - Moralsfor Modems (1991:125), Bennion, paraphrasing from 
the book Let Thm Be Lot~ by Gunnel Enby a handicapped Swedish young woman 
living in an illstitutioll for the disabled where sex is banned, writes: 
If a person's faith in their own lovableness is denied by ignoring or dismissing the 
sexual part of their personality, the whole process of rehabilitation is undermined. 
18. I remember that when I was 12, having "failed" the ll-plus and finding it hard to 
settle at a Secondary Modem school, my parents, thinking they were acting in my 
best interests, sent me to a supposedly prestigious boarding school for cerebral 
palsied children at the other end of the country. Not only was I homesick but being 
with other cerebral palsied sufferers rather than in the ordinary rough and tumble 
environment that I was used to, not to mention realizing that the academic standard 
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was nothing like what my parents had been promised, I became very unhappy and, 
after three months I was removed, my parents having been medically advised that I 
would do better at home at the Secondary Modern school I had left. 
19. Gregory McCulloch (The Milld alld Its Wodd, 1995, p.72) writes perceptively: 
... even if I could open your head and see coloured pictures inside - surely the best 
possible scenario - this would not help. For my seeing your ideas would be 
mediated by my having my own ideas of them, and the crucial question of 
whether they match would be left open. Perhaps your idea is yellow but I see it as 
blue! As Frege says, to compare our ideas we should need to "bring [them] 
together in one consciousness" [("111e thought: a logical enquiry", trans. A. and 
M. Quinton in Philosophical Logic, ed. P. Strawson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1967)], and this is impossible as Locke acknowledges [All Essqy COllcemi1Jg 
HII!7,afl UnderstatldbJg, Bk 2, Ch. 32, vs. 15]. 
In the above mentioned passage Locke writes: 
... if ... the same object should produce in several men's minds different ideas at the 
same time: e.g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eye 
were the same that a marigold produced in another man's, and visa versa. Por, 
since this could never be known, because one man's mind could not pass into 
another man's body to perceive what appearances were produced. 
20. This is also acknowledged by Locke in the above passage: 
.. .1 am nevertheless very apt to think that the sensible ideas produced by any 
object in different men's minds are most commonly very near and undiscernibly 
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alike ... if it could be proved, [it] is of little use either for the improvement of our 
knowledge or convenience of life ... 
I cannot agree with Locke that perceiving things differently from someone else, even 
though referring to them by the same names, doesn't matter. Someone like Dr P. 
(mentioned earlier in this chapter) who, suffering from progressive "agnosia", patted 
the heads of water-hydrants and parking meters taking them to be the heads of 
children and amiably addressed carved knobs on the furniture, being astounded when 
they did not reply, had a severe CO""1III11icati011 problem. Similarly, I should have 
thought that a disagreement about a colour scheme might be the result of two people 
seeing two different colours and not just a difference of opinion based on equal 
phenomenological perceptions. Whilst Dr P's wife was understanding when he 
mistook her head for his hat, such behaviour, without being aware of the problem, 
would have been interpreted as very odd and eccentric. 
21. Tests given to Stephen Wiltshire indicate both emotional and intellectual defects. At 
the same time he showed a prodigious visual memory but a problem with 
communication and social language. Chris Marris, a teacher at the special school 
Stephen attended was amazed at the sophistication of his drawings - their line and 
perspective even at the age of seven years. Marris remarks that while Stephen was 
one of a group of six children in his class and knew the names of the others "there 
was no sense of interaction or friendship between them. [Stephen] was an isolated 
little chap". Stephen is not distracted in his drawing tasks no matters what is going on 
around him. Once while visiting Dr Sacks at his home in New York Stephen drew 
the outside of the house from memory. As he was putting in the porch railings, Chris 
remarked, "I didn't see any of that detail there." Dr Sacks tells us that Stephen simply 
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replied, "No" but that his expression had implied, "No, you wouldn't." Sir l1ugh 
Casson, former President of the Royal Academy of Arts said that Stephen was 
possibly the best child artist in Britain. During tests, carried out by Dr Sacks, Stephen 
displayed an ability to fit together a large jig-saw very swiftly and irrespective of 
whether the picture is face-up or not. 
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Notes on Chapter Two 
1. The neurologist, Damasio(1995:29), claims that there are more than 10 billion neurons 
in the brain and more than 10 trillion synapses with each neuron forming around 1,000 
synapses although some have as many as between 5,000 and 6,000. However, such 
figures are very controversial. Crick (1994:82) tells us that there are tens of billions of 
neurons in the human neocortex, the same as the number of stars in our Milky Way 
galaxy (that is, 100 billion), with between 500 and 20,000 synapses each (p.97). 
2. The physicist Peat (1996:194-5) explains that: 
Within quantum field theory both particles of matter, like the electron and the· 
proton, and the quanta of energy such as a photon of light, appear as vibrations of 
quantum fields. But what is particularly interesting about the field is that its lowest 
energy state, called the ground state or vacuum state, is the state of total emptiness, 
the quantum void, for within this state no excitation exists. One would expect the 
vacuum state to be empty of all vibrations and energy. But paradoxically this 
absolute state of the quantum world is totally full of energy. It is packed with an 
infinity of energy, so that there is more energy within this tiny dot "." of the vacuum 
state than in the whole observable universe.The entire visible universe, with its 
planets, stars, and galaxies, is no more than a tiny fluctuation upon an immense sea 
of nothingness, that boundless zero-point energy ... Within the zero of the quantum 
field is the totality of creative energy in the cosmos ... Many of the world's spiritual 
and meditative traditions share the same notion of the infinite potential of the void. 
It is sometimes said that the goal of meditation and of spiritual transcendence is to 
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reach a state of emptiness in which all thought and attachment ends. When this is 
achieved the seeker is open to the infinite flux of the void and the ultimate state of 
the no-mind. 
3. John Gribbin and Michael White in their book Eiflsteill-A Life in Sciellce (1993:216-18) 
write: 
Schrodinger was disgusted with the absurdity of quantum physics highlighted by the 
cat in the box experiment; so was Einstein. Niels 13ohr, the pragmatist, didn't worry 
about the cat in the box as long as the theory could explain actual measurements on 
real systems. The absurdity has never been resolved, but quantum physics still 
works .... Many people, when they first encounter the bizarre concepts of quantum 
physics such as uncertainty, and the role of the observer in determining the 
outcome of an experiment, instinctively react with the assumption that this must all 
be, in some sense, an illusion. Common sense tells us that behind the quantum 
scenes there is surely a clockwork of Newtonian determinism, a world of certainties 
and objective realities which creates the appearance of uncertainty and subjectivity 
to our imperfect senses and inadequate measuring apparatus. But more than thirty 
years after the rules of quantum mechanics were first worked out, the physicist John 
13ell, working at CERN in Geneva, devised a test which could, in principle, 
distinguish the influence of the underlying clockwork at work - if it really was there. 
After a further two decades, in the 1980's, experimenters in Paris, headed by Alain 
Aspect, were able to carry o~t an actual experiment along the lines proposed by 13ell. 
The experiments showed that common sense - and Einstein - was wrong. There is 
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no underlying clockwork, and the strangeness of the quantum wo1-ld really does have 
to be taken at face value. 
As Gribbin and White go on to say, the only alternative to quantum probabilities, 
superpositions of states, collapse of the wave function and action at a distance is that 
absolutely everything is predetermined. In such a case there would be no need for faster 
than light signals to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle D, 
because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its 
outcome, will be. Einstein, in his speech to the German League of Human Rights in 1932, 
had accepted a certain restriction upon "freedom" when he quoted Schopenhauer's words; 
"Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills". Gribbin and White continue 
(p.22S): 
Einstein, like Dell, died believing that quantum theory is only a temporary expedient, 
and that a better description of the universe must one day be found. He may yet be 
proved right. Dut until we get that better theory, quantum mechanics remains the 
best description of reality that we have, and the paradoxes of cats and clocks in 
boxes, as well as the spooky action at a distance, are the price we have to pay for a 
working understanding of phenomena as diverse as lasers, nuclear power, computer 
chips, virtually all the modern understanding of chemistry (which depends on 
understanding the behaviour of electrons in the outer part of the atom) and, 
through biochemistry, our understanding of genetics, DNA and life itself. 
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4. What we momenL1.fily desire most becomes the thing we are conscious of, just as a 
hungry man is conscious oflittle beyond his desire for food. Ornstein(1975:175) writes: 
Needs, hopes, and wants are strong biasing factors in personal consciousness. When 
hungry, we are likely to search out food or even to create food images and smells. 
Since we continually "tune out" the potions of the environment which do not suit 
our needs, we can ignore much when in severe need. If hungry, we might not notice 
the river flowing by, or tl1e people speaking to us, or our reading. At these 
moments, we are almost totally concerned with food and construct our world 
around food. 
~ 5. In The Politics ojE:x.pefiellce (1967:107) R.D. Laing writes tl1at schizophrenia used to be a 
i 
new name for dementia praecox - a slow, insidious illness that was supposed to overtake 
young people in particular, and to be liable to go on to a terminal dementia. Perhaps we 
can still retain the now old name, and read into it its etymological meaning: SchiZ -
"broken"; PhrC1IOS - "soul or heart": 
The schizophrenic in this sense is one who is broken-hearted, and even broken 
hearts have been known to mend, if we have heart to let them. 
6. Campbell (1996:6) tells us that in the 1960s the American neuroscientist, Paul MacLean, 
stated that each human brain has three separate parts, which corresponds with 
evolutionary stages. He called this the "triune" brain: 
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I. The reptilian brain keeps us territorial and able to be aggressive when we need 
to be. It is concerned with primary survival, and does not deal with emotions 
or with ideas about the past and future. 
II. The paleol7lal7ll7laliall brain is linked to the primary emotions(fear, anger, love, 
attachment) and memory, leading to decisions such as fight, flight, bonding 
and mating. 
III. The lleol7lallll1laliall brain controls sophisticated thinking and understanding -
and, therefore, non-instinctive behaviour. 
7. Suzuki (1957:10) says that, perhaps because of our psychological peculiarities, there are 
always two opposing tendencies in our human way of thinking and feeling: extrovert 
and introvert, outer and inner, objective and subjective, exoteric and esoteric, traditional 
and mystic. 
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Notes on Chapter Three 
1. In his book, E",oliotlall1ltelligetlce, (Bloomsbury, 1996,pp.xii&19) the psychologist, Daniel 
Goleman diagrammatically shows that most of a sensory input, say sight or hearing, 
goes via the sense organ to the thalamus and then to the neocortex (the thinking brain) 
or visual cortex and, finally, to the amygdala; part of the input, however, bypasses the 
cortex and goes straight to the amygdala so that a response in an emergency can be 
activated without waiting for it to go through the thought processes. 
2. Indeed, Wilkes in her Real People (1993:83-4) reminds us that the idea of 
unconsciousness, which like an iceberg mainly remains below the surface, goes back 
more than 2,000 years. Along with references to Shakespeare (2 Henry IV, iv.v.92 and 
The Merchallt ojVel1ice, 1.1.1.) she quotes Heraclitus: 
You will not find out the limits of the psyche by going, even if you travel over every 
way-so deep is its nature. (Diels and Kranz [1968], vol 1, fragment 45, p.161). 
Wilkes also quotes Goethe (who influenced Schopenhauer) as being quite decided about the 
significance of the unconscious mind to creativity: 
Take for instance the talented musician, composmg an important score: 
consciousness and unconsciousness will be like warp and weft, a simile I am fond of 
using. Through practice, teaching, reflection, success, failure, furtherance and 
resistance, and again and again reflection, man's organs unconsciously and in a free 
activity link what he has acquired with his innate gifts, so that a unity arises which 
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leaves the world amazed ... (Letter to W. v. Hun/boldt, 1832, cited by Whyte [1962],p. 
129). 
3. Skynner writes (1993): 
If there is any quality which can sustain us in a comparable way, it is the connection 
with o1lese!! - the ability to make and keep contact with the sense of one's inner life -
to experience vividly, and enjoy the fact and feeling within being alive. This 
awareness of the flow of living energies animating us is always potentially available, 
though we lose it as a result of myriad distractions which constantly tempt us away 
from the essential centre ~f ourselves. But the more we seek it again when there is 
opportunity, the more readily we will find this life-enhancing resource when we 
need it. And as with our ability to nurture and sustain our love for others, this 
capacity to sense vividly the vital core of our being is more available in adversity if 
we have practised and developed it when there is spare time and energy to do so. 
More and more people nowadays have drawn on traditional Eastern methods of 
developing this kind of attention to one's inner-life's energies, like different forms of 
meditation, Yoga and Tai Chi, but many still find it through Western religious 
practise, like prayer and retreats. Others have come to it through the experience of 
stillness and quietness induced by contact with nature, poetry, or beauty of other 
kinds. Our most pleasurable activities follow this imperative. Any action practised 
with a high degree of attention is intently pleasurable and attractive precisely because 
it gives us a taste of our inner life, at the same time that it heightens the awareness 
of what we are attending to ... Those who can bring this kind of attention to their 
work tasks are especially fortunate. 
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4. At a higher, quantum, level of consciousness matter is energy. Campbell (1996:9) tells us 
that in the late 15th century the Confucian philosopher, Wang, wrote: 
The master of the body is the Mind; what the Mind develops are Thoughts; the 
substance of Thought is Knowledge; and those places where thoughts rest are 
Things. 
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Notes on Chapter Four 
1. This is similar to the thought-experiment of Frank Jackson's (1982), quoted by Patricia 
Smith Churchland in her book NCllrophilosopl!J (1986:pp330-333), by which he denies the 
reducibility of psychology to neuroscience: Briefly, suppose Mary is a neuroscientist who 
has lived her entire life in a room carefully controlled to display no colours, but only 
shades of white, grey, and black. Her information about the outside world comes to her 
via a monochrome television set. She knows everything there is to know about the brain 
and understands a completed neuroscience that, among other things, explains the nature 
of thinking, feeling, and perception, including the perception of colour. The argument is 
that despite knowing all there is to know about the brain and about the visual system 
she does not know JI!bal it is like to sec redwhen say, looking at a tomato. This implies that 
there is something in psychology that is not captured by neurology. However, 
Churchland herself is not convinced by the argument that mental states, being 
essentially private, have an irreducibly phenomenological character. 
2. Sutherland's speculation apart, I note that when Norman Vincent Peal was a student at 
Delaware's Ohio Wesleyan University one of his professors recommended that he 
should "seriously bring (his) mind up against one of the very greatest minds in history, 
the mind of St. Paul". " \Vhat you learn about the Bible will be secondary to what this 
study will do for you as a thinker", the professor told him. Peal comments, "That study 
project became one of the most determinative influences in my total learning process" 
(peal, 1984:56-7). 
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3. The physicist, Peat(1996:113) writing about the indigenous sciences o'f the Native Indian 
American people says that all those he had spoken to always spoke "of obligations rather 
than rights and of the importance of their ceremonies of renewal, for, they say, nothing 
persists; all is flux, and unless a society is willing to renew itself through sacrifice it will 
pass away". 
4. Wilkes' criticism of the Gyges ring is that it's a "thought experiment" which could not 
happen in real life and therefore, in her opinion, relies on unfounded assumption. 
5. In his book War of the Worlds (Abacus, 1995), Mark Slouka says morality matters only 
within the bounds of the physical world and that the dangers of virtual reality (cyberspace) 
is that we might begin to devalue physical reality. Slouka, a lecturer in 20th-century culture 
at the University of California, instances a hardworking, reassuringly stable male graduate 
of political science, a husband and father, who had become a member of the cyberspace 
community. He had created for himself an identity of the female gender in virtual reality 
and as such had carried-on a two year lesbian relationship with a female surfer of which 
his wife knew nothing. On the Net this identity, over time, took on a curious life of her 
own. Asked whether he could ever reveal his true physical identity, the student replied 
that he could not. Everyone responded to him as a female and had told him things as a 
female. He went on to say how interesting it was to find out what it was like to be 
harassed by a man (never considering that his harasser might himself be a woman 
pretending to be a man). What is made clear is the apparent irreversibility of the 
situation once multiple personalities have been created. In real life multiple personalities 
are a disorder primarily because social existence reqwres at least 
209 
the appearance of a unified personality. In virtual reality the surfer can become addicted 
to his/her new personalities - to come off the Net would be tantamount to killing those 
personas, a thought that is unthinkable, and therefore only the cost of the 'phone bill is 
a deterrent. A world in which we become psychologically dependent upon a machine 
(the computer) could be as bad as the worst scenario of George Orwell - we need the 
moral restraints of real life to prevent the extreme excesses of human nature when it 
thinks it goes undetected as would be the case if we allowed ourselves to become mere 
neurones in a vast brain/mind (the Net) which runs on without moral constraints. 
6. Darryl Reanney in his book Music q[ the Mind (Souvenir Press Ltd, 1995:128-9) list the 
equivalent to the Golden Rule in other religions: 
Judaism "What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow man. That is the entire law; 
all the rest is commentary" (Talmud, Shabbat, 31a). 
Hitldllism "This is the sum of duty; do naught unto others which would cause pain if 
done to you" (Mahabharata 5, 1517). 
Bllddhism "Hurt not others in ways that you yourself find hurtful" (Uda1/a- Valga 5, 
18). 
COf!/ifciattism "Surely it is the maxim of loving kindness; do not unto others that you 
would not have them do unto you" (Allalects 15, 23). 
Taoism "Regard your neighbour'S gain as your own gain and your neighbour'S loss as 
your own loss" (T'ai Shattg Kan Yittg pten). 
Islam "Not one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he 
desires for himself" (SI/flt/ah). 
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Reanney then quotes a poem remembered from his youth: 
So many ways, so many creeds, so many paths that wind and wind when just 
the art of being kind is all this old world needs. 
7. Wilkes (1993:181) tells us that in an experiment conducted by Holzman, Rousey, and 
Snyder [1966] a number of subjects heard a tape of twenty different voices reading the 
same innocuous sentence. 'I11eir own voice was always the twelfth recorded, although 
they did not know this. Various physiological tests (such as galvanic skin response tests, 
electromylograms, finger plethysmograms) showed in almost all instances clear 
autonomic arousal reactions when they heard their own voices, but more than half failed 
to recognize any voice, let alone the twelfth, as their own. 
8. The accused was sentenced to 21 months m jail at a subsequent hearing (Todqy 
NeJJ/spapel; 21st April,1995). 
9. Capra (1996,40-2) writes: 
In the new paradigm it is recognized that all scientific concepts and theories are 
limited and approximate ... This may sound frustrating but ... the fact that we cafl 
obtain approximate knowledge about an infinite web of interconnected patterns is a 
source of confidence and strength. Louis Pasteur said it beautifully: Science advances 
through tentative answers to a series of more and more subtle questions which 
reach deeper and deeper into the essence of natural phenomena. 
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10. There is a natural caution to any theory that proposes a scientific reason for "bad 
behaviour". The notorious 1848 case of Phineas Gage, the New England railroad 
engineer whose own tamping iron passed through his frontal lobe causing his character 
to change from being one of a pleasant and responsible disposition to one lacking in 
finer scruples and responsibility caused a dispute between those who believed that 
different areas of the brain have unique functions and those who did not (Damasio, 
1995:13). There are those today who remark that people are happy to accept the 
discoveries of science when genes are found which cause health problems but not when 
possible unsociable behaviour is indicated. They say that this seems unreasonable when 
it is known that 50% of our genes, around 30,000, are involved with the brain. If, they 
say, mutations affect our physical health then such mutations in brain cells will affect its 
behaviour function. While this seems a persuasive argument it must be remembered, as 
Jones (1996) points out, that such so-called abnormalities are far from being rare and 
may, as my text says, merely give rise to an adverse reaction to certain foods. 
11. Anthony Storr (1972:193) writes: 
The use of the word "intelligence" requires some comment upon the vexed question 
of the relation between intelligence and creativity. Frank Barron, in his book CrcafitJc 
Persoll alld Creatit1e Pmcess, summarises the findings of current research by stating: 
"For certain intrinsically creative activities a specifiable minimum IQ is probably 
necessary to eng,lge in the activity at all, but beyond that minimum, which is often 
surprisingly low, creativity has little correlation with scores on IQ tests." So long as 
that dubious abstraction "intelligence" is defined in terms of scores on IQ tests, this 
lack of correlation will continue: but psychologists are increasingly coming to realise 
------------------------------------~.-.-.. --- ........ -
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that such a definition of intelligence is too limited. It is not possible to perform well 
in an intelligence test without being intelligent; but it is possible to perform badly 
and yet to display considerable intelligence in appraising and adapting to new real-
life situations. In recent years it has been fashionable to dissociate intelligence and 
creativity to the point where one might suppose that the possession of a high IQ 
was a bar to originality. 
Also, in section 34 - "The Biological Approach to Human Knowledge and Intelligence" - of 
The S e!f afld Its Brain (1983), Karl Popper writes: 
It seems likely that there are innate differences of intelligence. But it seems almost 
impossible that a matter so many-sided and complex as human inborn Knowledge 
and Intelligence (quickness to grasp, depth of understanding, creativity, clarity of 
exposition, etc.) can be measured by a one-dimensional function like the 
"Intelligence Quotient (IQ)" .... Moreover, it is quite possible that, among most 
normal people, inborn differences in talent are comparatively negligible; compared, 
that is, with the tremendous intellectual achievement of almost all children in being 
able, by their active efforts, to acquire a human dialect with all its intricacies at an 
early age. 
See my chapter six - Spititllali(y atld the Creatit'C Self 
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Notes on Chapter Five 
1. See Wittgenstein's The BIlle and Brolllfl Books (The Brolll1l Book, section 1, para.66-68, 
pp.117-122) where hardwired reading machines, such as the pianola in which hammers 
respond to the guiding signs in the pianola roll, are compared with the versatile and 
adaptable human brain. 
2. The whole question of "not seeing ourselves as others see us" is grossly illustrated 
where someone has cerebral palsy. Another such case is that of Alan Counsell who, in 
his book, So Clear ill My Mind-C1982) asks throughout his autobiography (pp 18, 25, 28, 
39, 53, 62) II}I!} other people have such difficulty understanding what he says when "its so 
clear in Q1is own) mind"? On becoming aware, as a young man wishing to appear normal 
on his brother's wedding photographs, of his awkward posture, he writes (p77), "1 have 
always thought that my speech was the only outward sign of my handicap and 1 have not 
been aware of my posture defect. 1 feel so self-conscious as 1 walk about, thinking that 1 
look handicapped". Again, when employed to help supervise in the dormitories and 
assist cerebral palsied youngsters, who are to be assessed for their employment potential, 
in their washing and dressing Counsell writes (P114), " .. .1 am horrified when 1 realize 
that 1 am, for most social intents and purposes, classed in the same categories as they 
are. 1 cannot identify with them; they seem much more handicapped than 1". Later, 
Counsell writes (pp 178-9), " ... when 1 was filmed on video, 1 was shocked to see myself 
on the screen. I had no idea that my handicap was still so noticeable. Each movement 1 
make betrays my state. 1 had thought 1 could almost pass as normal if 1 were merely 
walking. But now, as 1 look at myself, each time 1 move my hands 1 am amazed at my 
posture and appearance. It is absolutely no use becoming depressed about this: I am the 
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same now as I was before I saw myself on film and I am never going to be able to hide 
what I am". 
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Notes on Chapter Six 
1. This, following his reading of Porphyry (c.232-30SAD), who taught that the soul's 
fulfilment is "the enjoyment of God" which was to be achieved by ascetic restraint and 
contemplation, the soul occupying a median position between material things and the 
higher realms of intelligible reality. Towards the end of his life Porphyry, who believed 
that God contains all things but is contained by nothing and who is reported by some 
Christian writers to have been a Christian in his youth but then to have apostatized, 
composed a lengthy and bitter attack on Christian beliefs and on the historical 
trustworthiness of biblical books. Chadwick (1986:22) tells us that Augustine was 
unaware of Porphyry's book against Christians. He goes on to point out, however, that 
Porphyry's works may fairly be described as offering an alternative religious philosophy, 
designed, whether consciously or unconsciously, to provide a rival and antidote to 
Christianity. 
2. Augustine used hean to refer to those things we now think of as pertaining to the miNd. 
Both terms seem to embrace what we feel as well as what we think, their incIusivity being 
allowed when we accept the metaphysical meaning of heart beside the physical one. 
\Vhile the intellect, in terms of thoughts, memories and attitudes, are now considered to 
have more to do with the brain, we still commonly refer to the heart when it is a matter 
of human feelings in terms of desires, motivations and objectives that are being 
questioned. Scientifically, all these things require mental events and rely upon the 
nervous system but equally, this system works inter-connectedly with the cardiovascular 
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system, whose main organ is the heart, to gives us increased heart rate etc. of which we 
then become consciously aware. 
In a similar way, the medieval idea that characteristics are inherited through the blood is 
modernised by reflecting scientitic thought in substituting the word ''geNe'' for "blood'. 
3. Our ontological viewpoint is likely to be the "ground" against which we form our values 
just as the "context" of an event give it its "meaning". To illustrate, an old Chinese 
Taoist story tells of a farmer in a poor country village who was considered very well-to-
do because he owned a horse which he used for ploughing and transportation. One day 
the horse ran away and all his neighbours exclaimed how terrible this was but the farmer 
simply said, "Maybe". A few days later the horse returned and brought two wild horses 
with it and the neighbours all rejoiced at the farmer's good fortune but he simply said, 
"Maybe". The next day the t;lrmer's son tried to ride one of the wild horses but it threw 
him and he broke his leg. The neighbours all offered their sympathy for his misfortune 
but, again, the farmer said, "Maybe". The next week conscription officers came to the 
village to take young men for the army. They rejected the farmer's son because of his 
broken leg. When the neighbours told him how lucky he was, the farmer replied, 
"Maybe". 
The meaning of any event depends upon the "frame" in which we perceive it. \Vhen 
we change the frame we change the meaning. For example, in the above illustration, 
having two wild horses is a good thing until it is seen in the context of the son's broken 
leg. The broken leg seems to be bad in the context of peaceful village life but, in the 
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context of conscription and war, it suddenly becomes good. Similarly, when we adopt a 
transcendental ontological viewpoint our values are likely to change. 
4. Recent research using P.E.T scans of people's brains show that the same part of the 
cerebral cortex that is stimulated by perception is also stimulated in imagination 
(Robertson, 1996). 
5. The prophetic Utopian VISion, in which judgement is followed by deliverance of a 
righteous remnant who will enjoy a new life of blessing, goes back to the story of the 
Flood itself. Zephaniah, who lived during the second half of the seventh century B.c., 
prophesied that (3:9 RSV): ... at that time I [God] will change the speech of the peoples 
to a pure speech ... [my italics]. 
The hope of some believers is that language will then give a true understanding of 
thought. 
6. \Vhether or not we agree with I3ertrand Russell's stand on nuclear disarmament, we 
cannot but admire him for his courage of his own convictions and the stand he took in 
pressing the discussion. 
7. Humphrey (1995:13) reminds us that Carl Jung wrote: "Among my patients in the 
second half of life _ that is to say over thirty-five - there has not been one whose 
problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life" and 
continues to tell us that equally, an ex-nun, Karen Armstrong, speaking for those in the 
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first half, said: "At adolescence, when you are so bogged down in 'misery about your 
own confusions, the idea of losing yourself in God and finding an enhanced self seems 
enormously attractive". 
8. Robert Dilts, an author, developer and consultant in the field of Neuro-Linguistic 
Programming, writes (1990:16): 
Beliefs are not necessarily based upon a logical framework of ideas. They are, 
instead, notoriously unresponsive to logic. They are not intended to coincide with 
reality. Since you do not really know what is real, you have to form a belief - a 
matter of faith ... 111ere is an old story described by Abraham Maslow that illustrates 
this. A psychiatrist was treating a man who believed he was a corpse. Despite all the 
psychiatrist's arguments, the man persisted in his belief. In a flash of inspiration, the 
psychiatrist asked the man, "Do corpses bleed?" the patient replied, "That's 
ridiculousl Of course corpses don't bleed." After first asking for permission, the 
psychiatrist pricked the man's finger and produced a drop of bright red blood. The 
patient looked at his bleeding finger with abject astonishment and exclaimed: "I'll be 
damned, corpses do bleed!". 
9. We can see another example of the power of the mind over the body in Dilts' (above, 
p75) observation: 
People who have multiple personalities often have different immune reactions in 
each personality. For instance, they may have an allergy in one personality and not 
in the other. One woman I read about even had diabetes in one personality and not 
in the other. One type of diabetes is related to a malfunction where the immune 
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system attacks the cells in your pancreas that produce insulin. 'By changing your 
identity you frequently change a whole bunch of other things (such as the immune 
system), all the way down. 
10. Another little understood affect of tisllalisation is mentioned by the much respected 
psychologist, Robert E. Ornstein, who asks his readers to consider an example from the 
Japanese discipline of aikido(1975:169): 
Ask a friend to lift you three times. Without saying anything to him, do not do 
anything out of the ordinary the first time. On the second, think "up." Imagine your 
"energy" focused just above your head. Actively imagine it flowing upward through 
your head. On the third lift, think "down." Visualize your legs as part of the earth, 
and imagine your "energy" as flowing downward through the soles of your feet. Do 
!Iot tense your muscles, or make any other attempt to help or hinder the lift. Then 
reverse the roles. Lift your friend, but ask him to mix up the order of the three 
procedures (and not to inform you, of course). You will easily be able to feel the 
result of his "convenient visualization," and he of yours. 
11. Again, ancient wisdom tells us that 'a cheerful heart is a good medicine, but a downcast 
spirit dries up the bones' (proverbs, 17:22,RSV). 
12. There is, of course, the possibility that simply visllalisillg and expecting a positive 
outcome lowers the level of anxiety which itself has a beneficial or placebo affect. 
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13. Thomas Schelling makes an interesting comment on the affect of observation when he 
illustrates what "'igbt be going on when we make choices, as for example, from a 
restaurant's menu: 
It sometimes seems to me .... that I choose dinners from menus rather like the way I 
used to choose movies from <coming attractions': I mentally consume a morsel of 
broiled salmon, register the quality of the taste but erase the taste itself, do the same 
for the roast duck and let the two sensations feed into an analogue computer that 
signals my choice. But I can't be sure; if I watch myself and find that that is what 
seems to happen, it may be the result of the watching. (Elster,1986:191-2). 
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Notes on Concluding Chapter 
1. Goleman speaks (p.61) of "emotional highjacking" to refer again to the situation where, 
because of a surge of catecholamines (that is, types of hormonal neurotransmitters 
including dopamine, epinephrine/adrenalin, and norepinephrine/noradrenalin) caused 
by the amygdala being stimulated prior to the neocortex, action precedes the thought 
process. "These neurochemicals [adrenalin and noradrenalin]," says Goleman (p.20S), 
"mobilize the body for an emergency; the same catecholamine surge stamps memories 
with special strength." 
2. Those of the Christian persuasion might reflect that Jesus taught his followers that, 
rather than give a party for relatives, friends and rich neighbours, they should give one 
to which the less fortunate were invited (Luke 14:12-14). 
3. Interestingly, Dr Norman Vincent Peale in his autobiography, The Jqy 0/ PosilitJe Utillg 
(1984:199-201), tells that for three years they had "a lovely, sensitive, and intelligent 
Swiss girl named Ursula von Aesch Qater Stingclin)" living with them whilst learning 
English and carrying out domestic tasks. As minister of New York's Marble Collegiate 
Church and well-known author, he and his wife Ruth received many gifts at Christmas. 
These, generally, were "not expensive presents, just loving thoughts, many handmade", 
for which the Peale's were very grateful. They gave Ursula responsibility for opening 
these Christmas presents and making a list of what they were and who had sent them. 
The flood of presents overawed her and on Christmas Eve she went to a store and 
bought a beautiful little baby dress which she had present-wrapped in colourful paper. 
1', 
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With the help of a Salvation Army man she saw on leaving the store she located a poor 
family and gave the gift to a grateful mother who, in tears, asked why she had done it. 
Ursula replied, "It's a gift not only to you, but it's also a gift to a family in Manhattan 
with whom I live." 
On Christmas morning she told the story to the appreciative Peale family saying, "This 
is my Christmas present to you." 
4. To those who might wish to say that Dr J.M. Smith, B.A., Ph.D., A.B.Ps.S., F.B.I.M., 
who analysed these test results (November 1989), must have caught me on a good day I 
offer no countervailing argument. 
5. Anyone who thinks that no one would interfere in such a restrictive way should 
consider the following incident which happened to me only a short while ago. I had 
fallen down in the street and someone kindly helped me to my feet but then, seeing me 
in a nearby car park getting into my car, he stood behind my vehicle to prevent me 
reversing out while he used his mobile 'phone to call the police. Fortunately, the two 
policemen were very understanding when they arrived in a panda car and quickly put the 
man straight, letting me drive away (probably to the man's absolute amazement!) 
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